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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
VOTING AS A (MANDATORY) DUTY: CITIZEN ATTITUDES, POLITICAL 
ENGAGEMENT, AND PARTY OUTREACH UNDER COMPULSORY VOTING 
 
Political participation is paramount to the well being of a democracy. Concerns 
over low turnout rates across the world have prompted a growing body of research on the 
potential for political institutions to foster electoral participation. Amongst those 
institutions, compulsory voting is found to have the largest and most robust impact on 
maximizing participation rates. Under this system, eligible citizens are required by law to 
go to the polls on election day, and are subject to penalties if they fail to do so. Beyond 
its positive impact on turnout, we know far less about what other aspects of the 
democratic process are influenced by compulsory voting. The main goal of this 
dissertation is to inform the debate on how and when the effects of compulsory voting 
extend beyond voter turnout. Specifically, I draw on numerous sources of survey data 
across the world to investigate the impact of compulsory voting (herein CV) on three 
distinct political aspects: citizen attitudes towards voting, political engagement, and elite 
campaigning.  
 
The first step in understanding the broader effects of CV is to examine whether it 
influences citizens’ perceptions of the democratic act of voting. In chapter two, I develop 
a detailed theoretical framework that highlights whether compulsory voting increases 
citizens’ feelings of civic duty, or generates resentment amongst eligible voters. I also 
argue that the impact of CV on attitudes could be neutral—by devaluing the act of voting 
and making individuals indifferent towards the democratic process. Using a hierarchical 
modeling technique and survey data from Latin America, I show that voters living under 
CV are no more likely to report either increased feelings of civic duty or higher rates of 
resentment, compared to their counterparts under voluntary voting. Instead, individuals 
who are required to turn out by law are slightly more likely to feel indifferent towards 
electoral participation. Then, chapter three takes advantage of the recent abolition of 
compulsory voting in Chile to evaluate whether CV laws promote political engagement 
beyond election day. An empirical analysis of public opinion surveys over a 10-year 
period pre and post reform shows that rates of political engagement—specifically, 
watching and reading political news and discussing politics with family—are 
 significantly higher under compulsory than under voluntary voting, and this is especially 
the case for those with lower levels of education. These findings suggest that when 
presented with the task of turning out at the polls, citizens seem to incur the extra costs 
necessary to make an informed decision.   
 
Finally, in chapter four I investigate whether mandatory voting laws alter the way 
political parties decide to engage in outreach during political campaigns. Using a 
comprehensive dataset of post-election surveys of over 40,000 individuals in 27 different 
countries, I find that political elites do adjust to their institutional context—when voting 
is mandatory, parties invest in campaign outreach at similar levels (not less) than when 
voting is voluntary, and that this outreach is much less skewed towards individuals of 
higher socioeconomic status compared to when voting is voluntary. I also show evidence 
that parties under CV are more likely to engage in persuasion rather than mobilization via 
party outreach. Taken together, this dissertation provides a comprehensive analysis of 
how maximizing electoral participation through a legal requirement to vote shapes 
individual and elite behavior, contributing to our understanding of the implications of 
political institutions for the quality of representative democracy worldwide. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The 2016 Presidential Election in the United States was a contentious one. Apart 
from lively debates on health care, immigration, and national security, candidate Bernie 
Sanders addressed an issue that has failed to garner much public attention—voter turnout. 
A quote posted on his twitter page touted that “if we truly believe in a vibrant democracy, 
then we [the U.S.] must have the highest voter turnout in the world.”1 Indeed, electoral 
participation is often considered an integral feature of a healthy democratic system (Dahl 
1971; Franklin 2004; Norris 2002). A large body of research has examined factors that 
can influence participation rates. One of the most robust and consistent findings in this 
literature is that one political institution in particular has the potential to significantly 
increase participation—Compulsory Voting (CV hereafter) (Geys 2006). While 
maximizing voter turnout by mandating that all eligible voters turn out at the polls might 
seem like an attractive option for countries where participation rates are waning, this 
institution remains a controversial one. In particular, critics and proponents of 
compulsory voting point to many potential desirable and undesirable second-order effects 
that extend beyond high voter turnout. The main goal of this dissertation is to inform the 
debate on how and when the effects of compulsory voting extend beyond participation at 
the polls. In particular, I assess the impact of CV on three main aspects of the democratic 
process: citizen attitudes towards voting, political engagement beyond turnout, and elite 
campaigning via party outreach.  
                                                 
1 Bernie Sanders, Twitter post, August 15, 2015, 7:58 p.m., 
https://twitter.com/berniesanders/status/632702839534391296 
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 A total of 26 countries in the world employ some form of compulsory turnout law 
today. The adoption (or abolishment) of this institution has been debated for decades. In 
the U.S., for instance, the possibility of instituting a compulsory law for elections was 
presented as early as 1770 in the state of Georgia and later in 1910 in the state legislature 
of Oregon. In 1997, the issue was revived as Arend Lijphart (1997) proposed compulsory 
voting as the solution to the country’s low and unequal turnout. Even more recently, 
President Barack Obama has been quoted saying that “it would be transformative if 
everybody voted” when asked about the fact that other countries have mandatory voting 
laws (Sonin 2015).  
In a comparative perspective, other countries have actively engaged in the CV 
debate. Australia’s mandatory voting laws are often met with opposition and criticism 
(Hill 2010), and Chile recently abolished their compulsory voting law after extensive 
political debate (Barnes and Rangel 2014). Both Britain and Colombia have introduced 
legislation to adopt compulsory voting in the past two years (Marty 2014; Padmanabhan 
2015).2 The institution has drawn even more attention as average rates of voter turnout 
continue to steadily decline across the world (Blais and Rubenson 2013). Although the 
assertion that CV produces higher turnout rates has been well investigated and 
empirically supported, we still know little about the effects CV has on a number of 
additional political factors. As Birch (2009, iv-x) summarizes: 
Approximately one-sixth of all the states in the modern world that hold elections 
hold them under a compulsory voting regime. This is a substantial number, in 
comparison to the number that employ certain other political institutions—such as 
                                                 
2 In Colombia, the legislation was introduced in 2014, and is still being debated today. 
The bill introduced in the UK parliament in 2015 is no longer under consideration. 
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the single-transferable vote or the double ballot—which have received 
considerably more treatment in the academic literature. 
 This is not to say that scholars have largely ignored this institutional design. 
Earlier work on the topic focused largely on voter turnout as an outcome. More recently, 
the literature has shifted towards examining other substantive outcomes. These include, 
for instance, a focus on political engagement, gendered and socioeconomic patterns of 
participation, partisan electoral gains, economic voting, and political sophistication. A 
variety of quantitative techniques have been applied. Methods used to study the 
byproducts of CV include the use of survey data and cross-national analyses (e.g., Birch 
2009; Córdova and Rangel 2017; Singh and Thorton 2013), single country studies (e.g., 
Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2016; Fowler 2013, Irwin 1974), and experiments 
(Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2007, Shineman, forthcoming).  
 Despite the increase in research on this topic, much of the empirical evidence 
provided thus far has offered mixed results. For instance, in a comprehensive study of the 
impact of CV on several political outcomes, Birch (2009) finds that CV matters little 
beyond promoting electoral participation. A lack of consensus still exists about how CV 
influences political engagement (Carreras 2016). Evidence that CV benefits left-leaning 
parties, as typically argued, is mixed (Miller and Dassonneville 2016). This lack of 
consistent evidence highlights the need for a sustained effort to provide policymakers 
with valuable information when considering CV as a political institution. My dissertation 
addresses a number of shortcomings in the existing literature that will allow for a better 
understanding of the exact mechanisms that may (or may not) lead CV to have an 
influence on democratic politics, in addition to its impact on voter turnout. 
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 The first step in understanding the broader effects of compulsory voting is to 
examine whether it influences citizens’ perceptions of the democratic act of voting. The 
first empirical component in this dissertation, then, examines whether compulsory voting 
promotes feelings of civic duty or resentment amongst the population, while also 
considering a potential for CV to increase feelings of indifference towards voting. The 
second empirical element asks how and when compulsory voting laws influence political 
engagement beyond voting. The final research question asks how campaigns are shaped 
by institutional context, by analyzing patterns of party outreach in the presence and 
absence of compulsory voting. In the remainder of this chapter, I first provide a general 
discussion of compulsory voting laws across the world, followed by a short review of 
what we currently know about the effects of this institutional design. Then, I elaborate on 
the shortcomings of the existing literature and how the research presented in this 
dissertation helps fill those gaps. The final part provides an outline of the dissertation, 
which highlights some of the theoretical expectations and previews some of the main 
findings.  
Compulsory Voting Around the World 
 The UK Electoral Commission defines compulsory voting as “a system of laws 
mandating that enfranchised citizens turn out to vote, which is usually, though not 
always, accompanied by a system of compulsory voter registration” (Electoral 
Commision 2006, 3). Similarly, Birch (2009, 2) describes the institution of compulsory 
voting as “the legal obligation to attend the polls at election time and perform whatever 
duties are required there of electors.” It is common for compulsory voting to be 
misunderstood as a compulsion to vote for a given candidate (Keaney and Rogers 2006). 
However, countries with CV simply require citizens to turn out to cast a ballot, regardless 
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of whether it is valid or not. Individuals have the option to vote blank or spoil the ballot. 
Due to this misconception, compulsory voting is sometimes referred as “compulsory 
turnout,” highlighting that it merely represents the legal obligation to cast a ballot and not 
the obligation to select a candidate against a citizens’ will (Keaney and Rogers 2006). 
Compulsory voting laws are not consistent across all countries. First, there is 
variation in how these laws are codified. Some countries explicitly state in their 
constitution that voting is compulsory. For instance, Article 37 of Argentina’s 
Constitution states that “suffrage is universal, equal, secret, and mandatory” (Arg Const. 
art. 37). Compulsory laws in Australia, by contrast, are not formally written in the 
constitution, but are rather enforced via federal law (Birch 2009). Another variation is in 
terms of who is required to turn out. In some countries, like Ecuador, voting is 
compulsory only for those who are literate. In others, voters who reach a certain age (70 
years old in Luxemburg, 75 years old in Peru) are no longer required to vote. In 
Argentina and Brazil, voting is compulsory once an individual turns 18, but voluntary for 
those between 16 and 18 years of age (IDEA 2017).  
Most importantly, the extent to which CV laws are enforced and the penalties for 
not complying vary significantly by country. Failure to vote in Brazil can result in the 
inability to obtain a passport, and monetary fines (IDEA 2017). In Singapore, those who 
abstain are automatically removed from the registry and required to reapply with an 
explanation. Conversely, while voting is a legal obligation in Mexico, non-voters are not 
necessarily subject to any sanctions. The same is the case in Greece, which lifted once-
strong sanctions in 2000 (IDEA 2017).   
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The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) is an 
intergovernmental organization that publishes research on democratic participation 
worldwide, and maintains a record of CV implementation and abolishment in different 
countries. Currently, it identifies 26 countries where voting is compulsory. Table 1.1 
highlights the presence of CV laws, sanctions, and enforcement in each country. Figure 
1.1 presents a visual representation of the spatial presence of compulsory voting across 
the world, according to IDEA (2017). 
Compulsory voting was primarily introduced in the twentieth century around the 
world, as countries began to democratize or expand the franchise (Birch 2009).3 Several 
explanations exist for its adoption, although reasons vary by country and context. Some 
countries adopted CV in order to strengthen democratic legitimacy and further engage the 
public (Birch 2009). Others hoped that it would reduce corruption and electoral abuse 
once electorates started to grow and more individuals got the right to vote (Murray 1998). 
Another widespread and perhaps counterintuitive explanation for implementation, 
especially in Europe and Latin America, was that conservative parties in the 20th century 
feared that mass enfranchisement of the working class would promote participation of 
left-leaning indiviuals. Therefore, conservative parties chose to adopt CV in order to 
ensure their survival by forcing citizens who would otherwise not be mobilized by the left 
to turn out to vote (Birch 2009; Boveda 2013; Maldonado 2015). Finally, compulsory 
voting is also thought to be simply a product of diffusion effects or colonial history 
(Massicotte, Blais, and Yoshinaka 2004). While many explanations exist, the adoption of 
                                                 
3 See Birch (2009), page 36 for a detailed account of dates in which compulsory voting 
were adopted. 
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compulsory voting primarily took place very early on most countries’ development into 
nation-states or democratization (Birch 2009).  
Table 1.1. Countries with Compulsory Voting in 2017 
Country with 
Compulsory 
Voting 
Generally 
Enforced? 
Sanctions 
Explanation Fine 
Civil Rights 
Infringements/ 
Disenfranchisement 
Other 
Argentina Yes x x x  
Australia Yes x x   
Belgium Yes x x x x 
Bolivia No   x  
Brazil Yes  x   
Costa Rica No     
Cyprus Yes x x   
D.R. Congo n/a     
Dominican Republic No     
Ecuador Yes  x   
Egypt No x x   
Gabon n/a     
Greece No     
Honduras No     
Lebanon n/a     
Liechtenstein Yes x x   
Luxembourg Yes x x   
Mexico No    x 
Nauru Yes x x   
Panama n/a     
Paraguay No  x   
Peru Yes x x x  
Singapore Yes   x  
Switzerland* Yes  x   
Thailand No     
Turkey Yes x x   
Uruguay Yes  x x  
Notes: In Switzerland, CV is only practiced in one Canton (Schaffhausen). No sanction 
and enforcement information available for the D.R. Congo, Gabon, and Lebanon. 
Explanation requires non-voters to provide legitimate reason for abstaining. Fines vary 
by country. Civil rights infringements include inability to access certain public services if 
no proof of voting is provided. Disenfranchisement can happen in certain cases if an 
individual fails to vote for a number of consecutive elections within a given timeframe 
(varies by country). “Other” sanctions could include difficulty getting a job within the 
public sector, or social sanctions that are less formalized. Source: IDEA (2017). 
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Figure 1.1. Compulsory Voting Across the World 
Notes: Figure 1.1 shows a spatial representation of countries that have compulsory voting 
laws across the world in 2017. Source: IDEA (2017) 
 
Questions Surrounding Compulsory Voting  
The benefits and consequences of compulsory voting have been debated for 
decades. The 1970s abolition of compulsory voting in the Netherlands, however, 
prompted a more scholarly discussion on the effects of the institution, and by 1996, 
Arend Lijphart’s famous Presidential Address to the American Political Science 
Association advocating for the adoption of compulsory voting in the United States 
stimulated a new wave of discussion on mandatory voting laws (Lijphart 1997). 
Countries that currently have CV laws, such as Australia, have had their fair share of 
debates regarding its abolition (Hill 2010; Lever 2010b). Other countries with voluntary 
voting laws, such as Britain, Canada, Colombia, and India, have considered its 
introduction. Most recently in 2011, election law reform in Chile generated several rich 
discussions on the advantages of maintaining or abolishing CV in the country (Barnes 
and Rangel 2014).  
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The questions surrounding compulsory laws tap into several political dimensions. 
One aspect is normative—whether mandating that voters go to the polls is democratic or 
not. Here, the tension is between those who believe that voting is a civic duty and 
therefore should be mandated, and those who value the freedom to choose not to 
participate. Another leading question seeks empirical evidence of the institution’s ability 
to promote higher turnout rates. Relatedly, scholars also contemplate whether mandatory 
turnout for all eligible citizens has the potential to erase inequalities in the electorate. A 
growing body of research has also begun to investigate whether the effects of CV extend 
beyond voter turnout. Scholars often deliberate on whether CV increases or decreases 
political engagement beyond the ballot box, and the institution’s influence on levels of 
political knowledge. Finally, recent studies of CV focus on how it may be influential in 
determining electoral outcomes. I summarize the current debates surrounding compulsory 
voting laws in Table 1.2. 4 
 Within these dimensions—particularly the ones that contemplate the effect of CV 
beyond voter turnout—CV is often theorized to produce opposing outcomes. For 
instance, while some argue that CV leads to more political education, others highlight 
potential explanations as to how CV could actually reduce political education. Given the 
rich variation in theoretical expectations, scholars have made efforts to empirically test 
many propositions in order to settle any existing debates or to provide policymakers with 
more guidance. In what follows, I discuss the theoretical arguments for each of the 
dimensions from Table 1.2, and provide a summary of the empirical evidence that has 
evaluated existing claims.  
                                                 
4 Briggs and Chelis (2010) provide a similar classification of the literature on compulsory 
voting.  
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Table 1.2. Questions Surrounding Compulsory Voting Laws 
 Positive Expectations Negative/Null Expectations 
The Normative 
Question 
CV enhances democracy, 
legitimacy, voting as a 
civic duty 
CV undermines democratic 
freedom, promotes 
resentment 
The Turnout 
Question CV increases voter turnout 
CV has no effect on voter 
turnout 
The Unequal 
Electorate Question CV promotes equal turnout 
CV does not promote a 
balanced electorate 
The Political 
Engagement 
Question 
CV increases political 
engagement beyond voting 
CV decreases/does not affect 
political engagement beyond 
voting 
The Electoral 
Outcomes Question 
CV benefits left-leaning 
parties 
CV has no effect on electoral 
outcomes 
 
The Normative Question 
Scholars and politicians have long debated whether compulsory voting is a moral 
institution. Those who defend CV highlight that high voter turnout is paramount for the 
promotion of democracy (Brennan and Hill 2014). High levels of turnout indicate 
stronger legitimacy as the elected government is more representative of the majority of 
the citizenry (Franklin 2004; Dahl 2006). Citizens who want to demand accountability 
from their governments should exercise their duty to vote, and this requirement 
essentially creates a binding contract between individuals and representatives (Jackman 
1999). Back in the 1920’s, a legislator in Oregon stated that “it is not just the vicious who 
refuse to vote, but those who do not take their franchise rights seriously, those who 
permit others to run the government, and then spend their spare moments protesting 
because it is not run to suit them… the votes of many of these people are worth getting" 
(Barnett 1921, 266). In other words, it is important that all citizens express their 
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preferences, and that government is not a mere reflection the wishes of a small section of 
the population. 
In this normative debate, those against compulsory voting emphasize that forcing 
people to vote is undemocratic and might instead generate resentment among citizens 
(Henn and Odfield 2016; Lever 2010a; Senado 2012). It is argued that mandatory voting 
is a violation of the democratic freedom to choose, which is “the cornerstone of liberal 
democratic practices” (Briggs and Chelis 2010, 5). Just as democracy grants citizens the 
right to vote, it also grants citizens the right not to vote.  Forcing people to vote can 
provoke resentment and lead citizens to question their ability to choose against 
participating without being subject to punishment by the state. Brennan (2014, 82) also 
argues that citizens can contribute to a democratic society in a number of ways, and not 
voting is simply a poor reason to regard those individuals as “free riders” or to claim they 
are not doing their civic part. 
Overall, the normative question surrounding compulsory voting is a complicated 
one. While some of these arguments are difficult to test empirically, a couple of studies 
have tried to provide some evidence on whether individuals who are subject to CV laws 
report certain feelings that can speak to the morality or democratic value of the 
institution. Singh (2016) shows that compulsory voting is associated with decreased 
satisfaction with democracy, especially for those who view democracy negatively to 
begin with. He argues this is because external coercion by the state can be associated with 
decreased interest in its democratic status, and lower belief in the legitimacy of the 
system. Using the World Values survey, Lundell (2012) finds that compulsory voting has 
a small but positive impact on trust in political institutions, suggesting CV can actually 
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enhance institutional legitimacy. These findings, however, promote conflicting answers 
as to whether CV strengthens or harms democracy, as both sides of the normative debate 
claim.  
The Turnout Question 
Compulsory voting is most often referenced when issues of low participation are 
emphasized. This is because, in theory, it is difficult to argue against the contention that 
CV increases voter When all eligible voters are mandated by law to turn out, it is 
reasonable to expect that a higher number of voters will show up at the polls. Compulsory 
voting increases the costs of abstaining by imposing penalties on those who don’t show 
up at the polls (Panagopoulos 2008). This expectation assumes that individuals living in 
countries where voting is compulsory are both aware and willing to abide by the law. 
Indeed, a large number of studies confirm that CV does in fact significantly increase 
voter turnout rates anywhere from 10 to 18 percentage points (Baek 2009; Bechtel, 
Hangartner, and Schmid 2015; Franklin 1999, 2004; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; 
Hirczy 1994; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi 2017; Jaitman 2013; Norris 2004; 
Quintelier, Hoodhe, and Marien 2011; Singh 2011).  
Because in order to actually spur turnout, individuals should be both aware and 
compliant with the law, research also shows that the effect of CV on turnout is stronger 
when penalties for abstaining are strong and strictly enforced (Blais, Massicotte, and 
Dobrzynska 2003; León 2017; Panagopoulos 2008; Singh 2011). When stronger penalties 
are enforced, the cost of abstaining is higher, thus motivating compliance with the law. It 
is also more likely that when penalties are strongly enforced—the need to pay a fine or 
the inability to apply for a federal loan—individuals will be more aware of the existence 
of the law and the costs that non-compliance produces. Overall, the turnout question has 
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received the most attention in the CV literature, and there is overwhelming evidence to 
support the idea that CV works to increase voter turnout. The institution promotes high 
turnout rates even in institutional contexts where participation is expected to be low, such 
as when elections are non-competitive or district sizes are high (Barnes and Rangel 
2017). In a review of aggregate-level studies of turnout, Geys (2006, 652) confirms that 
“the effect of compulsory voting on turnout is one of the robust findings in studies that 
analyze cross-national variation in voter turnout.”  
The Unequal Electorate Question 
Another dimension of CV as an institution is its potential to promote equality in 
the electorate. Compulsory voting is argued to erase electoral biases, since certain groups 
of citizens are systematically less likely to turn out when voting is voluntary (Carreras 
and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Smets and van Ham 2013; Verba et al. 1993). When 
voting is mandatory, however, those who are least likely to turn out under voluntary 
systems (marginalized citizens) are more likely to participate, because participation is 
now required (Gallego 2015). This was Lijphart’s (1997, 2) focus when advocating for 
the institution—stating that “the most obvious way to make voting more equal is to 
maximize voter turnout.” When all enfranchised citizens regardless of age, income, 
education, or gender are subject to non-voting penalties, the likelihood that the post-
election electorate reflects a closer make up of the true citizen population is much higher 
than when citizens are not required to turn out. 
Empirical research does find some support for this hypothesis (Carey and 
Horiuchi, forthcoming). Compulsory voting is found to decrease the voting gap between 
low and high-income voters (Fowler 2013), and it narrows the gap between highly 
educated and less educated individuals (Gallego 2015; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). CV 
  14 
also mobilizes a higher number of young voters to turn out, erasing generational 
differences in voting (Irwin 1974; Singh 2011). Recent work also finds a positive effect 
of CV in decreasing the gender gap in electoral engagement beyond voting (Córdova and 
Rangel 2017), and an improvement on rates of income inequality (Chong and Olivera 
2008). Still, compulsory voting might not necessarily eliminate any inequalities in the 
electorate. In many cases, gaps in participation among disadvantaged groups still persist 
even when turnout is mandatory (Cepaluni and Hidalgo 2016; Power 2009). While 
making voting mandatory might not necessarily promote one hundred percent equal 
participation, it is unlikely that it would harm advances in political equality.  
The Political Engagement Question 
The previous debates have focused on issues of electoral participation at the ballot 
box under compulsory voting. More recently, scholars have considered the effects of CV 
beyond turnout. Although we know that CV increases voter turnout, it is unclear whether 
it also increases participation in other aspects of democratic politics. An important line of 
research examines the impact of CV on political engagement. Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady (1995, 38) define political engagement as “activity that has the intent or effect of 
influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or 
implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who 
make those policies.” As this is a broad definition, there are many indicators of political 
engagement. These could be political (such as persuading others, making campaign 
contributions), acts of public voice (signing petitions or protesting), or cognitive (paying 
attention to the news, or levels of political knowledge) (Zukin et al. 2006). Accordingly, 
research investigating the effect of compulsory voting on political engagement has 
examined a multitude of engagement outcomes. 
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Theoretically, CV could influence engagement in positive, negative, or neutral 
ways. On the one hand, compulsory voting could motivate individuals to engage further 
with the polity once they turn out to vote. Compelling citizens to vote might increase 
citizens’ interest in the political process, generate higher levels of political information 
and support a more engaged citizenry (Jakee and Sun 2006; Lijphart 1997; Shineman 
2009). There is some cross-national evidence to support these contentions, especially 
when it comes to cognitive engagement. Studies show that countries with CV report 
slightly higher levels of political knowledge (Berggren 2001; Gordon and Segura 1997), 
and that this effect is stronger among low educated voters (Sheppard 2015). Experimental 
work also shows that incentivizing participation through penalties can motivate citizens 
to seek out more political information (Shineman, forthcoming). Individuals living under 
compulsory voting rules are also more likely to report higher rates of party attachment 
(Singh and Thorton 2013).   
On the other hand, compulsory voting could decrease individuals’ rate of political 
engagement because it makes citizens resent participating in politics after being coerced 
to vote. Given that non-voters are found to be less politically knowledgeable and 
informed than voters (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Converse 1964), others argue 
that the inclusion of uninformed voters into the voting electorate might add noise or bias 
in electoral patterns (Saunders 2010). Having more uninformed voters turning out could 
in turn affect overall levels of political knowledge in the electorate, ultimately producing 
sub-optimal electoral outcomes (Ballinger 2006).  
Some studies show that CV systems do indeed produce a higher number of 
invalid and random votes (Power and Garand 2007), especially among those who lack 
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literacy or language skills (McAllister and Makkai 1993; Power and Roberts 1995). No 
empirical evidence, however, indicates an explicit negative effect on political 
engagement. A number of studies find a null relationship between CV and levels of 
political information (Birch 2009; de Leon and Rizzi 2016; Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 
2007), and other general measures of political engagement, such as attending party 
meetings (Carreras 2016), and contacting political leaders (Birch 2009). Answers 
regarding this specific question, therefore, remain unclear. 
The Electoral Outcomes Question 
Finally, compulsory voting can have implications for electoral outcomes. Many 
scholars have argued that near-universal voter turnout produced by CV laws would 
disproportionally benefit one type of party over the other. More liberal, left-leaning 
parties are among those who benefit from CV laws, since voters who are encouraged to 
turn out under CV are more likely to be of low income and education and thus more 
inclined to support liberal policies (Green and Schwam-Baird 2016; Tucker, Vedlitz, and 
DenNardo 1986). Empirical studies focused on how CV impacts electoral outcomes, 
however, have found mixed support for the proposition that higher and more equal voter 
turnout would benefit leftist parties, with some studies finding no effect (Ferwerda 2014; 
Hoffman, León, and Lombardi 2017; Jackman 1987; Miller and Dassoneville 2016), and 
others finding a positive effect (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2016; Fowler 2013; 
Jensen and Spoon 2011).  
Taken together, the voter turnout question seems to be the only dimension of the 
effects of compulsory voting that has found clear answers through empirical research. 
The additional consequences and substantive impacts of CV still remain unclear. This 
lack of consistent evidence only adds to the controversy surrounding this political 
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institution. In the next section, I identify some key ways to expand the existing literature, 
and discuss how this dissertation helps inform the existing questions surrounding 
compulsory voting.  
Contributions 
A review of the different questions surrounding this controversial institution 
suggests more research is needed to determine what kinds of democratic political 
processes are affected when voting is mandatory. In this dissertation, I empirically assess 
the impact of compulsory voting on three specific outcomes: citizen attitudes towards 
voting, political engagement beyond turnout, and political campaigning via party 
outreach. In the paragraphs that follow, I discuss how these analyses make important 
extensions to the previously mentioned dimensions. 
At its core, the normative debate on CV taps into the notion of voting as a civic 
duty. It posits that countries with compulsory voting laws are fostering this civic duty to 
vote, while at the same time perhaps creating resentment amongst those who think 
mandatory turnout violates democratic freedom. While some studies have contributed to 
this debate by assessing CV’s impact on satisfaction with democracy (Singh 2016) and 
trust in institutions (Lundell 2012), no study has yet to test the direct effect of compulsory 
voting on citizen’s feelings towards going to the polls. By better understanding whether 
CV does (or does not) promote feelings of civic duty or resentment among individuals, 
we can at least understand where people who are compelled to vote stand and whether 
arguments that posit particular attitudinal effects of compulsory voting are empirically 
supported. 
This part of the dissertation also speaks to existing shortcomings in the debates on 
political engagement and political knowledge. Specifically, parts of this literature 
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mention the impact of CV on individual attitudes as mechanisms through which CV 
influences behavioral outcomes. For instance, work that associates CV with increases in 
political information and engagement note that this can happen partly due to CV’s 
potential to promote a sense of civic duty (Engelen 2007; Jackman 1999; Shineman 
2009). Similarly, one of the reasons why CV is expected to decrease overall levels of 
political engagement is that it provokes feelings of resentment amongst individuals 
(Carreras 2016). These propositions, however, have largely been assumed to date. In 
order to understand how CV influences substantive outcomes such as political knowledge 
or engagement, it is critical for us to better understand how CV impacts the way citizens 
perceive the act of voting to begin with, as such perceptions are often posited as key 
mechanisms motivating behavior.  
The second component of this dissertation contributes directly to the Political 
Engagement Question. Apart from a lack of consistency in the findings, existing 
empirical studies fail to establish a clear causal link between compulsory voting and 
levels of political engagement, or have used less than ideal ways to capture compulsory 
voting laws.5 Further, studies in this area tend to either focus on one narrow and specific 
political engagement measure, or attempt to predict a large number of political outcomes 
that are somewhat related to political engagement in tandem. This discrepancy makes it 
difficult to judge under what circumstances CV actually influences political engagement.  
I overcome some of these shortcomings by examining the abolition of compulsory 
voting in Chile, and carefully distinguishing between different types of political 
engagement and the theoretical mechanisms that they are associated with. Specifically, I 
                                                 
5 I expand on these critiques in Chapter 3. 
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use survey data over the course of 11 years pre and post reform in Chile and investigate 
six features of political engagement. In doing so, this research provides a nuanced and in 
depth empirical investigation into which specific political engagement outcomes should 
be influenced by CV and why that should be the case.  
In addition, this part of the dissertation also contributes to the Unequal Electorate 
question by examining not only whether CV increases engagement, but also whether it 
increases engagement differently for some groups versus others. Specifically, I look at 
how an individual’s level of education is an important moderating factor in how CV 
impacts political engagement. This investigation takes the unequal electorate question—
which largely focuses on turnout—and expands it to a more substantive political 
outcome. By doing this, I am directly contributing to a burgeoning body of literature that 
has tried to understand how voting institutions can impact individuals differently, 
depending on their level of income, education, or even gender (Carreras 2016; Córdova 
and Rangel 2016). 
The final component of this dissertation addresses missing pieces in the Electoral 
Outcomes Question. This dimension is distinctive within the larger debate on compulsory 
voting because most existing literature focuses primarily on its impact on individuals, and 
not political elites. The electoral outcome debate shifts this dynamic and instead 
contemplates whether CV can influence aggregate-level electoral outcomes. It is still 
unclear whether CV benefits one party over another. But, this literature has yet to 
consider how political elites might update their electoral strategies when working under 
compulsory voting laws. I develop an in-depth theoretical framework that generates 
expectations as to how CV plays a role in elites’ decisions prior to elections in terms of 
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party outreach, and then test these implications empirically. Specifically, I investigate 
how compulsory voting affects the amount of party outreach during campaigns, the 
potential targets of outreach, and which parties are likely to lead outreach efforts. 
Dissertation Outline  
 This first chapter (Chapter 1) has aimed to preview the research questions 
motivating this project, provide an overview of the definition of compulsory voting and 
its manifestation across the world, and to highlight how the dissertation complements and 
helps inform the existing debates in the compulsory voting literature. The body of the 
dissertation (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) has three main empirical components. Each of these 
investigates the impact of CV on distinct political outcomes, and therefore each chapter 
has its own introduction, review of the literature, theoretical framework, research design, 
empirical analysis, and concluding remarks. All three empirical chapters can, thereby, be 
treated and read as stand-alone research projects. But, as all of these empirical pieces 
share a common theme, I elaborate on the overarching scholarly and policy implications 
of this dissertation in a concluding chapter (Chapter 5). 
 In more detail, Chapter Two develops and tests expectations of how CV 
influences citizens’ feelings towards voting. First, I discuss why the institution of CV 
should have an effect on citizens’ perceptions of going to the polls on election day. I 
propose theoretical mechanisms for how CV can foster feelings of civic duty or 
resentment amongst its population. I also argue that the impact of CV on attitudes could 
be neutral—by devaluing the act of voting and making individuals indifferent towards the 
turnout process. I use survey-data from the Latinobarómetro Database,6 as Latin America 
is a region where compulsory voting is prevalent but not absolute, to estimate citizens’ 
                                                 
6 For more information on this data source, see page 36. 
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feelings when they go to the polls. A set of hierarchical multinomial logit models show 
that contrary to common arguments for and against CV, mandatory turnout does not lead 
citizens to feel a higher sense of civic duty, nor does it increase rates of resentment 
towards the process. I do, however, find that under CV, there is a higher probability that 
an individual will report feeling indifferent towards voting.  
 Chapter Three uses a unique research design to test whether compulsory voting 
influences political engagement beyond voter turnout. I leverage novel public opinion 
data from Chile7—a country that abandoned compulsory voting in 2011—over an eleven-
year timeframe to investigate whether levels of political engagement were higher under 
compulsory versus voluntary voting. In doing so, I also carefully distinguish between six 
different aspects of political engagement, and develop nuanced theoretical expectations 
of how CV might influence different aspects of engagement for different reasons. I find 
that compulsory voting does promote higher rates of political engagement, but primarily 
in a private way—citizens under CV are more likely to individually absorb political 
information by watching and reading about the news, but not necessarily more likely to 
discuss politics around their friends or actively engage in political activity. 
 In Chapter Four, the focus shifts from citizens to political elites to examine how 
CV influences campaign behavior. I argue that compulsory voting can affect three main 
elements of campaign strategy: (1) how much party outreach there is; (2) who is the 
target of outreach; (3) who is leading the outreach. In particular, I develop expectations as 
to how overall levels of party outreach change when the electorate expands under CV, 
and why compulsory voting should encourage parties to reach out to traditionally 
                                                 
7 Data comes from Chilean think thank Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP). For more 
information on this data source, see pages 76-77. 
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marginalized voters. Then, I examine whether members of a specific party ideology have 
a higher incentive to mobilize voters under compulsory voting in comparison to if they 
were conducting campaigns under voluntary voting. Using data from the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES),8 I employ a comprehensive cross-national analysis of 
27 countries across the world to test my expectations. Results show that political elites do 
adjust to their institutional domain—when voting is mandatory, parties invest in 
campaign outreach at similar levels (not less) than when voting is voluntary, and that 
outreach is also less skewed towards individuals with higher socioeconomic status. I also 
show evidence that parties under CV are more likely to engage in persuasion rather than 
mobilization via party outreach. 
Finally, in Chapter Five, I summarize the main results of the dissertation and 
discuss how they, in tandem, contribute to our overall understanding of the impacts of 
mandatory voting across the world. I also elaborate on this research’s broader 
contributions to the scholarly literature on political institutions and political behavior, 
while also commenting on the policy implications to be drawn from the material 
presented here. I conclude by suggesting fruitful avenues for future research in order to 
address possible questions that remain. 
 
 
                                                 
8 For more information on this data source, see pages 109-110. 
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Chapter 2 
Attitudes Towards Voting: Evaluating Civic Duty, Resentment, and Indifference 
Under Mandatory Turnout 
 
Elections represent one of the most important aspects of democracy (Dahl 1971). 
Despite the importance of electoral participation, many democratic countries have 
recently reported rates of voter turnout well below 50 percent.9 Extant research has noted 
that certain electoral institutions can motivate citizens to participate.10 Can electoral laws 
also influence citizens’ attitudes towards the democratic process? One mobilizing 
institution designed to manufacture high turnout rates—compulsory voting (CV)—has 
been a successful tool for maximizing political participation (Baek 2009; Franklin 1999, 
2002; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi 2017; Quintelier, Hoodhe, and Marien 2011). Still, 
the adoption or abolition of this voting system remains a controversial issue for its 
potential consequences beyond turnout (Brennan and Hill 2014). While many scholars 
have gone on to investigate the more substantive impacts of CV, this research addresses 
an overlooked, albeit highly contentious, argument: How does compulsory voting 
influence citizens’ attitudes towards the democratic process of voting itself?  
Existing arguments for and against this voting institution typically categorize 
compulsory voting into promoting either positive or negative attitudes amongst voters. 
On the one hand, the continuous act of voting under CV and the sense of inclusiveness it 
promotes may trigger a sense of civic duty, which can in turn make citizens more 
politically engaged (Blais 2000; Engelen 2007; Keaney and Rogers 2006). On the other 
                                                 
9 For example, countries such as the United States, Colombia, and Switzerland all 
recorded turnout rates lower than 50 percent in their most recent legislative elections. 
Data available at: http://www.idea.int/vt/. 
10 See Cancela and Geys (2016) for a review of this literature. 
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hand, forcing individuals to vote might generate resentment among the population, by 
coercing voters to incur the costs of turning out and violating the premise of democratic 
freedom (Brennan 2014; Birch 2009; Senado 2012). In this paper, I examine empirical 
evidence for these arguments and also develop an alternative theoretical implication that 
considers how the context surrounding CV laws might increase the likelihood that 
citizens simply feel indifferent towards voting. I argue that the shift away from the 
relevance of turning out, combined with the reduced costs of turning out produced by 
voter-friendly institutional design, should minimize both negative connotations and 
positive associations with voting. Drawing on survey data from Latin America, I employ 
a hierarchical multinomial technique to test my theoretical expectations.  
The contributions of this research are numerous. First, I unpack previous 
arguments for and against CV by further developing the theoretical mechanisms that can 
cause mandatory turnout to affect citizen attitudes towards voting, thus directly 
contributing to the broader institutions literature that aims to better understand the 
implications of voter mobilization efforts (e.g., Bedolla and Michelson 2012; Green and 
Gerber 2015). Additionally, I also offer an alternative theoretical expectation about a 
potential attitudinal effect of CV that has not been considered before. In doing so, this 
article also contributes to the voting literature, which has mostly focused on voter 
abstention as the equivalent of political indifference (e.g., Fife-Schaw and Breakwell 
1990; Hastings 1956; Mayo 1959), by showing that indifferent attitudes can be also 
displayed in the presence of active voting behavior. Third, this research presents the first 
attempt to empirically test existing and new theories about the direct effects of CV on 
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citizen attitudes towards voting, offering new evidence and further nuance to theoretical 
mechanisms that have largely been assumed to date.  
Finally, this research has important implications for policymakers who continue 
to consider the adoption or abolition of compulsory voting. The recent electoral law 
reform that took place in Chile in 2011, for instance, generated much debate among 
legislators who argued both for and against the abandonment of CV laws in the country 
(Barnes and Rangel 2014). Amongst these arguments, the issue of how CV affects citizen 
attitudes towards democracy and political participation was prominent. Other countries 
have recently begun to consider implementing a formal requirement to vote (Marty 
2014). Although the observation of aggregate effects post-reform might provide 
policymakers clues as to how voting laws affect citizen behavior, such conclusions paint 
an incomplete picture of the psychological and intrinsic effects voting laws have on 
citizens’ attitudes. By providing a direct theoretical and empirical account of individual 
attitudes towards voting, this research will better inform those who primarily evaluate 
support or opposition for election law reform on the basis of overall citizen perceptions 
and willingness to engage with the polity in a meaningful way.  
Compulsory vs. Voluntary Voting: An Unsettled Debate 
Although many factors explain voter turnout, compulsory voting laws are argued 
to be one of the only ways to ensure near-universal political participation (Gallego 2015; 
Geys 2006). Countries with CV laws report average turnout rates approximately 10 to 18 
percentage points higher than countries with voluntary voting (Baek 2009; Blais and 
Aarts 2006, Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Jaitman 2013), and this effect is even 
stronger when sanctions penalizing non-voters are in place and enforced (Panagopoulos 
2008, Singh 2011). This is not surprising—when voting is required by law, the cost of 
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abstaining is often higher than the cost of turning out, encouraging participation 
regardless of institutional constraints or individual resources.  
Despite producing a large turnout bonus, compulsory voting remains a 
controversial institution. Arguments in favor of CV highlight that high voter turnout is 
paramount for the promotion of democracy, legitimacy, and representativeness. High 
levels of turnout indicate stronger legitimacy as the elected government is more 
representative of the majority of the citizenry, indicating signs of a healthier democracy 
(Ballinger 2006; Franklin 2004). Further, CV has the potential to erase electoral biases, 
since those who are least likely to turn out under voluntary systems (marginalized 
citizens) are required to participate (Córdova and Rangel 2017; Gallego 2015). Finally, 
compulsion should increase citizens’ interest in the political process and generate higher 
levels of political information and more engaged citizens (Jakee and Sun 2006; Lijphart 
1997; Shineman, forthcoming). 
Arguments against compulsory voting emphasize that forcing people to vote can 
be considered undemocratic and counterproductive (Barnes and Rangel 2014; Lever 
2010a). Also, given that non-voters are found to be less politically knowledgeable and 
informed than active voters (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Converse 1964), the 
inclusion of uninformed voters into the voting electorate might add noise or bias in 
electoral patterns (Jakee and Sun 2006; Saunders 2010). Having more uninformed voters 
turning out could in turn affect overall levels of political knowledge in the electorate, 
ultimately producing sub-optimal electoral outcomes (Ballinger 2006; Loewen, Milner, 
and Hicks 2007). Relatedly, the participation of non-voters under CV might increase the 
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level of invalid or random votes, which can then raise questions regarding the system’s 
legitimacy (Mackerras and McAllister 1999; Power and Garand 2007).   
In an attempt to settle the existent debate, many scholars have gone on to 
empirically test some of the arguments for and against CV. For instance, compulsory 
voting is found to decrease the voting gap between low and high-income voters (Fowler 
2013), and between highly educated and less educated individuals (Gallego 2015; 
Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). CV also mobilizes a higher number of young voters to turn 
out, erasing generational differences in voting (Irwin 1974; Singh 2011). More recent 
work has also found a positive effect of CV in decreasing the gender gap in electoral 
engagement beyond voting (Córdova and Rangel 2017). At the same time, CV is found to 
produce higher numbers of invalid and random votes (Power and Garand 2007, Uggla 
2008). Mixed evidence still exists on whether higher and more equal voter turnout would 
benefit leftist parties (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2016; Ferwerda 2014, Hoffman, 
León, and Lombardi 2017; Jensen and Spoon 2011) and whether CV increases or 
decreases levels of political knowledge and engagement (Birch 2009; Loewen, Milner, 
and Hicks 2007, Shineman, forthcoming, Singh and Thorton 2013).  
Although most of the empirical literature on this topic focuses on aggregate 
patterns of behavior, there have been no attempts to empirically assess how this 
institutional design might individually influence citizens’ attitudes. As such, this research 
provides the first empirical assessment of how CV influences attitudes towards the 
democratic process of voting itself. This research also offers a fruitful way to move the 
existent debate forward, given that much of the current literature highlights the influence 
of CV on citizens’ attitudes as a mechanism leading to more substantive outcomes. 
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Scholarship on a potential positive effect of CV on political sophistication, for instance, 
often incorporates the mechanism of increased civic duty as part of the main theoretical 
framework (Engelen 2007; Gordon and Segura 1997; Jackman 1999). For example, when 
summarizing the arguments in the literature, Shineman (2009, 3) notes that “simply 
requiring people to vote will awaken in them a stronger sense of civic duty, a deeper 
political interest, and it will lead to a more politically aware society.” The actual 
proposition that CV instigates a sense of civic duty among voters, however, has not been 
systematically and empirically tested to date. In the next section, I develop expectations 
about how mandatory voting laws changes citizens’ perceptions of the act of voting, 
which could consequently influence voting behavior and other political outcomes.  
Mandatory Turnout and Citizen Attitudes Towards Voting 
In his seminal book, Downs (1957) argued that voting can be explained as a 
rational decision calculus. The likelihood that an individual will vote depends on the 
probability that their vote will make a difference (p), the individual’s utility of voting (B), 
and the costs of turning out (C). Voters should only turn out when they believe that the 
benefits outweigh the costs (pB > C). Accordingly, scholars have identified several 
factors that either increase the probability of votes mattering (p), or decrease the costs of 
voting (c), and thus encourage turnout. Given that the probability of benefits outweighing 
the costs of turning out is extremely low, a main conclusion established by Downs (1957) 
is that voting should be considered irrational. And yet, we still see people turn out to vote 
in relatively large numbers. Scholars have argued that in addition to rational calculations, 
voters also tend to consider the psychological benefits of turning out—citizens might vote 
because it “makes them feel good” or because they think is what good citizens ought to 
  29 
do (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Essentially, it means adding another term to Downs’ 
equation, (D), that represents the psychological benefits of turning out (pB+D > C) 
Indeed, research shows that individuals are largely driven by these psychological 
benefits when going to the polls. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) find that turnout is 70 
percentage points higher for those who indicate having a strong sense of civic duty in 
comparison to those who do not. Other research shows that civic duty is one of the most 
important motivations driving the willingness to vote (Blais 2000; Clarke et al. 2004; 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Even though a great deal of research examines how 
big a role the “D” term plays in motivating electoral participation, fewer studies have 
focused on predicting the “D” term in the rational voting calculus.  
On average, a substantial number of individuals believe voting is a civic duty. 
Blais (2000) reports that in the United States, 84 percent of surveyed university students 
indicate support for the statement that voting is a citizen’s duty. The number is even 
higher for a sample of Canadian students—99 percent for those in Quebec and 92 percent 
in British Columbia. Individuals with higher levels of political interest tend to feel a 
higher sense of civic duty, which is not surprising. Blais (2000) also finds that women, 
older individuals, and those with higher degrees of religiosity also report higher rates of 
civic duty. With a focus on individual level determinants, the study does not, however, 
consider institutional design as a predictor of civic duty.  
 What remains to be studied is how certain election laws—such as compulsory 
voting—can change or influence the psychological or intrinsic value of voting, which 
could ultimately determine a citizens’ willingness to engage with the democratic system 
as a whole. While we often associate the “D” term with a sense of civic duty, other 
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psychological attitudes could change one’s calculation regarding voting. In particular to 
compulsory voting, the two main factors mentioned in most normative discussions relate 
to positive (civic duty) or negative (resentment) emotions. In the next section, I discuss 
theoretical mechanisms behind these two commonly cited attitudes, and also propose an 
alternative expectation for how CV should influence individual attitudes. I highlight the 
importance of taking into account contextual factors and argue that CV may also yield a 
more indifferent electorate.  
Compulsory Voting and Civic Duty  
A relatively common argument in the compulsory voting literature is that CV has 
a positive impact on individual’s attitudes. Some existing literature suggests that CV can 
increase rates of political engagement and knowledge because it increases one’s sense of 
civic duty (Engelen 2007; Lijphart 1997). The theoretical mechanism promoting that 
claim, however, remains underdeveloped. I contend that there are several reasons to 
expect CV laws to positively affect individuals’ feelings towards the act of voting.  
First, mandating that all eligible citizens turn out in every election consequently 
creates a habit of voting, directly influencing citizen behavior. Previous works show that 
in CV systems, voting is likely to become a habit even for those who would be 
considered non-voters under voluntary systems (Blais and Achen 2010; Gerber, Green, 
and Schachar 2003). Once voting becomes a habit, participation patterns are likely to 
spill over into other types of political involvement, and politics becomes a more 
significant part of citizens’ lives (Lijphart 1997; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1995; Wertheimer 
1975). As Jakee and Sun (2006, 64) put it, “the more people vote, the more they become 
civic and politically minded.” Thus, having to vote election after election, an individual 
living under CV is likely to develop a stronger sense of civic duty. 
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Additionally, one of the main concerns involving low voter turnout rates is that 
young voters are increasingly less interested and involved in politics (Engelen 2007; 
Keaney and Rogers 2006). Research shows, however, that young people’s participation is 
significantly influenced by the presence of active voters in the household (i.e., parents) 
(Fieldhouse and Cutts 2012). When children are exposed to political participation from a 
young age as they observe their parents and other relatives going to the polls, they are 
more likely to perceive it as an important act and a civic duty. Plutzer (2002, 43) also 
argues that “parental political involvement can provide both behavior to model and 
campaign-relevant information that children rarely get from formal schooling.” When 
voting is compulsory, the likelihood that a young individual will also observe their 
parents participating often is much higher, which in turn makes them better able to 
internalize the norm to vote, ultimately increasing the likelihood that the act of voting is 
perceived as a civic duty from a younger age (Engelen 2007).   
Compulsory voting can also incite feelings of civic duty via a more symbolic 
mechanism. Making voting a requirement can send a signal that the government values 
every citizen’s participation, and is committed to incorporating as many individuals into 
the electorate as possible. An Australian politician explains that “Compulsory voting 
allows the entire electorate to feel that they have a degree of ownership in government 
and its decisions. People feel they are part of the loop and matter. It avoids the 
marginalization, hostility and sense of remoteness found in the US” (Australia 1997, 
124). 
Thus, compulsory voting can be perceived as an inclusive institution rather than 
an alienating one. This can, in turn, foster an individuals’ sense of civic duty and 
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likelihood that one perceives voting as a positive civic obligation. Taken together, the 
voting habit created by CV laws, the early exposure to participation in the household, and 
the symbolic effects that make citizens feel included lead to my first general hypothesis: 
 H1: Compared to those living under voluntary voting, voters living under 
compulsory voting are more likely to perceive voting as a civic duty. 
Compulsory Voting and Resentment 
The counter argument to the belief that CV increases feelings of civic duty is that 
coercing people to turn out generates resentment. This could be the case for a variety of 
reasons. First, it is well established that turning out to vote is costly, especially for low-
income or disadvantaged voters (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Requiring citizens to turn out by law virtually forces 
voters to incur the costs of going to the polls against their will. The disregard for 
individuals’ own resources can generate resentment and cause voters to feel negatively 
about the act of voting itself. Going back to the rational theory of voting, compelling 
citizens to incur the costs of voting (C) can decrease one’s psychological and intrinsic 
value (“D” term) attached to the process, instead generating more resentment and 
decreasing the chances a potential voter would turn out if not required by law.  
Indeed, Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998) asked respondents in Belgium whether 
they would still go vote if CV were abolished in the country. They find that about 30 
percent of respondents indicated they would never vote again if CV laws were 
eliminated. A similar study of Brazil also finds that a large proportion of voters indicated 
a wish to abstain if CV laws were no longer in place (Elkins 2000). Significant declines 
in aggregate turnout in countries that have actually abolished compulsory voting in 
practice (i.e., Venezuela and Chile) corroborate these hypothetical outcomes (Barnes and 
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Rangel 2014; Birch 2009), suggesting that it is possible for CV laws to negatively 
influence citizens’ attitudes towards voting.  
Symbolically, a particular argument supporting the fact that CV laws create 
negative attitudes is that people living under democratic institutions should have the 
freedom and right to choose not to vote. As emphasized by an Australian policymaker, 
“the assertion that voting is a ‘right’ means little if one can be imprisoned for 
conscientiously choosing not to exercise that right” (Jackman 1999, 31). Similarly, Hill 
(2010) explains that in Australia, many individuals who abstain invoke the principle of 
democratic choice and freedom of expression as objections to compulsion. When Chilean 
lawmakers were debating whether to abolish compulsory voting in 2011, for example, 
political opponents of CV specifically argued that forcing citizens to participate against 
their will could provoke resentment, consequently discouraging political education 
(Barnes and Rangel 2014). As Birch (2009, 63) puts it, “obliging people to vote may 
alienate the unengaged even further… for this reason the introduction of compulsory 
voting may be counter-productive.” Overall, forcing individuals to incur costs and 
disregarding one’s democratic freedom to abstain can nurture feelings of resentment 
towards voting. Based on the combination of these arguments, my second general 
expectation is: 
H2: Compared to those living under voluntary voting, voters living under 
compulsory voting are more likely to report feelings of resentment towards the act 
of voting. 
Compulsory Voting and Indifference 
 Although most existing arguments for how CV influences citizen attitudes 
highlight clear positive and negative consequences, I also argue that mandatory voting 
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laws can promote feeling of indifference for voters. The two previous attitudinal 
outcomes cite convincing arguments as to why we should expect either strong positive or 
negative feelings amongst voters.  
But, I argue that important contextual features of compulsory voting may mitigate 
some of these positive and negative effects, fostering instead more neutral feelings. First, 
even though voting is costly and CV drives citizens to incur the costs, one overlooked 
aspect of this institutional design is that it is typically coupled with other institutions that 
are designed to decrease the cost of voting, such as concurrent elections, automatic 
registration, and voting on weekends. The vast majority of countries in Latin America 
with CV laws, for instance, hold concurrent elections. Every Latin American country that 
requires citizens to turn out to vote holds their elections on a Sunday in order to 
maximize turnout and minimize the likelihood that voters would have to abandon work or 
personal duties to go the polls. The result is that voters do not incur extremely high costs 
of voting that are typically associated with voluntary voting systems, which would 
subsequently minimize fears that CV might lead to negative attitudes. Instead, it can 
contribute to feelings of indifference towards an institution that might be a burden but not 
as costly as typically imagined.  
Second, elite behavior related to voter turnout can mitigate the positive effects 
associated with CV laws. Under voluntary systems, candidates often highlight the 
importance of turning out, and engage in multiple “Get out the Vote” (GOTV) 
campaigns. In these countries, voting is regarded as an important and crucial act, and this 
message is constantly displayed and circulated. Indeed, it is not uncommon for political 
parties and donors to allocate significant funds towards GOTV efforts (e.g., Green and 
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Gerber 2015, Stone 2012). Meanwhile, CV should, in theory, minimize mobilization 
efforts and shift attention away from simply turning out and towards policy issues or 
voter persuasion. Therefore, a lack of focus on intensive mobilization fails to invoke the 
kind of excitement or sense of fulfillment that occurs under voluntary voting rules.  
Additionally, the novelty of voting is minimized under compulsory voting. Take 
the United States, for example. During elections, voters often receive an “I voted” sticker 
which publicizes their participation. Because voting is voluntary and a large percentage 
of the population does not participate, receiving this sticker makes individuals feel as if 
they have partaken in an important act that should be publicized. But, once voting is a 
mandatory requirement in which all citizens are required to partake in, voting loses its 
novelty. Individuals no longer feel as if they are performing an extraordinary act, rather 
they are simply complying with the law and doing something all other individuals are 
required to do as well, contributing to feelings of indifference. Taken together, the 
presence of institutions that reduce the costs of turning out and the lack of emphasis on 
the importance of going to the polls combine to create an image of voting as not terribly 
costly but also not terribly novel, lead individuals to feel indifferent towards voting. 
 H3a: Compared to those living under voluntary voting, voters living under 
compulsory voting are more likely to feel indifferent or apathetic about voting. 
Similarly, the shift away from highlighting the importance of voting and the lack 
of novelty drawn from something that the whole population is required to do should 
decrease individuals’ satisfaction when going to the polls. Gans (2001) argues that those 
who suffer from political indifference are less likely to draw satisfaction from political 
acts, suggesting that the same mechanisms proposed above to produce feelings of 
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indifference can also be displayed as lower feelings of satisfaction instead. Therefore, I 
include a complimentary hypothesis: 
H3b: Voters living under compulsory voting are less likely to draw satisfaction 
from voting, when compared to those living under voluntary voting. 
Data and Methods 
 To evaluate individual attitudes towards voting, I use a hierarchical modeling 
strategy with a survey question available in the 2010 Round of the Latinobarometro 
Project Survey fielded in 18 Latin American countries. The Latin American region is an 
excellent setting in which to examine the question of CV’s impact on attitudes toward 
voting, since it holds the majority of countries with compulsory voting. Although 
compulsory voting is prevalent in the region, 5 out of 18 countries have voluntary voting 
systems, offering adequate variation for comparing attitudes in compulsory systems to 
voluntary systems. Further, focusing on a single region allows me to obtain interesting 
variation on the main independent variable, while at the same time holding constant a 
number of cultural and historical factors that might potentially confound citizen attitude 
formation (Inglehart 1988; Lijphart 1975). In this section, I describe the variables used to 
test my hypotheses and the methods applied.  
Dependent and Independent Variables of Interest 
To evaluate citizens’ attitudes towards voting, respondents were asked the 
following question: “Which of the following statements is the closest to your feelings, 
when you go to vote?” Respondents could select one of the following answers: (a) I have 
a feeling of satisfaction…(coded as satisfaction); (b) I do it only because it is my 
duty…(coded as civic duty);  (c) I feel upset, it is just a waste of time… (coded as 
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resentment);  (d) I don’t feel anything in particular…(coded as indifference);  (e) I don’t 
vote.11  
The format of this question is not the traditional way in which civic duty is 
typically captured. But, using this questions allows for a much more nuanced 
investigation of citizens’ attitudes towards voting. Most measures of civic duty simply 
ask respondents whether they think voting is a civic duty, or whether voting is important 
to be considered a good citizen (Blais and Galais 2016). More recently, Blais and Galais 
(2016) have proposed a battery of questions related to voting and citizens’ responsibilities 
to measure civic duty. However, none of these measures capture alternative (and 
particularly negative) psychological responses to the act of voting. Hence, in order to test 
which side of the normative debate on the positive or negative attitudinal impacts of 
compulsory voting, a direct question offering a variety of possible outcomes is needed. 
Thus, this measure allows me to capture whether CV has a positive, negative, or neutral 
impact on voters.  
 The main explanatory variable is compulsory voting, which I code in two 
different ways. First, a dichotomous measure of compulsory voting is coded as a 1 if 
voting is compulsory in a particular country and a 0 if voting is non-compulsory. A 
second categorical measure, enforced CV takes into account the presence of enforcement 
mechanisms, and countries where voting is compulsory and enforced receive a (2), 
countries where voting is compulsory but unenforced receive a (1), and countries where 
voting is voluntary receive a 0. These data were drawn from the International Institute for 
Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), which identifies which countries around 
                                                 
11 See Table A1 in Appendix A for the Spanish translation of the question and answer 
options. 
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the world practice compulsory voting. In the sample, Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, 
El Salvador, and Nicaragua do not have compulsory voting rules.12 Seven other countries 
have relatively unenforced compulsory voting laws, and 6 other have enforced CV 
rules.13 
Control Variables 
 I control for several variables that might affect how citizens perceive the act of 
voting. At the individual level, age can be an important factor influencing attitudes, as 
older individuals are found to report higher feelings of civic duty (Blais 2000) as well as 
overall rates of political engagement (Verba and Nie 1972). Additionally, socioeconomic 
status is known to affect citizen political participation (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Thus, I control for education and income. I also control for 
political interest, satisfaction with democracy, and minority. Finally I also take into 
account whether the individual indicated a willingness to vote in an upcoming election 
(voter).14 All individual-level variables were drawn from the same Latinobarometro 
Survey (2010) from which the dependent variables were drawn.15 
                                                 
12 See Table A2 in Appendix A for a complete list of all countries included in the analysis 
and their respective compulsory voting coding.  
13 Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Paraguay 
are considered to have weak enforcement of CV laws. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Uruguay have enforced CV laws.  
14 This variable is different from the dependent variable’s option to select “I Don’t Vote.” 
This is because selecting “I Don’t Vote” implies the individual has little to no experience 
with voting, or is not able to express how they feel towards voting. Instead, the 
independent (control) variable voter is based on a question that asks individuals whether 
who would they vote for if an election took place on Sunday. If individual expressed a 
vote choice, they are coded as being a voter, and those who expressed not voting if an 
election would take place are coded as a non-voter.  
15 See Table A3 in the Appendix A for a complete description of each control variable, 
and Table A4 for descriptive statistics for all control variables. 
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 At the country level, I control for the level of democracy and economic 
development for each country. Data on democracy comes from the Freedom House’s civil 
liberties and political rights ratings (Freedom House 2014). This variable was 
transformed in order to report states with higher scores in the freedom house scale as 
more democratic, while lower scores reflect less democratic states.16 Economic 
development is measured as Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2014), with higher levels indicating more 
developed countries.17 
Methodology 
One important feature of the data in this study is that observations are clustered at 
different levels of analysis. Specifically, the data are clustered at two levels: individual 
respondents 𝑖 (level 1) nested within countries 𝑗 (level 2). The main explanatory variable 
is compulsory voting, which is recorded at the country level. The outcome variable, 
citizen attitudes, is measured at the individual level through public opinion data. To 
account for the nested nature of the data, I estimate a hierarchical model across two levels 
of analysis: respondents nested within countries (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). In 
addition, the outcome variable is based on a survey question that allows individuals to 
select one of many categorical outcomes. That is, a respondent will select an answer in 
comparison to all other answer choices they were provided with. Given that these answer 
options are categorical and not structured as an ordinal scale, I employ a hierarchical 
multinomial logit model, which predicts the likelihood of selecting a specific answer in 
                                                 
16 Democracy data comes from the 2011 Freedom House Report, which includes 
information from the year 2010. 
17 This variable is introduced in the models by taking the logarithm of the GDP values 
recorded.  
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comparison to a specific baseline. The model specification for testing the main 
hypotheses is as follows: 18 
𝑌𝑖𝑗  = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐴𝑔𝑒1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾40 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾50𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦5𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾60 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟6𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾70 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒7𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾80𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦8𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾02𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎2𝑗 + 𝛾03𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑗
+ 𝑈0𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗 
where 𝑈0𝑗 represents the random effects for the intercept across countries, and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 are 
errors at the individual level.  
Cross-Country Variation 
The question on citizens’ feelings towards voting contains a lot of information. 
Individuals are able to select one out of many responses. To better visualize the 
distributions, Figure 2.1 graphs the percentage of respondents in each country selecting 
each possible answer. One preliminary observation that can be drawn from these 
descriptive stats is that a plurality of voters in every single country identifies feelings of 
civic duty as the defining sentiment when they vote. In many countries, a large majority 
of voters report a sense of civic duty. Thus, regardless of the voting system, a great 
number of voters in the Latin American region recognize voting as a civic obligation. 
This is consistent with previous work that shows most people, in general, agree that 
voting represents an act of civic duty (Blais 2000; Blais and Galais 2016). 
While it is apparent that individuals in most countries report high rates of feelings 
of civic duty, much more variation exists for the selection of other responses, such as 
resentment, or feelings of indifference. For instance, Ecuador, reports the highest 
                                                 
18 This model only assumes random effects for the intercept. 
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percentage of citizens identifying civic duty as the reason why they vote (over 60 
percent) amongst countries. At the same time, Ecuador reports one of the highest rates of 
voter indifference in comparison to other countries (approximately 20 percent). Uruguay 
and Venezuela, by contrast, have much more similar rates of citizens reporting both civic 
duty and satisfaction. Rates of resentment, overall, seem to be pretty low across most 
countries, while satisfaction varies considerably. In sum, a great deal of variation is 
reported within and across countries. It is difficult however, to observe any systematic 
patterns across the set of responses based off of each country’s voting laws. In the next 
section, I conduct an empirical investigation into which attitudes are more likely to take 
shape when voting is mandatory or voluntary. 
Figure 2.1. Average Levels of Attitudes Towards Voting, by Country 
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Empirical Findings 
I begin by first examining how, on average, compulsory voting influences a 
citizen’s feeling towards the act of voting. Results from a hierarchical multinomial logit 
regression analysis appear in Table 2.1. This model estimates the probability of 
individuals selecting any one of the possible answers to the attitudinal question, 
compared to a baseline category. Because it was the most common choice across the 
sample, civic duty is used here as the baseline.19  
Notably, we see that citizens living under CV rules are no more likely to report 
feeling resentment, in comparison to a sense of civic duty. The same is the case for 
reporting satisfaction. But, the coefficient for indifference is positive and statistically 
significant, meaning that those living under CV are significantly more likely to report 
feeling indifferent about voting in comparison to civic duty.  
Because the significance of the results might change depending on the baseline, I 
graph the marginal effects for a change in the dependent variable in order to estimate the 
change in predicted probability of selecting each option. Figure 2.2 shows the change in 
predicted probability of reporting a specific feeling (compared to all other possibilities) 
when voting laws when going from a zero (voluntary voting) to a one (compulsory 
voting). The confidence intervals indicate statistical significant differences at the 95% 
                                                 
19 Tables A5-A7 in Appendix A include the results when the baselines are abstention, 
resentment, and satisfaction. The model with indifference as the baseline did not 
converge in the statistical software used. But, one way to compare the statistical 
significance of compulsory voting among all attitudes is to independently create 
dichotomous variables for each (did respondent select, for instance, feeling resentment or 
anything else). When disaggregating each outcome, indifference is the only attitude that 
is predicted by compulsory voting (i.e., statistically significant at p<.001). These results 
can be found in Table A8 in Appendix A.  
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confidence level. If the confidence intervals cross the zero line, the change is not 
statistically significant.  
Table 2.1. The Impact of CV on Individual Attitudes Towards Voting 
(Civic Duty as the Baseline) 
 Resentment  Indifference  Satisfaction  Don’t Vote 
Compulsory Voting 0.175  0.489***  -0.091  -0.771 
 (0.114)  (0.087)  (0.211)  (0.616) 
Age -0.002  -0.004  0.004***  -0.037*** 
 (0.002)  (0.052)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Female 0.045  -0.105**  -0.008  0.004 
 (0.068)  (0.035)  (0.038)  (0.079) 
Education -0.086  -0.108***  -0.004  -0.254*** 
 (0.046)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.058) 
Political Interest -0.052  -0.145***  0.413***  -0.279*** 
 (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.020)  (0.051) 
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 
-0.316***  -0.388***  0.196***  -0.121* 
(0.042)  (0.058)  (0.022)  (0.047) 
Voter -0.619***  0.011  0.635***  -1.684*** 
 (0.074)  (0.020)  (0.056)  (0.081) 
Income 0.026  0.061  0.075***  -0.062* 
 (0.026)  (0.062)  (0.015)  (0.031) 
Minority -0.209**  0.136**  0.025  -0.062 
 (0.079)  (0.051)  (0.045)  (0.093) 
GDP per capita 0.036  -0.117**  0.135  0.096 
 (0.071)  (0.038)  (0.125)  (0.365) 
Democracy Level 0.119*  -0.012***  -0.069  0.144 
 (0.051)  (0.002)  (0.092)  (0.270) 
Constant -1.637**  -0.957*  -3.570***  0.341 
 (0.564)  (0.420)  (0.965)  (2.789) 
# of Individuals 17,020       
# of Countries 18       
Note: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the 
probability of selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline response of 
Civic Duty. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows that a change from voluntary to compulsory voting leaves the 
predicted probability of an individual selecting “civic duty” as their closest feeling when 
turning out essentially unchanged, and not statistically different from zero. Contrary to 
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Hypothesis 1, then, it does not appear that compulsory voting leads to higher levels of 
civic duty amongst its citizenry. This null finding represents a significant departure for 
the literature that has largely assumed a relationship between compulsory voting and 
civic duty (Gordon and Segura 1997; Lijphart 1997). If compulsory voting has any 
effects beyond increased turnout, it is likely not because it makes citizens feel more 
civically minded and consider voting to be a duty. 
Figure 2.2. Marginal Effect of Compulsory Voting on Individual 
Attitudes Towards Voting 
 
Notes: Figure 2.2 shows the change in predicted probability of reporting a specific 
feeling (compared to all other possibilities) when the voting law goes from zero 
(voluntary voting) to one (compulsory voting) with 95% confidence intervals. If 
confidence intervals cross the zero line, the effect is not statistically significant. 
Estimates were calculated from results in Models 1-4 in Table 2.1. 
 
Hypothesis 2 posited that CV should instead lead to higher feelings of resentment 
towards voting. If it is clear that CV does not increase civic duty, then critics of this 
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institution would likely expect this to be the case. But, as Figure 2.2 shows, there is a 
slight increase in the predicted probability of selecting “resentment” when voting is 
compulsory, but that change is incredibly small and not statistically significant (i.e., 
confidence interval crosses the zero line). This null finding is perhaps even more 
surprising, given that the chances someone living under voluntary voting would indicate 
feeling resentment when voting is likely really low (rather than just abstaining). But, even 
when coercing a much larger amount of individuals into the electorate, it does not seem 
like the average level of resentment increases. While this finding does not provide 
support for Hypothesis 2, it does show that CV does not negatively impact citizens’ 
attitudes significantly.  
 Figure 2.2 also shows that one specific outcome is statistically significant: having 
a compulsory voting system increases the probability that an individual will report feeling 
indifferent towards voting. Specifically, individuals that are subject to compulsory voting 
laws are about 5 percent more likely to report feeling indifferent when turning out at the 
polls. While this effect is not huge, it does provide support for Hypothesis 3a. By contrast, 
Hypothesis 3b is not supported—CV does not significantly affect the probability that one 
feels “satisfied” when going to the polls. The findings are also similar when we take into 
account the level of enforcement of compulsory voting laws, as shown in Figure 2.3.20 
This likely suggests that when it comes to attitudes, CV has more of a symbolic effect, 
and does not necessarily need to be enforced to produce a specific pattern. 
In tandem, the findings reported in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show that compulsory 
voting laws do not have the attitudinal impact that is often argued and discussed. When 
                                                 
20 Marginal Effects were calculated from results shown in Table A9 in Appendix A. 
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subjected to mandatory voting laws, individuals are no more likely to feel a higher sense 
of civic duty or resentment. Instead, they are slightly more likely to feel neutral towards 
the act of voting. This supports the notion that CV minimizes the novelty associated with 
voting, and voting appears to be a rather routine chore that all individuals take part in, 
such as paying taxes or jury duty, for instance.  
Figure 2.3. Marginal Effect of Enforced Compulsory Voting on Individual 
Attitudes Towards Voting 
 
Notes: Panel A in Figure 2.3 shows the change in predicted probability of reporting a 
specific feeling (compared to all other possibilities) when the voting law goes from zero 
(voluntary voting) to one (unenforced compulsory voting) with 95% confidence intervals. 
Panel B in Figure 2.3 shows the change in predicted probability of reporting a specific 
feeling (compared to all other possibilities) when the voting law goes from zero 
(voluntary voting) to two (enforced compulsory voting) with 95% confidence intervals.  
If confidence intervals cross the zero line, the effect is not statistically significant. 
Estimates were calculated from results presented in Table A9 in Appendix A. 
 
Additional Analyses 
As previously discussed, the question used in this study is not the traditional way 
to measure attitudes towards voting, but offers the benefit of exploring a variety of 
feelings and attitudes simultaneously. One critique may be that the wording of the 
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question used to estimate the dependent variable—feelings towards voting—assumes that 
an individual has had some type of experience with voting before. However, one answer 
option is to select “I don’t vote,” which implies that the individual does not have 
sufficient experience with voting and therefore has no ability to answer the question 
properly. This category is important to have because it works as a form of quality control, 
by offering an alternative for individuals who may otherwise randomly select an answer 
(as it often happens with attitudinal questions) (Converse and Presser 1986). In this sense, 
having this option increases the confidence that individuals are sincerely selecting a 
feeling towards voting—especially the ones expressing indifference. Yet, the percentage 
of individuals selecting that they don’t vote is incredibly small (6.32 percent in countries 
with VV; 4.73 in CV).  
We know from aggregate reported levels of voter turnout that the percentage of 
abstainers in any given election tends to be larger than that. Even in compulsory voting 
countries, turn out is not completely universal. Thus, a better way to capture whether 
reported attitudes correspond to how people actually feel when they vote is to consider 
actual voting behavior in tandem with reported attitudes. 
In order to ensure that I am mostly capturing those who actually vote under both 
systems, I take two approaches. In the main analysis presented in Table 2.1, I control for 
whether an individual indicated that they would vote if an election was held this 
Sunday.21 Note that the voter variable works as expected for the resentment, satisfaction 
                                                 
21 This is based on a question that asks, “If elections were being held this Sunday, which 
party would you vote for?” If the respondent identified a specific party or reported they 
would vote blank, the voter variable is coded as a 1. If they responded that they would 
not vote, the variable is coded as a 0. The 2010 Latinobarometro does not directly ask 
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and abstain outcome. Individuals who reported willingness to vote in an upcoming 
election were significantly less likely to report feeling resentment when voting, and also 
less likely to say they just don’t vote in general. Voters were also significantly more 
likely to feel satisfaction when voting. But, being a voter does not matter for reporting 
indifference.  
In order to assess whether being a voter matters depending on the institutional 
design, I also conduct an analysis where voter is interacted with compulsory voting.22 I 
then graph the predicted probabilities for each attitudinal outcome based on the system 
and whether individual was a voter or not (see Figure 2.4). The top right graph of Figure 
2.4 shows that while both voters and non-voters in CV systems report slightly higher 
average levels of resentment in comparison to voters and nonvoters in VV systems, these 
differences are not statistically significant (i.e., confidence intervals overlap). Statistically 
significant differences exist between voters and non-voters within each system. This is 
intuitive; non-voters in each system are much more likely to report feelings of resentment 
in comparison to those who identify themselves as voters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
individuals if they actually voted in the previous election, as many other surveys do. 
Therefore, this is the best way to approximate reported voting behavior.  
22 See Table A10 in Appendix A. 
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Figure 2.4. Predicted Probabilities of Individual Attitudes by Voting System 
and Voting Behavior 
 
Notes: Figure 2.4 shows the predicted probability of selecting a specific feeling, 
conditioned by being a voter or not. Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant 
differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated from results presented 
in Table A10 in Appendix A. 
 
In regards to civic duty, the top left graph in Figure 2.4 shows that voters and non-
voters in both types of systems report feeling like voting is a civic duty. Here, it is 
interesting to note that when it comes to perceiving voting as a civic obligation, voters 
and non-voters report virtually the same patterns—meaning, nonvoters are just as likely 
to report feelings of civic duty towards voting, but that does not ensure that they will 
actually turn out. The bottom right graph in Figure 2.4 shows that, similar to feelings of 
resentment, but in an inverse direction, voters in both VV and CV systems tend to report 
significantly higher levels of satisfaction in comparison to non-voters, but that the 
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differences between compulsory and voluntary voting per se are not statistically 
significant.  
Most importantly, however, the bottom left graph of Figure 2.4 suggests that (1) 
non-voters are significantly more likely to report feelings of indifference towards voting 
than voters in both systems, and (2) voters in CV are significantly more likely to report 
indifference relative to voters in VV systems. Non-voters under CV are also slightly more 
likely to report feeling indifferent than non-voters in VV, and this different is close to 
being statistically significant. This suggests that even when you take away the most 
indifferent people under compulsory voting (those who would likely by non-voters), there 
is still a significant difference between voters in both systems. This provides evidence 
that this effect is not only being driven by unlikely voters. 
I also graph the interaction between voters/nonvoters under both systems as an 
predictor of selecting the option “don’t vote” in Figure A1 in Appendix A in order to 
show how selecting “don’t vote” and as attitude towards voting differs from whether the 
respondent indicated voting in an upcoming election. The figure shows that both non-
voters and voters under compulsory voting system are less likely to select the “don’t 
vote” category, since they are more likely to turn out due to the requirement to vote. It 
also shows that non-voters in both systems are significantly more likely to say that they 
“don’t vote,” consistent with the expectation that it is only people who have had less or 
no experience with voting that are more likely to chose that answer to the attitudinal 
question.  
A second concern is that the statistically significant result that individuals living 
under CV laws are more likely to report feeling indifferent might simply be a product of a 
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higher number of politically uninterested voters being coerced to the polls under CV. In 
other words—it is not that CV is affecting a change in attitudes, but simply that it is 
including voters to its electorate that are not interested in politics and would otherwise 
abstain if voting weren’t mandatory. If that is the case, we should expect that the 
statistically significant effect of CV on indifference is restricted to those who are not that 
interested in politics. That gap should then essentially close for those with higher levels 
of political interest. In order to see if that is the case, I estimate a model that predicts 
citizen attitudes using levels of political interest conditioned by the voting system.23 I 
then graph the predicted probabilities to ease interpretation in Figure 2.5.  
Figure 2.5. Predicted Probabilities of Indifferent Attitudes Towards 
Voting by Voting System and Political Interest 
 
Notes: Figure 2.5 shows the predicted probability of selecting feelings of indifference, 
conditioned by an individuals’ level of political interest. Confidence intervals indicate 
statistical significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated 
from results presented in Table A11 in Appendix A. 
                                                 
23 See Table A11 in Appendix A for the results. 
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Figure 2.5 shows levels of indifference towards voting for each level of political 
interest, and by voting system.24 The figures show that while it is clear that the more 
interested an individual is, the less likely they are to feel indifferent towards voting 
regardless of the voting system. Most important for my argument, however, individuals 
under CV are still significantly more likely to feel indifferent than their counterparts 
living under voluntary voting at every level of political interest, including those who 
report “some” or “high” interest in politics. Admittedly, these statistically significant 
differences are not particularly large. It does still show that indifference is not only a 
product of more uninterested voters being driven to the polls under CV. Instead, it 
appears compulsory voting does influence individual attitudes—even amongst those who 
are particularly interested in politics.  
Taken together, these findings show that while most scholars and political figures 
tend to perceive the impact of compulsory voting on individual attitudes as either positive 
or negative, evidence shows that the impact of CV on individual attitudes towards voting 
is not as clear as expected. Unlike certain proponents of CV argue, mandatory turn out 
does not inspire citizens to become more civically minded. At the same times, it appears 
that concerns over CV instigating negative feelings amongst citizens have been 
overstated. Instead, there is evidence that CV increases the likelihood that individuals feel 
indifferent towards voting, although the magnitude of this effect is still small. 
                                                 
24 Political Interest is measured via the following question: “How interested are you in 
politics?” The variable was recoded so that a 1 equals not at all interested, 2 low interest, 
3 some interest, and 4 high interest.  
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Confirming the Null Effects on Civic Duty 
 The main dependent variable in this study is a useful way to capture variations in 
individual’s feelings towards the democratic process because it allows for individuals to 
select a variety of attitudes that provide important information about how institutional 
design changes citizens perceptions. At the same time, it does not provide a conventional 
way to capture civic duty. The main analyses of this study suggest that compulsory 
voting does not influence an individuals’ sense of civic duty. Because this null finding 
contrasts with other literature arguing the CV could positively influence individuals’ 
attitudes towards the political process, I conduct an additional analysis to confirm that 
this is the case using more conventional measures of civic duty.  
 As previously discussed, one of the most common way to capture civic duty is to 
ask whether an individual perceives voting as an important feature of being a good citizen 
(Blais and Galais 2016). Consistent with a number of additional surveys, the 2010 round 
of the Latinobarometro asks the following question: “which of the following things do 
you believe you should do in order to be considered a good citizen?” Among several 
potential options, if the respondent selected “you should vote,” I recorded that as 
indicating a civic duty to vote. Table A12 in Appendix A indicates that compulsory 
voting is not a statistically significant predictor of recognizing voting as a civic duty. 
Below in Figure 2.6, I report the results graphically in order to ease interpretation.  
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Figure 2.6. Predicted Probability of Civic Duty to Vote, by Voting System 
 
Notes: Figure 2.6 shows the predicted probability of selecting voting as 
important for being a good citizen. Confidence intervals indicate statistical 
significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated 
from results presented in Table A12 in Appendix A. 
 
 In the figure, we first note that the predicted probabilities of an individual in Latin 
America identifying voting as a civic duty is relatively high, somewhere between 70 and 
80 percent. This is again consistent with previous literature on individuals in the United 
States and Canada (Blais 2000), and with the high levels shown earlier in Figure 2.1. But, 
there are no apparent differences depending on the voting system. Individuals under both 
compulsory and voluntary voting are equally as likely to report feelings of civic duty (i.e. 
confidence intervals overlap). This provides strong face validity to the an important 
finding of this study—compulsory voting does not fundamentally change how much 
individuals perceive voting to be a civic duty.  
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Conclusion 
 Overall, the results provided in this research suggest that on average, citizens 
living under compulsory voting systems tend to feel slightly more indifferent towards the 
act of voting when compared to their counterparts in voluntary systems. Contrary to a 
variety of scholars who argue CV laws should awaken a sense of civic duty amongst its 
citizenry, individuals living under these systems are no more likely to perceive voting as 
a civic duty than those living under voluntary voting. It also provides empirical evidence 
against the claim that CV creates more resentful citizens. The findings also suggest that 
CV can change the amount of value citizens see in actually going to the polls. This is an 
important piece of evidence to be invoked when scholars, practitioners, and policymakers 
highlight the potential harming or beneficial effects of voting system reform.  
 While this research provides empirical evidence for how mandatory voting 
influences citizen attitudes, further research is necessary to unpack the mechanisms that 
lead individuals to feel indifferent towards voting. Specifically, the contextual effect of 
institutions that are coupled with compulsory voting in order to make turning out less 
costly cannot be empirically tested in the Latin American region due to the widespread 
similarity in institutional design among countries with both voluntary and compulsory 
laws. We could, however, gain useful insight as to how such voter-friendly institutional 
design works to influence citizen attitudes by expanding the analysis to other regions or 
countries in which more significant variation exists.  
Also, future research should investigate voter mobilization efforts under 
compulsory voting in order to better understand why CV can lead certain individuals to 
devalue their votes. A careful investigation of how individuals perceive the value of their 
vote given the institutional environment they are presented with could offer scholars and 
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practioners more insights as to how to engage the population as a whole. Although this 
article focuses on attitudes and not political behavior, it is possible that indifferent 
attitudes under CV can be behaviorally displayed as patterns of invalid or blank voting—
what some consider as the equivalent of abstention when voting is mandatory (Lavareda 
1991). While the investigation of whether apathetic attitudes correspond to higher rates of 
invalid voting (or less political activism) is beyond the scope of this study, a further look 
into the behavioral manifestation of feelings of indifference would represent a fruitful 
avenue for future research.    
The effects (or lack thereof) of CV laws on individual attitudes presented in this 
paper are likely the first step in a chain of events that explains how mandatory voting 
influences overall political behavior and electoral outcomes, relationships that have been 
vastly explored in the literature to date. While this primary link was largely unexplored to 
date, it can help explain the existing lack of consensus that exists in terms of the 
byproducts of CV (i.e. its impact on political sophistication or political engagement), add 
nuance and empirical evidence to specific untested mechanisms assumed to be present in 
driving aggregate outcomes in the presence or absence of compulsory voting. Overall, 
this research contributes to our broader understanding of the psychological and intrinsic 
effects of maximizing turnout via mandatory voting laws.
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Chapter 3 
Political Engagement When Voting is Mandatory: Evidence From Election Law 
Reform in Chile 
 
Electoral participation is a core element of democracy (Dahl 1971). Political 
participation on election day is crucial for establishing democratic legitimacy, as election 
outcomes are perceived as more representative when a large part of the population turns 
out to vote (Dalton 2004). Broader civic engagement also strengthens democracy 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993). While a considerable amount of research has 
aimed to explain what cultural and institutional factors influence voter turnout and 
political engagement as a whole, what do we know about political engagement when 
turnout is a given? Under a system of compulsory voting, all eligible citizens are required 
by law to turn out at the polls, causing turnout rates to be much higher (Bechtel, 
Hangartner, and Schmid 2016; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Hoffman, León, and 
Lombardi 2017; Singh 2011). Our knowledge of how compulsory voting (herein CV) 
influences citizens’ political behavior beyond election day remains unclear. 
A burgeoning body of research has started to investigate this question, but 
empirical findings are mixed. For instance, experimental designs simulating mandatory 
requirements to vote have found both positive (Shineman, forthcoming) and null 
(Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2007) effects. Single country studies, often using 
counterfactual scenarios of institutional reform, also raise doubts as to whether CV has 
any potential effects beyond voting (De Leon and Rizzi 2014; Singh, Roy, and Fournier 
2017). More comprehensive cross-national studies of political engagement under CV 
conclude that little to no relationship exists in the aggregate (Birch 2009; Carreras 2016), 
but that enforced mandatory voting laws do help decrease engagement gaps of certain 
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marginalized groups (Córdova and Rangel 2017; Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Miller, 
forthcoming). This growing mixed evidence suggests we do not yet fully understand the 
second-order effects of mandatory voting laws. Existing inconsistencies may be due to 
variation in research designs in this literature, which at times are lacking in internal 
validity or fail to capture the causal relationship between CV and engagement, or also 
due to the variety of engagement outcomes examined. 
This study overcomes these issues by leveraging novel public opinion data from 
Chile over an eleven-year timeframe that captures a change in CV laws. The abolition of 
compulsory voting in Chile in 2011 provides a unique opportunity to estimate the effects 
of CV on political engagement beyond the ballot box. Apart from this type of reform 
being extremely rare, the lack of quality individual survey data before and after reform 
has prevented scholars from pursuing a thorough quantitative analysis of the effects of 
compulsory voting beyond turnout (Selb and Lachat 2009).25 The empirical approach 
used in this study allows us to more accurately capture the effect of compulsory voting on 
engagement by taking advantage of an exogenous institutional change while holding 
constant many other contextual and cultural factors that are difficult to isolate in cross-
national analyses.  
This study also makes an important theoretical contribution by carefully 
distinguishing between different aspects of political engagement, and by drawing specific 
connections between the many theoretical mechanisms and outcomes to be observed. I 
examine the impact of compulsory voting on six distinct aspects of political engagement 
                                                 
25 Apart from Chile, the only other countries to ever formally abandon compulsory voting 
are the Netherlands (in 1970) and Venezuela and Italy (in 1993) (Gratschew 2004; 
Lijphart 1997).  
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related to information seeking, the information environment, and political activism—
which all rely on distinct theoretical mechanisms. In doing so, this study provides a more 
nuanced picture of the ways in which a mandatory requirement to vote might affect 
overall political engagement. I find that CV does increase political engagement, but in a 
rather private form—citizens are more likely to individually absorb political information 
by watching and reading about the news, but not necessarily more likely to discuss 
politics around their friends or actively engage in political activity. All in all, this 
research contributes directly to our understanding of how attempts to maximize turnout 
via institutional change can affect not only electoral participation, but also broader 
aspects of political engagement.  
Determinants of Engagement and the Mixed Evidence on Compulsory Voting 
Concerns over low turnout are prominent among scholars and political elites 
across the world. High levels of turnout indicate stronger legitimacy as the elected 
government depicts a more direct representation of the will of the majority (Dalton 2004; 
Scully, Jones, and Trystan 2004). Higher turnout also increases the chances that the 
voting electorate is more representative, suggesting that elected officials and subsequent 
policies are more reflective of a wider and more diverse set of the population (Dahl 2006; 
Hill and Leighley 1994; Lijphart 1999). Given the established importance of electoral 
participation for the functioning of democracy, an extensive body of research investigates 
what factors best predict voter turnout rates. We know, for example, that individuals of 
higher socioeconomic status are more likely to turn out to vote (Smets and van Ham 
2013; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1995). Older individuals tend to vote at higher rates (Leighley 
1995), and in some countries, women go to the polls at lower rates than men (Córdova 
and Rangel 2017; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2014).  
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Research also shows that political institutions have a particularly strong impact on 
an individuals’ likelihood to go to the polls (Cancela and Geys 2016; Geys 2006). 
Institutions that reduce the costs of voting, such as inexpensive registration laws 
(Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Vonnahme 2012) or concurrent elections (Hajnal and 
Lewis 2003; Lijphart 1997), encourage voters to turn out at the polls. Additionally, 
lowering the cost of getting to the polls by holding elections on weekends can promote 
electoral participation (Franklin 2002). Institutions can also foster political participation 
by increasing the value of one’s vote, sending a signal that an individual’s vote might 
make a difference (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Levine and Palfrey 2007). Proportional 
electoral systems (Blais and Aarts 2006; Karp and Banducci 1999), high district 
magnitudes (Blais and Carty 1990; Geys 2006), and strong electoral competition (Blais 
and Rubenson 2013; Engstrom 2012) all motivate electoral participation by making an 
individual vote more valuable.  
Yet, the strongest and most robust predictor of turnout is the presence of 
compulsory voting laws (Cancela and Geys 2016). This institution encourages 
participation by raising the cost of not voting, as the government is allowed to impose 
sanctions or fines on those who choose to abstain altogether (Panagopoulos 2008). When 
sanctions are enforced, compulsory voting is especially efficient in mobilizing 
participation (Blais, Massicotte, and Dobrzynska 2003; Singh 2011). Countries with 
mandatory voting requirements display turnout rates anywhere from 10 to 18 percentage 
points higher than countries with no formal requirement to turn out (Baek 2009; Fornos, 
Power, and Garand 2004; Jaitman 2013). Where compulsory voting was abolished, 
turnout rates severely declined, such as in the Netherlands in 1970 (from 94.9 percent to 
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79.1 percent within one election cycle) Venezuela in 1993 (from 81.7 percent to 60 
percent) and most recently Chile in 2011 (from 86 percent to 50 percent) (Barnes and 
Rangel 2014; Birch 2009; Irwin 1974).26 
As certain as we are about compulsory voting increasing turnout, much debate 
still exists in regards to the additional effects of compulsory voting laws. Aside from an 
ongoing philosophical debate on the legality and suitability of mandatory turnout,27 
scholars have recently turned their attention to studying the second-order effects of CV 
that expand beyond voter election day. A burgeoning body of literature investigates 
whether CV promotes engagement in other aspects of the political realm beyond the 
ballot box.  
Political engagement can be a rather broad term. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
(1995, 38) define political engagement as “activity that has the intent or effect of 
influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or 
implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who 
make those policies.” Zukin et al (2006, 7) note that this is different than civic 
engagement, which they define as “organized voluntary activity focused on problem 
solving and helping others.” Political engagement can take on many forms. Typical 
political indicators of engagement include not just voting but also persuading others, 
volunteering for a campaign, or making campaign contributions. Cognitive engagement is 
often related to actions such as discussing politics, attention to the news, and also overall 
levels of political knowledge.   
                                                 
26 Here, turnout is calculated as the proportion of registered electors who participated. 
27 See Brennan and Hill (2014) for a comprehensive discussion of this debate. 
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While the factors that influence political engagement are often similar to the ones 
that predict voter turnout (which in and of itself is a political form of engagement), it is 
still unclear whether the positive impact compulsory voting has on voter turnout 
translates into other engagement outcomes. The empirical evidence on this relationship is 
far from conclusive, with some studies showing a positive effect (e.g., Gordon and 
Segura 1997; Shineman, forthcoming, Singh and Thorton 2013), moderate effects (e.g., 
Birch 2009), or little to no effect (e.g., Carreras 2016; Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2007). 
These discrepancies may in part be due to the different research designs used to 
investigate the question, and the types of engagement outcomes they examine. Existing 
studies of CV and political engagement have used multiple empirical strategies: cross-
national, large-N approaches; single-case and subnational studies; and experimental 
designs. 
Cross-National Designs 
The most comprehensive studies of CV use cross-national data to investigate 
whether levels of political engagement are higher in countries with compulsory voting 
laws versus those where voting is voluntary. What is meant by political engagement, 
however, varies. A few studies focus on political sophistication as the outcome—with the 
theoretical assumption that CV promotes higher overall engagement with politics, 
thereby raising the amount of knowledge for a given individual. These studies find small 
but positive increases in the level of knowledge for those living in CV countries 
(Berggren 2001; Gordon and Segura 1997), and stronger evidence that it makes political 
knowledge more evenly distributed among the population (Dassoneville, Hooghe, and 
Miller, forthcoming; Sheppard 2015). Focusing specifically on partisan attachment as an 
aspect of engagement, Singh and Thorton (2013) argue that the higher presence of non-
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sophisticated voters in the electorate of CV countries prompts individuals to make use of 
shortcuts for deciding who to vote for. The authors find that rates of party attachment are 
indeed higher in countries where voting is compulsory. Additionally, studies focusing on 
the engagement of specific groups of the population, such as women, find that CV works 
to close the gender gap in election-related forms of political engagement (Córdova and 
Rangel 2017).  
Other studies focusing on a more wide-ranging list of political engagement 
outcomes start to cast uncertainty upon the positive findings discussed above. Birch 
(2009) shows that CV has little to no impact on political knowledge, levels of political 
conversation, and certain measures of political participation. In a recent and 
comprehensive analysis of 21 Latin American and Caribbean countries over a period of 
ten years, Carreras (2016, 155) examines the impact of CV on both cognitive (i.e., 
political interest, attention to news) and active (i.e., attendance in party meetings or 
community events) forms of engagement, concluding that “compulsory voting has a 
negligible effect on political engagement.”  
While these studies add valuable information to our understanding of the impacts 
of CV laws, cross-national designs raise doubts about the causality of the relationship 
between CV and political engagement. Cross-national designs allow us to observe the 
existence of a correlation, but make it difficult to establish whether CV as a single 
institution is causing levels of engagement to change given that they are examining 
average levels across different states at the same point in time. Although these studies 
make strong efforts to control for as many confounding factors as possible, they still 
investigate different individuals under a diverse set of institutions, election dynamics, and 
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cultural or social elements. Cultural factors, which are possible determinants of behavior, 
are especially difficult to control for in cross-national studies (Fowler and Kam 2007; 
Rolfe 2012). For instance, Norris’ (2004) finding that CV matters more for turnout in 
established democracies versus emerging ones is often attributed to the fact that 
mandatory laws depend on broader social norms about adherence to law and authority. 
These aspects can be difficult to capture with existing cross-national survey data. Such 
research designs, therefore, are believed to be more error-prone (Hirczy 1994; Selb and 
Lachat 2009).   
Single Country Studies 
Another empirical approach is to evaluate some of the patterns in political 
engagement in countries where compulsory voting already exists. One option is to take 
advantage of subnational variation in compulsory voting laws. Switzerland and Austria 
are the only countries that have had, at some point in time, subnational variation in where 
voting is compulsory. All other countries employ compulsory voting at the national level. 
Shineman (2009) takes advantage of the Austrian case, and using survey data from 1999 
(in which two provinces still maintained CV), she finds that citizens living under CV 
laws were more politically interested and engaged with politics. 
A second option in single country studies of CV is to hypothetically estimate 
whether an individual would still vote if voting were no longer compulsory. Multiple 
studies have used this approach primarily to estimate the direct impact of CV on voter 
turnout—by asking citizens of Belgium or Brazil whether they would still turn out to vote 
if voting was no longer compulsory (Elkins 2000; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). Specific 
to political engagement, however, Singh, Roy, and Fournier (2017) use an experiment in 
Australia to show that individuals who identified as not being willing to vote if voting 
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was no longer compulsory were also less likely to spend time searching for additional 
information for a simulated election. They conclude, therefore, that those who do not turn 
out to vote voluntary “spend less time arriving at their vote choices, and engage with less 
political information when doing so” (Singh, Roy, and Fournier 2017, 2).  
While designs of this nature are compelling and considered superior to cross-
national studies for drawing causal inferences (Selb and Lachat 2009), it is still not ideal 
to estimate the legal requirement to vote by using a counterfactual estimate of whether an 
individual would vote under a different system. This measure raises doubts regarding the 
construct validity of the study—is this hypothetical estimate a proper operationalization 
of the presence/absence of compulsory voting laws? As Singh, Roy, and Fournier (2017) 
recognize, this counterfactual approach can be subject to a social desirability bias. 
Respondents in the study may be hesitant to identify not being willing to vote in fear of 
being perceived as a non-law abiding citizen. We know, for instance, that respect for 
compulsory voting laws relies not solely on a monetary penalty, but also partially on 
social norms and the wish to be perceived as a good citizen (Funk 2007). We also know 
that when confronted with questions about voter turnout, individuals in general tend to 
over-report positive voting behavior (Karp and Brockington 2005; Silver, Anderson, and 
Abramson 1986).28 Therefore, such research design might underreport the number of 
people who are most likely driven by the simple requirement to vote. It might, in turn, be 
capturing only those who are especially against the compulsory voting law or politics in 
general, which could explain the negative results.  
                                                 
28 Research also shows that individuals tend to underreport undesirable behavior. For 
instance, in a study of vote buying in Nicaragua, Gonzales-Ocantos et al. (2012) show 
that while 24% of registered voters were offered something for their vote, only 2% of 
respondents reported the behavior when asked about it.  
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A more recent approach in single-case studies has been to take advantage of 
instances where the law actually varies within the population. In Brazil, for instance, 
voting is initially voluntary for those between 16-18 years old, and then becomes 
compulsory when the individual turns 18. De Leon and Rizzi (2014) employ a regression 
discontinuity approach to estimate whether individuals react to the introduction of CV at 
18 years old by acquiring more information and consequently becoming more 
knowledgeable about politics. They find no significant differences in levels of political 
knowledge or information consumption. A similar statistical approach used by Holbein 
and Rangel (2016) also reports that CV has no impact on a wider range of engagement 
variables.29 This approach, however, does not consider that many other exogenous shocks 
happen at the exact time when voting becomes compulsory (such as starting college, 
leaving the home, etc.), which could obfuscate the causal effect of CV. Also, restricting 
the sample to those individuals around the age of 18 may not be representative of the 
effect of CV on the broader population. This is important because studies show that 
young people vote less often than older individuals (Leighley 1995) and even when 
voting is compulsory, young individuals are still less likely to vote and engage with 
politics (Singh 2011). This implies that any byproducts of CV might not immediately 
apply at voting age, and instead be part of a longer learning process. 
Experimental Designs 
In order to better establish causality, some scholars have used experiments to 
estimate the impact of a legal requirement to vote on political engagement. Loewen, 
Milner, and Hicks (2007) place a sample of students in Quebec, Canada into two groups, 
                                                 
29 Such as political interest, participating in civic associations (such as unions or political 
parties), and political knowledge 
  67 
and all participants are asked to complete two surveys—one prior and one following the 
2007 provincial election. All individuals are then offered a $25 gift card for completing 
both surveys. One of the two groups, however, was told that in order to get the gift card, 
the individual must also vote in the election. This was a way to simulate coercion by 
saying that if the individual did not vote, they would have incurred the cost of not 
receiving the promised gift card. When comparing the treatment group to the control 
group that was not required to vote, the authors found no significant effect in the amount 
of knowledge, news consumption, and political discussion between the groups. A very 
similar experiment done by Shineman (forthcoming) in San Francisco’s 2011 municipal 
elections, however, does find a positive effect on individuals’ investment in information 
when compelled to vote.  
Although experiments are better at estimating causal effects, it is debatable 
whether the treatment conditions used in such studies accurately approximate compulsory 
voting as an institution. Even by subjecting individuals to a future penalty for not having 
voted, the financial burden still constitutes an additional amount that they simply forgo 
by not following the voting requirement. Under compulsory voting systems, the financial 
burden is more direct in the sense that it is actually removing existing resources from 
people’s pockets, which could represent stronger incentives to comply with the law. This 
calculation resonates with prospect theory, which argues that individuals are more loss 
averse, and that “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 279; Vis 
2011). Further, as previously discussed, research has also shown that adhering to the 
voting law under CV may be a function of not only fines or financial burdens that are 
implemented, but also social desirability and the wish to be perceived as a law-abiding 
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citizen (Funk 2007; Geys 2006). Therefore, the treatments simulating financial burdens 
fail to capture adherence to CV due to social pressure that is prevalent when all 
individuals are bound by the law, which could in turn also affect these second-order 
effects.   
In order to circumvent some of the shortcomings in existing studies, I take 
advantage of a rare instance where compulsory voting has been abolished: Chile. This 
design would account for any variation at the aggregate or country-level that cannot be 
captured in cross-national studies, minimize the possibility that additional exogenous 
shocks might be taking place, and provide a direct and explicit measure of what happens 
in the presence and absence of compulsory voting that is representative of the broader 
population. Indeed, Selb and Lachat (2009) suggest that such design would be preferable 
over other approaches. They note, however, that apart from the rare instances of election 
law reform, survey data expanding a sufficient time frame before and after reform are 
nonexistent, making this task a difficult if not impossible one. Fortunately, in the case of 
Chile, detailed individual-level survey data capturing several aspects of political 
engagement are available from 2005 to 2016. Given that the election law reform took 
place in 2011, these data demonstrate enough variation before and after the reform in 
which to uncover any potential effects. This feature presents a major contribution of this 
study, especially for those aiming to establish the benefits or shortcomings of introducing 
and abolishing compulsory voting.  
Another existing gap in this literature, however, concerns the link between 
theoretical expectations and observed outcomes. Many theories as to why CV would 
influence engagement exist, but often scholars will simply list the distinct theoretical 
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mechanisms, and combine them to arrive at one expectation in regards to political 
engagement. By aggregating all different expectations and outcomes, scholars have made 
inferences as to how CV influences overall political engagement (which can mean several 
different things), but ignore that CV may influence certain aspects of engagement and not 
others. This approach hinders our ability to truly understand how and when CV may or 
may not affect political outcomes beyond voter turnout. In this paper, I draw careful 
distinctions as to how certain measures of political engagement are qualitatively different, 
and thus correspond to different theoretical mechanisms. This discussion helps clarify 
when we should expect CV to have second-order effects and why that should be the case. 
In the section below, I engage in an in-depth discussion of the proposed theoretical 
mechanisms. Following the theoretical discussion, I explain how the case of Chile allows 
me to text my expectations, covering the particular characteristics of the data and 
research design. 
Compulsory Voting and Political Engagement: Theoretical Mechanisms 
  Mandatory voting rules should affect political engagement beyond the ballot box 
for several reasons. These mechanisms include (1) personal investment in information, 
(2) a change in the information environment, and (3) spill-over effects from turnout 
behavior. Few studies have made distinctions in regards to which specific outcomes are 
expected to arise from each potential mechanism. For instance, when studies test the 
impact of CV on multiple aspects of political engagement and find significant effects for 
one but not six other outcomes, their conclusion is that CV has a negligible effect on 
engagement (e.g., Carreras 2016; Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2007). But, it could be that 
CV affects one aspect of engagement and not another, and that can be better understood if 
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we link theoretical expectations with specific proposed outcomes. I discuss each of the 
mechanisms in turn. 
Compulsory Voting and Information Seeking  
 The first reason why one might expect CV to increase political engagement 
originates from the idea that once an individual is required to vote by law, they will likely 
seek out information in order to make an informed decision (Córdova and Rangel 2017; 
Shineman, forthcoming). In other words, when individuals are required to show up to the 
polls and cast a ballot (either valid or blank/null) regardless of their willingness to do so, 
they will likely want to learn something about the candidates or the election (Birch 2009; 
Engelen 2007). This is because individuals have an incentive to cast an informed vote. By 
seeking information on how to maximize their vote at the polls, individuals are provided 
with increased marginal benefits as the chances of an optimal outcome taking place 
increases. Making an informed vote may also increase an individuals’ utility of voting 
and provide some psychological benefit.  
Although this argument may not seem plausible since acquiring information itself 
is a costly act, this decision can be represented as a rational one. Just as individuals under 
voluntary voting laws calculate the costs and benefits associated with turning out to vote 
(Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968b), individuals that are compelled to vote via 
CV also consider the cost-benefit structure associated with voting. When voting is 
voluntary, individuals are essentially subject to two costs: the costs of going to the polls 
and of acquiring the information to do so. Under compulsory voting, however, the cost of 
voting is much lower, because instead, abstention is the costlier action. Therefore, the 
costs of voting under CV are perceived as non-recoverable (i.e., sunk cost), which in turn 
incentivizes individuals to then invest resources to gather information in order to avoid 
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wasting their vote (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Córdova and Rangel 2017; Shineman, 
forthcoming). In sum, when the combined costs of voting and information seeking 
decrease under compulsory voting, individuals may find it rational and worthwhile to 
spend resources on acquiring information.  
 If the implication of this mechanism is that additional political engagement 
beyond turning out to vote will come from individuals actively seeking out information 
and investing additional resources to make an informed choice, we should observe CV 
affecting measures of engagement that particularly relate to the private behavior of 
acquiring information. The easiest way to gather such information would be to read about 
politics or watch political news. This represents a private and direct initiative from the 
individual, consistent with the idea that such initiative is a response to a personal and 
independent calculation of the costs and benefits described above. As such, my first 
expectation to test this specific mechanism is as follows: 
H1 (Information Seeking Hypothesis): Compulsory voting laws should increase 
individuals’ propensity to watch or read news about politics. 
Compulsory Voting and the Information Environment  
 A second argument for how CV might increase political engagement focuses on 
the information environment under both systems. When all eligible citizens are required 
to turn out to vote, the saliency of political discussion increases, and there is a higher 
probability that an individual will be exposed to political discussion (Birch 2009; 
Shineman 2012). When simply increasing the total number of people that are required to 
vote, there is a higher chance that an individual gets exposed to political information and 
discussion. Electoral information is especially likely to disseminate through informal 
conversations. This should be the case even for those who are not typically associated 
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with civic groups or networks that facilitate political discussion (Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1995). In a setting where all individuals are required to turn out, political discussion can 
disseminate not only in settings where we may typically expect them to (such as union 
meetings or even religious groups), but also in more informal settings, such as a 
conversation with neighbors. 
Political discussion may also increase due to the fact that compulsory voting may 
eliminate a taboo associated with the discussion of politics. When all individuals are 
required to vote and one can assume that the other is likely to do so, it may decrease the 
chance that someone may feel uncomfortable when confronted with a political 
conversation. Finally, political parties are likely to contribute to the dissemination of 
information by reaching out to a larger and wider set of voters under compulsory voting 
(Lijphart 1997). As such, political parties contribute to the change in the information 
environment and the salience of political conversation. In order to capture this 
phenomenon, one must be able to observe whether political discussion is indeed 
heightened under compulsory voting system. This logic leads be to the following 
hypothesis:  
 H2 (Information Environment Hypothesis): Compulsory voting laws should 
increase levels of political discussion.  
Compulsory Voting and Spill Over Effects from Turnout 
 The most cited mechanism through which CV should increase political 
engagement is the simple fact that taking part in one political activity may spur activism 
in other areas of politics (Lijphart 1997; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1995). The legal 
requirement to turn out to vote in every election consequently creates a habit of voting, 
directly influencing individual political behavior (Blais and Achen 2010; Gerber, Green, 
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and Schachar 2003). Once voting becomes a habit, participation patterns are likely to 
spill over into other types of political involvement, and politics becomes a more 
significant part of citizens’ lives (Jakee and Sun 2006; Wertheimer 1975). For instance, 
voting in an election may spur political interest, and subsequently encourage individuals 
to remain active in politics, perhaps in order to try to hold politicians accountable, or to 
check on their progress. Requiring all eligible citizens to turn out to vote should also 
boost higher levels of political efficacy, which would then translate into greater political 
participation (Birch 2009; Hill 2006, 2014). By actively showing up at the voting booth, 
individuals feel that they matter and are part of the political system, therefore 
encouraging them to continue to play a role in the political domain. 
This mechanism specifically focuses on the potential for CV to spur political 
activities beyond the ballot box. Hence, these effects should translate into political 
engagement in the form of direct political activism. This logic leads to my next 
hypothesis: 
H3 (Spill Over Hypothesis): Compulsory voting laws should increase an 
individual’s likelihood of participating in political acts. 
Compulsory Voting and the Engagement of Low Probability Voters 
 A crucial argument against the idea that compulsory voting promotes political 
engagement is that compelling citizens to turn out by law would only force uninformed 
individuals to go to the polls without making them more engaged (Brennan and Hill 
2014; Briggs and Chelis 2010; Denemark 2015). In other words, individuals who are 
unlikely to turn out when voting is voluntary would simply show up at the polls and 
either cast a blank ballot or choose at random. Indeed, research has found that rates of 
invalid voting are higher under compulsory voting than when voting is voluntary (Hill 
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and Young 2007; Uggla 2008). But, this argument simply assumes that an actor’s level of 
political information is fixed and would not change based on institutional design. This 
assumption is problematic because, as Shineman (forthcoming, 4) puts it, “it neglects to 
account for information acquisition to be endogenous to participation.”   
 In fact, it could be the case that under compulsory voting, less sophisticated voters 
would be particularly likely to become politically engaged, since they require more 
information and are more subject to consuming information via informal discussions 
(Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008; Sheppard 2015). It would be reasonable to expect, 
then, that although compulsory voting should increase overall levels of political 
engagement, this effect should be particularly strong for those that are typically unlikely 
to engage with politics. Research has established that individuals with lower 
socioeconomic status (SES) are less likely to engage with politics (Smets and van Ham 
2013; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1995), and would thus be particularly likely to need to engage 
with politics further. This logic leads to the final hypothesis: 
H4 (Socioeconomic Impact Hypothesis): The impact of compulsory voting on 
political engagement should be particularly strong for those of lower 
socioeconomic status. 
The Case of Chile 
 As previously discussed, election law reform is rare, and countries have very 
seldom decided to abandon compulsory voting all together. The Netherlands abolished 
CV in 1970, as did Italy and Venezuela in 1994. The most recent reform, however, took 
place in Chile in 2011. Previously, Chile had a system of compulsory voting for those 
registered to vote—although registration was voluntary. Still, when Chile transitioned to 
democracy in the early 1990’s, an astounding 92 percent of the population was registered 
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to vote and thus subject to compulsory voting laws (Barnes and Rangel 2014). Although 
registration rates decreased gradually over time, Chile was still generally considered to 
have a mandatory voting law.30 In most datasets of compulsory voting, Chile is 
considered to have an enforced compulsory voting system prior to 2011 (Electoral 
Commision 2006; IDEA 2017; Singh 2011). Even though the registration requirement 
under the old system is not a common characteristic of most compulsory systems, Chile’s 
electoral reform provides a rare and unique opportunity to evaluate patterns of political 
behavior prior to and after the abolition of CV. 
 In 2010, Chile’s Senate voted to formally remove the existing compulsory voting 
laws. Now, the system consists of voluntary voting, but also automatic registration. The 
change to automatic registration in particular was expected to mobilize large amounts of 
voters to the polls. However, in the 2012 municipal elections—the first election following 
the reform—turnout declined by about 20 percent (Barnes and Rangel 2014). The 
following presidential election also saw the lowest voter turnout rate of any presidential 
election held in almost 20 years. Overall, it is clear that the election reform had a 
profound impact on patterns of participation. 
 The reform in Chile presents a great opportunity to improve our understanding of 
how compulsory voting laws shape political behavior. First, the availability of survey 
data over a number of years increases the chances of observing any causal effects. It can 
be argued, for instance, that a change in behavior might not be immediate after electoral 
                                                 
30 While this aspect of Chile’s compulsory voting is unique, the reform that took place in 
Chile still presents a rare opportunity to examine patterns of behavior under voluntary 
and compulsory voting. I also conduct robustness checks in order to account for some of 
the unique features of Chile’s compulsory voting system in a later section titled 
“Robustness Checks.” 
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reform, and therefore enough information needs to be gathered following an institutional 
change. In this study, data are available for 6 years prior to and 5 years following the 
reform, increasing the chances that any patterns will be captured. Second, data are 
available on a number of factors related to political engagement. This variety of possible 
outcomes allows us to parse out which aspects of political engagement are particularly 
affected by CV, and to determine which mechanisms are actually driving this 
relationship. 
 Most importantly, these analyses allow for many contextual, historical, and 
cultural variables to be accounted for given that the institutional reform is taking place in 
the same country and over time. During the time frame of the study, few things changed 
in Chile’s political system—there were no other major institutional reforms, and 
whatever major changes occurred (i.e. economic downturns) can be controlled for. 
Therefore, this design better captures the impact of compulsory voting itself, unlike 
aggregate cross-national studies, which can only compare average patterns of behavior at 
one moment in time (Selb and Lachat 2009). 
Data and Methods 
 The survey data come from the Centro De Estudios Públicos (CEP) in Chile—a 
private academic think tank. The organization conducts several individual surveys 
throughout the years on topics related to politics, the economy, and elections. Data is 
available starting in 2005, and the most recent published survey took place in November 
of 2016. Not all surveys include the variables of interest to this study, however. The items 
related to political engagement were available in 11 different surveys, each containing 
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approximately 1,500 individual respondents.31 Six surveys were conducted prior to 
Election Reform in 2011, while five were conducted afterwards. This totals to 
approximately 11,000 individuals over the 11-year period. 
Dependent and Independent Variables of Interest 
 Political engagement can be captured in many ways. As discussed in the 
theoretical framework, different mechanisms can influence different types of political 
engagement. The CEP survey data allow me to capture six different indicators of 
engagement, and two of each combine to represent a specific concept.32 First, in order to 
capture individuals seeking information, I use variables related to reading or watching of 
political news. The CEP surveys ask the following questions: “Please indicate whether 
you…. Watch political shows on television? … Read news about politics?” I create two 
variables: Watch Politics and Read Politics, which are both ordinal variables that take the 
value of (1) if respondent indicated never partaking in such activity, (2) if respondent 
indicates sometimes partaking in such activity; and (3) if the respondent indicated 
frequently partaking in such activity. While these variables are good indicators of an 
individual’s own willingness to engage in politics, another advantage is that the question 
specifically refers to political news. The majority of previous research that has used 
“attention to news” as an indicator of political engagement typically relies on questions 
that simply ask whether individuals watch the news (Birch 2009; Carreras 2016; Holbein 
and Rangel 2016). Even though this is a close indicator of the gathering of political 
information, my measure explicitly captures the political aspect, whereas other more 
general measures of newsgathering could pertain to a diverse set of information.  
                                                 
31 Table B1 in Appendix B includes a list of each of the surveys and when they were 
carried out. 
32 See Table B2 in Appendix B for a Spanish translation of all outcome variables. 
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 Second, in order to capture political discussion as a change in the information 
environment, I use two variables that relate to the discussion of politics. The CEP survey 
asks: “Please indicate whether you… Talk to family about politics?... Talk to friends 
about politics?” Both Talk Politics with Family and Talk Politics with Friends are coded 
in the same way as the information seeking variables—a value of 1 indicates never doing 
it, and a 3 frequently doing it.  
 Finally, in order to capture engagement in direct political activity, I use the 
following questions: “Please indicate whether you… try to persuade someone of what 
you believe politically?.... Work or have worked for a political party or candidate?” 
These variables are also coded in the same way as previous ones. In order to test my 
expectations, the main explanatory variable is compulsory voting, which is a simple 
dichotomous variable coded as a 1 prior to 2011, and a 0 after 2011. I also interact 
compulsory voting with an education variable in order to test hypothesis 4, which argues 
that patterns of engagement under both systems may also change given a respondent’s 
socioeconomic status. Education ranges from 0 to 9, where high levels indicate higher 
levels of degree completion. 
Control Variables 
 In addition to the change in voting system, I control for several variables that 
might influence an individual’s level of political engagement. At the individual level, 
socioeconomic status is known to affect citizen political participation (Verba, Nie, and 
Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Thus, I control for education and 
income. Even though women have made gains in terms of voter turnout, they are still 
found to be less politically engaged in many types of political activities (Kittilson and 
Schwindt-Bayer 2014), which leads to me to include a control variable labeled female. 
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Age is also a factor in predicting political engagement—older individuals are much more 
likely to read or watch politics, and also to participate in political activity (Smets and van 
Ham 2013). Lastly, those living in rural locations may have a harder time reaching 
information or participating in political activities, so I include a rural term in the model. 
All individual-level control variables come from the same CEP survey as the dependent 
variables.33  
 At the country level, I control for three important factors. It is expected that any 
type of political engagement may be heightened during election years. Thus, I control for 
both presidential and municipal elections since they do not take place concurrently. 
Although I expect presidential elections to have a stronger impact on political 
engagement, local campaign efforts during municipal elections might also prompt 
individuals to further engage in politics. Another factor that could influence political 
engagement is the economy. Research finds that when the economy is doing well, 
citizens are more likely to be politically engaged (Norris 2004). This consideration is 
especially important since Chile’s economic growth took a negative turn due to the 
financial crisis in 2009, and has gradually improved since. Because this shock took place 
at a similar time as the election reform, it is important to account for any potential 
confounding effects.34 Table B4 in the Appendix reports the descriptive statistics for all 
variables of interest. 
Methodology 
 To empirically test my expectations, an estimation technique that takes into 
account both the individual-level respondents and the country-level factors is needed. As 
                                                 
33 See Table B3 in the Appendix for a description of all control variables. 
34 The variable GDP growth is lagged by a year. 
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such, I employ a series of hierarchical models (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). One aspect 
of this analysis is somewhat unique given that hierarchical models used to evaluate the 
effect of contextual variables on individual behavior are usually applied in spatial 
analyses (either via cross-national, regional, or state analyses). This study, however, has a 
temporal component—individuals 𝑖 are nested within surveys 𝑗 that were carried out at 
different points in time. Therefore, given my interest in estimating the main impact of a 
country-level variable (compulsory voting) on individual level behavior (political 
engagement) and their interaction with individual SES that vary both within and across 
surveys, a hierarchical modeling technique is the most appropriate (Peffley, Hutchison, 
and Shamir 2015; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). I use a multilevel ordered logit model to 
account for the ordered structure of the dependent variables.35 Below, the first model 
specification (1) is used to test Hypotheses 1-3, while the second model specification (2) 
is used to test Hypothesis 4: 
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑗  = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾40 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾50𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙5𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾02𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑗
+ 𝛾03𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑗 + 𝛾04𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ4𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗 
 
(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑗  = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗 
+  𝛾11 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾20 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾40 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾50𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙5𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾02𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑗
+ 𝛾03𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑗 + 𝛾04𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ4𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗 
                                                 
35 The second model specification to test hypotheses 4 posits a cross-level effect 
(between education and compulsory voting). I test its statistical significant without 
assuming a random slope for the education variable. As such, the models only assume 
random effects for the intercept. Snijders and Bosker (2012, 106) explain that cross-level 
interaction effects can be tested through an interaction regardless of whether the 
individual-level variable has a random slope or not. 
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where 𝑈0𝑗 represents the random effects for the intercept across countries, and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 are 
errors at the individual level.  
Does Compulsory Voting Promote Engagement? Empirical Evidence 
 The results from a series of hierarchical models are presented in Table 3.1. The 
coefficients for compulsory voting are positive for all forms of political engagement. But, 
they are only statistically significant (p<.05) in 3 out of the 6 measures—read politics, 
watch politics, and talk politics with family. Altogether, the results observed in the table 
suggest that compulsory voting does exert some influence on political engagement. 
A better way to evaluate the individual hypotheses and interpret the results is to 
graph the predicted probabilities of an individual selecting a certain level of political 
engagement in each of the categories they have been presented with. Figures 3.1 through 
3.3 show the predicted probabilities of political engagement under both compulsory and 
voluntary voting while holding all other control variables at their means. The confidence 
intervals surrounding the means indicate whether the differences between groups are 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.36 Focusing on information seeking 
variables in Figure 3.1, the probability of never watching politics when voting is 
voluntary reaches almost 50 percent. By contrast, individuals living under compulsory 
voting are much less likely to identify never watching politics. Instead, they are 
significantly more likely to “sometimes” watch politics, and also 4 percentage points 
more likely to frequently watch politics than those under voluntary systems.  
 
 
                                                 
36 Research indicates that graphing 84% confidence intervals allow one to determine 
whether the differences between groups are statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level. Thereby, a statistically significant difference can be inferred if the confidence 
intervals in the figure do not overlap (Julious 2004).  
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Table 3.1. The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Political Engagement 
 Read 
Politics 
Watch 
Politics 
Talk 
Politics w/ 
Family 
Talk 
Politics w/ 
Friends 
Persuade 
Others 
Work 
w/ Party 
Compulsory Voting 0.387* 0.408* 0.142* 0.066 0.027 0.072 
 (0.061) (0.051) (0.043) (0.065) (0.085) (0.126) 
Female -0.375* -0.402* 0.022 -0.508* -0.236* -0.166* 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.054) (0.074) 
Age 0.005* 0.011* -0.001 -0.004* -0.007* 0.012* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.332* 0.233* 0.272* 0.283* 0.110* 0.190* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) 
Income 0.055* 0.034* 0.044* 0.055* 0.014 0.030* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) 
Rural -0.471* -0.184* -0.187* -0.235* -0.275* -0.267* 
 (0.059) (0.052) (0.056) (0.060) (0.080) (0.117) 
Presidential   
Election 
0.130 0.175* 0.180* 0.264* 0.289* 0.088 
(0.084) (0.071) (0.058) (0.091) (0.119) (0.175) 
Municipal Election -0.037 -0.138* 0.076 0.170* 0.197 -0.061 
(0.073) (0.062) (0.051) (0.078) (0.103) (0.152) 
GDP growth 0.045* 0.037* 0.028* 0.031 0.012 0.037 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019) (0.025) (0.037) 
Constant 2.009* 1.399* 1.702* 1.613* 1.865* 4.010* 
 (0.114) (0.105) (0.104) (0.118) (0.151) (0.217) 
# of Observations 11,014 11,023 11,012 11,011 11,010 10,997 
# of Surveys 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Note: Hierarchical Ordered Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant at 
*p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The pattern is remarkably similar for reading about politics—individuals under 
compulsory voting are significantly less likely to never read about politics, but instead 
more likely to sometimes or frequently engage in such activities. Overall, the findings 
presented in Figure 3.1 lend strong support for the Information Seeking Hypothesis 
(H1)—when voting is compulsory, individuals are much more prone to seek out 
additional political information, likely in order to make an informed decision when at the 
polls.  
  83 
Figure 3.1. Predicted Probabilities of Seeking Information, by Voting System 
 
Notes: Figure 3.1 shows the predicted probability of never, sometimes, or frequently 
watching/reading politics, based on whether individual is subject to voluntary or 
compulsory voting. Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant differences at the 
95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on Models 1-2 presented in Table 
3.1. 
 
Turning to the second theoretical expectation, Figure 3.2 displays levels of 
political discussion under both types of systems. Individuals living under the compulsory 
system appear to be slightly less likely to identify never discussing politics with their 
family, and slightly more likely to sometimes discuss politics. For discussing politics 
with friends, however, the differences are not statistically signficant, as the confidence 
intervals overlap. This evidence lends partial support to the Information Environment 
Hypothesis (H2). If political discussion is heigthened under compulsory voting, it is likely 
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because family members are discussing politics slightly more often, and not through 
more informal channel like conversations with friends. 
Figure 3.2. Predicted Probabilities of Discussing Politics, by Voting System 
 
Notes: Figure 3.2 shows the predicted probability of never, sometimes, or frequently 
discussing politics with family and friends, based on whether individual is subject to 
voluntary or compulsory voting. Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant 
differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on Models 3-4 
presented in Table 3.1. 
 
The third expectation highlights the dissemination of political engagement 
through the act of voting. I capture this aspect of engagement by estimating whether CV 
increases the probability that individuals will act to persuade someone on their political 
views, and whether they are likely to work for a political party or candidate. Figure 3.3 
shows that the probability that anyone will act to persuade others and work with parties at 
any level is extremely small. This is consistent with other literature that notes these types 
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of political activities are rare (Birch 2009). Nonetheless, there are no apparent patterns in 
relation to the impact of CV on these political activities. Predicted probabilities for 
persuasion and working for a party are essentially the same under both systems, and 
confidence intervals. This provides no support for the Spill Over Hypothesis (H3), 
suggesting that compulsory voting does not necessarily increase overall levels of political 
activism.  
Figure 3.3. Predicted Probabilities of Political Activism, by Voting System 
 
Notes: Figure 3.3 shows the predicted probability of never, sometimes, or frequently 
persuading others or working with a party, based on whether individual is subject to 
voluntary or compulsory voting. Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant 
differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on Models 5-6 
presented in Table 3.1. 
 
 Taken together, the results show that compulsory voting does have an impact on 
political engagement—primarily in aspects that capture an individual’s own action to 
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acquire political information, and their decisison to share their political thoughts with 
family members. This suggests that the impacts of CV promote more private forms of 
political engagement, and do not spill over into more public forms, such as open 
discussions with friends or active political work. In other words, it seems that CV 
enhances personal political development, but does not necessarily contribute to an 
enhanced politically engaged society.  
 Next, I investigate whether the higher levels of information seeking associated 
with compulsory voting are a product of a larger amount of uninformed voters entering 
the electorate, who need to acquire more information about politics.37 Figure 3.4 displays 
the predicted probabilities of  reading and watching politics by voting system and levels 
of education. The patterns indicate that the increased propensity in seeking information is 
not simply amongst those with lower levels of education. Under both systems, those with 
higher levels of education are more likely to engage with political information. But, when 
considering the likelihood that one “sometimes” discusses politics, it appears that while 
at low levels of education, individuals in compulsory voting are more likely to seek 
information, that gap disappears at the highest levels of education.  
This suggests that individuals with high levels of education will engage with 
political information regardless of whether voting is mandatory or not. But, when voting 
is compulsory, there is a higher probability that even the non-educated will attempt to 
gather information. This difference is robust, as someone with no formal education is 
almost 10 percentage points more likely to sometimes watch politics. Still, that is not to 
say that any gaps in political engagement are erased when voting is compulsory—there is 
                                                 
37 Table B5 in Appendix B includes an interaction term between compulsory voting and 
education to predict political engagement. 
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still a clear disproportional probability that education increases one’s likelihood of 
engaging with politics even under compulsory voting countries. Also, it seems that the 
differences between socioeconomic status are only present for the “sometimes” category, 
and not frequently. Meaning, compulsory voting encourages individuals of lower 
socioeconomic status to superficially attain information about politics, but does not 
prompt them to frequenly engage with such information.  
Figure 3.4. Predicted Probabilities of Seeking Information, by Voting 
System and Levels of Education
 
Notes: Figure 3.4 shows the predicted probability of never, sometimes, or frequently 
watching/reading politics, based on whether individual is subject to voluntary or 
compulsory voting and conditioned by the level of education. Confidence intervals 
indicate statistical significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were 
calculated based on results presented in Table B5 in Appendix B. 
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While this indicates that CV does not encourage frequent political engagement, 
this is consistent with the expectation that individuals are likely to seek additional 
information in order to make an informed vote. Due to the existance of political parties 
and campaigns, it may be easy for a voter to quickly identify a vote choice when 
watching or reading about politics. If the goal of engaging in order to not waste a vote, 
then we should not expect abundant engagement, but rather superficial. Also consistent 
with the fact that CV appears to motivate engagement in more prviate forms of 
information acquisition and discussion, it is unlikely that the mechanisms through which 
CV increases engagement is a simple wish to further engage with the polity in a 
meaningful way. Rather, it is a more pragmatic, superficial, and personal investment that 
likely voters are making, and it does not carry over to more frequent or active forms of 
engagment. 
Robustness Checks 
 One of the main contributions of this study is its novel research design and the 
ability to observe the effects of institutional change on public opinion within the same 
country, while holding constant a variety of confounding factors. This is only possible 
due to an extremely rare institutional reform in Chile and the unique availability of 
appropriate survey data over time. Prior to election law reform, however, Chile’s 
compulsory voting system was rather unique in the sense that it was voluntary to register, 
but compulsory to vote once registered. For this reason, there is criticism that Chile’s CV 
system is not an ideal representation of typical mandatory voting laws. In order to 
attenuate this concern, I have conducted some additional analyses that confirm the 
robustness of my results even when considering Chile’s CV system in particular. 
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 If simply looking at overall effects prior to and after reform in the case of Chile 
does not accurately represent individuals who were subject/not subject to mandatory 
voting laws, one must find ways to capture specifically the individuals who are likely to 
have been subject by the compulsory voting law in the first place. To do so, I take three 
separate approaches. First, I simply control for whether the individual identified as 
having been registered to vote prior to 2011 when voting was compulsory. All individuals 
after 2011 were automatically registered to vote under the voluntary voting system. Table 
B6 in Appendix B shows that when accounting for whether individuals were registered to 
vote or not prior to reform, we get the same effects—compulsory voting increases 
information seeking, and also discussion of politics. Second, I restrict the analyses to only 
those who are registered to vote, both prior and after reform. Table B7 in Appendix B 
shows that the main results are robust to this specification. 
 Still, it may not be surprising that engagement declines after the abolishment of 
CV even when only considering those who were registered before, because once voting 
becomes voluntary everyone is automatically registered. When voting was compulsory 
for those registered, it was likely that only those who actually were interested in politics 
registered to vote, and once all individuals were incorporated into the voter registries 
upon abolition of CV, it is likely that overall levels of engagement would decrease. 
Therefore, I take a different approach to examining this effect under Chile’s unique 
system. Previous research shows that while overall registration rates had been steadily 
declining since democratization in Chile, it was largely a product of younger voters 
entering the electorate and failing to register. Registration rates actually remained fairly 
steady for those in the 40 and above age cohort (Barnes and Rangel 2014).  
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 Table B8 in Appendix B show the results when restricting the analyses to only 
those of age 40 or above, and the results remain robust. Meaning, even when we compare 
only those who, under CV, were most likely to have been subject to compulsory voting 
laws to those of that same age cohort after voting becomes voluntary, we get the same 
patterns. These analyses add confidence that the case of Chile is an accurate way to 
understand the effects of mandatory voting, and that the effects of CV on political 
engagement presented in this research are robust. 
Conclusion 
Currently, approximately 26 countries in the world hold elections under 
compulsory voting. The institution has particularly gained attention in countries 
considering its introduction, such as Canada, Colombia, and India. Other countries have 
started to contemplate its abolition. Unfortunately, our understanding of the second order 
effects of compulsory voting is still unclear, making it difficult for scholars and 
practioners to evaluate the benefits of a legal requirement to vote. The lack of consistent 
empirical evidence only fuels the existing debate on the implications of compulsory 
voting. This research helps inform this existing debate by providing convincing evidence 
of the effects of compulsory voting on several forms of political engagement. By taking 
advantage of a rare election law reform and unique individual survey data, I show that 
CV does indeed increase political engagement, but only for certain aspects of political 
engagement. 
Specifically, the impact of CV on engagement works through a personal channel 
in which individuals are encouraged to seek additional political information, likely in 
order to make an informed vote once at the polls. This is particularly the case for less-
educated individuals, who require more information in order to cast an informed ballot. 
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These findings suggest that compulsory voting does not necessarily lead to a more 
politically active society overall, but does promote individual engagement with 
information and close-knit discussions.  
The data limitations in this study do not allow for a deeper investigation of how 
the increases in information seeking translate into levels of political sophistication. While 
political knowledge can be considered a form of cognitive political engagement (Carreras 
2016; Zukin et al. 2006), political sophistication often refers to factual knowledge about 
the political system and political issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). We could 
assume that when individuals devote more attention to watching or reading political 
news, they will inherently become more knowledgeable about these factual outcomes. 
But, in doing so, we would also be making assumptions as to what kind of content was 
promoted, and an individual’s ability to absorb such information and translate it into 
factual knowledge. As shown, levels of frequently engaging in any of the forms of 
political engagement studied here are relatively small, and most of the differences 
between the different systems occur in the middle category, in which individuals identify 
as “sometimes” engaging in politics. This is certainly better than no engagement at all, 
but it could suggest that the higher level of engagement under CV is superficial and does 
not translate into major changes in citizens’ knowledge of the political domain. Still, the 
increase in information seeking (however superficial)—especially among low-educated 
voters—could significantly affect an individuals’ vote choice, and has implications for 
how political parties and elite might choose to engage with the electorate.  
Relatedly, the theory and analyses presented in this research speak directly to one 
of the main objections to compulsory voting—that the introduction of millions of 
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“uninformed” voters to the electorate would have a negative impact on election 
outcomes. Consistent with Shineman (forthcoming), I show that political information is 
not fixed and can change once the turnout calculus shifts. In fact, it is under voluntary 
voting that citizens are less likely to seek political information. Shineman’s (forthcoming) 
experiment allows for a further investigation on whether that political information 
translates into higher levels of political knowledge, and the findings indicate that it does. 
Future research could benefit from a further analysis of whether this next step holds in a 
naturally occurring scenario, such as the case of Chile. 
One possible concern in interpreting the findings presented in this chapter is that 
higher rates of reported political engagement under the compulsory voting system were a 
product of a social disability bias towards reporting higher rates of political involvement. 
In other words, when voting is compulsory people may feel pressured to report that they 
are indeed paying attention to politics since we know they are required to vote. While this 
could be the case, we would need to see convincing evidence that it is indeed more 
socially desirable to be politically engaged under CV than under VV, and most 
importantly in this case that the election reform changed the perceived desirability of 
reporting attentiveness to politics in a significant way. While data limitations in this study 
constrain the ability to conduct a nuanced investigation on the social desirability of such 
political activities, future research should assess any changes in public opinion regarding 
what individuals believe to be a socially acceptable level of political engagement and 
how important they believe engaging in politics is to being considered a good citizen, for 
instance.  
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It is interesting to note that in the case of Chile, support for compulsory voting 
had dropped to incredibly low levels prior to reform. For instance, in 2010, only 22 
percent of the population supported CV, while almost 78 percent opposed it (CEP 2016). 
The most recent survey in 2016, however, reported that support for CV has surged back 
up again to almost 50 percent, suggesting that Chile’s own population might be starting 
to regret the reform. Other countries in the process of debating the merits of CV can look 
to Chile to draw more insights as to what kinds of changes to expect. This paper provides 
answers to one part of this puzzle.
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Chapter 4 
Campaigning Under Compulsory Voting: A Multilevel Analysis of Party Outreach 
 
Political campaigns are crucial components of the political process. It has been 
argued that the main goal of political parties and candidates is to win elections (Kollman, 
Miller, and Page 1992; Wittman 1973), and to do so they must ensure that individuals 
turn out at the polls and cast favorable ballots while there. Research shows that political 
elites spend significant amounts of time and money on mobilization efforts (Farrell and 
Schmitt-Beck 2002; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Overton 2004). Current literature 
tends to focus on the impacts of party outreach efforts on getting people to turn out to 
vote (e.g., Arcenaux and Nickerson 2009; Gerber and Green 2000; Green and Gerber 
2015; Green and Schwam-Baird 2016). More recent efforts have been aimed at 
understanding more about the strategic component of party outreach and when parties 
engage in campaign activity (Enos and Hersh 2015; Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek 2014; 
Karp and Banducci 2007; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008).  
An important component underplayed in this research is how institutional design 
shapes parties’ outreach decisions. Research has investigated how overall levels of party 
outreach change based on democratic experience (Karp and Banducci 2007) and electoral 
system (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008), but one institutional design that presents a 
particular puzzle as to partisan strategy is compulsory voting. How do political elites 
modify their campaign strategies when turnout is already amplified due to the legal 
mandate to vote?  
I argue that compulsory voting (CV hereafter) can affect three main elements of 
campaign strategy: (1) how much party outreach there is; (2) who is the target of 
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outreach; (3) who is leading the outreach. Thus, this study makes several contributions, as 
existing research on how institutions condition party outreach strategies focuses primarily 
on overall levels of party outreach. Here, I consider not only how overall levels should 
change, but also how differences may arise in who the targets or leaders of outreach 
efforts are. I thus develop nuanced theoretical expectations for how compulsory voting 
can affect several aspects of elite strategic behavior in the context of election campaigns.  
The argument that mandatory voting laws should alter the ways political parties 
campaign and promote their policies has appeared in previous works, but has received 
little theoretical and empirical attention thus far (Birch 2009; Keaney and Rogers 2006; 
Lever 2010a; Lijphart 1997). Most studies focused on the impact of CV on elite behavior 
examine whether mandatory voting laws benefit Left-leaning parties over conservative 
ones. Even in this aspect, empirical research presents mixed results (e.g., Fowler 2013; 
Jackman 1999; Jensen and Spoon 2011; Miller and Dassonneville 2016). What has not 
received as much attention are the ways in which political parties might update their 
campaigning strategies, given the knowledge that turnout is likely to be higher and more 
equal under compulsory voting. This could help explain why we have yet to reach a 
consensus on whether compulsory voting benefits the left. Thus, this study contributes to 
our understanding of how and why certain political parties may benefit from compulsory 
voting rules.  
I develop several theoretical expectations. First, an intuitive expectation is that the 
lack of need for turnout mobilization under CV will significantly decrease the overall 
level of partisan outreach in a given country. This expectation overlooks the fact that the 
goal of party outreach may not only be mobilization, but also persuasion. When voting is 
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mandatory, it is possible that parties will simply shift from mobilization to persuasion 
tactics, leaving outreach levels unchanged. It is also conceivable that when the pool of 
likely voters expands under CV, parties will need to invest additional resources towards 
outreach, thereby increasing overall levels of campaign contact. While these expectations 
are theoretically possible, I empirically investigate which outcome is likely to take shape 
under compulsory voting rules. I find that overall levels of party outreach are not 
significantly different under voluntary and compulsory voting rules, failing to support the 
view that perhaps campaigns should be less costly under CV when parties feel no need to 
mobilize. I also show evidence that when voting is mandatory, parties are likely to shift 
their outreach strategy from mobilization to persuasion, by reaching out to voters that are 
less partisan and thus can be more easily persuaded.  
Second, because turnout is not only higher but also more equal under CV, parties 
are encouraged to reach out to a wider net of voters in order to secure their votes (Lever 
2010a; Plutzer 2002; Singh and Thorton 2013), and we should expect outreach to be less 
skewed towards high-probability voters. Individuals with lower levels of education may 
also be easier to be persuaded, encouraging parties under compulsory voting to target 
them more than when voting is voluntary. I find that there is a clear, skewed pattern to 
which voters get targeted under voluntary voting, but not under compulsory voting.  
Finally, CV can also change which parties engage in outreach. Because CV 
encourages marginalized groups to turn out at the polls at significantly higher levels, 
right-leaning parties may step up campaign outreach in order to offset any gains from a 
traditionally more liberal electorate, and reach out to more moderate voters to win their 
votes. Using individual-level survey data across 27 countries, I find that overall levels of 
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party outreach are similar under compulsory and voluntary voting countries, and that 
under CV parties tend to reach out to individuals with lower socioeconomic status at 
higher rates than their counterparts. A further analysis of whether parties are targeting 
individuals with strong party attachments provides evidence that parties under CV are 
more likely to engage in persuasion rather than mobilization via party outreach. When 
considering the different types of parties, however, it does not appear that right-leaning 
parties are substantially changing their strategy in order to offset potential gains by the 
left. 
Although the empirical evidence presented here contributes directly to our 
understanding of how compulsory voting laws have effects that extend beyond voter 
turnout, this research also speaks to the potential of institutions to effectively transform 
the political realm. Scholars have often focused on examining how institutions influence 
individual patterns of political participation, but a burgeoning body of research shows 
that institutions can also constrain or motivate elite behavior (e.g., Bugarin and Portugal 
2015; Taylor-Robinson 2010). Only by considering both types of outcomes, which could 
be occurring simultaneously, do we have a better understanding of the overall impact of 
institutional design. In the case of compulsory voting, thorough knowledge of how parties 
update their strategies can help us better predict electoral outcomes and patterns of 
political engagement under this institutional variation.  
This research also alludes to issues of political inequality across the world. The 
exclusion of certain groups as targets of parties can exacerbate the marginalization of 
some from political involvement (Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek 2014). If parties lessen 
efforts to mobilize or appeal to a particular group, such group might suffer from a lack of 
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representation (Andrews, Fry, and Jakee 2005; Ballinger 2006). Also, systematic lack of 
contact with political parties may decrease individuals’ feelings of efficacy towards the 
political system, and also lower political knowledge and engagement overall (Keaney and 
Rogers 2006; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994). When all citizens are required by law to 
turn out—regardless of race, socioeconomic status, or age—parties are incentivized to 
reach out to a wider net of potential voters, ultimately improving the quality of 
representative democracy (Dahl 2006).  
Political Mobilization and Institutional Context 
 As rational actors, a political party’s main goal is to win elections (Kollman, 
Miller, and Page 1992; Wittman 1973). In order to do so, political elites are tasked with 
two challenges: (1) mobilizing voters to turn out at the polls (referred to as mobilization), 
and (2) convincing voters to choose their party when they go to the polls (referred to as 
persuasion) (Schmitt-Beck 2007). First, getting people to show up to the polls can be a 
difficult task. Turning out to vote is a costly action (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 
1968), and previous research has argued that individuals make rational calculations in 
deciding whether their vote will make enough of a difference to warrant such cost (Geys 
2006). Therefore, it is important that parties invest in “Get Out the Vote” (GOTV) 
campaigns—specific efforts to “transform nonvoters into voters” (Green and Gerber 
2008, 7). When doing so, parties decrease the costs of voting for individuals by providing 
them with informational shortcuts (Lupia 1994; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and also 
influence the intrinsic value citizens attach to voting as voters feel more wanted when 
they are contacted by parties (Green and Gerber 2008). 
 GOTV efforts are fairly successful in mobilizing turnout (Enos, Fowler, and 
Vavreck 2014; Green, Macgrath, and Aronow 2013). Certain tactics are more efficacious 
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than others, however. The more personal the contact is, the more likely it is to have a 
mobilizing effect. Door to door canvassing, for instance, is found to significantly increase 
turnout rates (Arcenaux and Nickerson 2009; Green, Gerber, and Nickerson 2003). 
Campaign phone calls that do not include a prepared transcript also motivate turnout 
(Green and Gerber 2015; Ha and Karlan 2009). Impersonal emails or TV ads, however, 
do not have much of an effect. All in all, research finds that parties do indeed invest 
significant amounts of resources on GOTV efforts (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2002; John 
and Brannan 2008; Holbrook and McClurg 2005).  
 A second dimension of political campaigning is voter persuasion. Persuasion 
involves any attempt to convert opposing voters into supporting one’s own party, or most 
importantly, attracting undecided or independent voters to become one’s supporters 
(Green and Gerber 2015). While mobilization efforts used to be the focus of campaigns 
in the past, persuasion has become increasingly important in modern elections (Harmel 
and Janda 1994, Rohrschneider 2002). How effective persuasion efforts are, however, is 
difficult to measure. The impact of mobilization can be clearly observed as rates of voter 
turnout. It is harder to capture whether someone was convinced to vote a certain way due 
to partisan persuasion. Furthermore, while persuasion may be productive when targeting 
undecided voters, research argues that on average, political campaigns hardly work to 
change people’s views, but rather reinforce them (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954). 
Because of these concerns, comparative studies of partisan outreach rarely distinguish 
between mobilization and persuasion (Karp and Banducci 2007; Karp, Banducci, and 
Bowler 2008).  
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Although most of the existing literature focuses on the byproducts of party 
mobilization, scholars have begun to empirically explore more of what factors shape 
campaigning strategies (Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek 2014; Enos and Hersh 2015). Because 
parties have limited time and funds during political campaigns, they must allocate their 
resources strategically (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Green and Schwam-Baird 2016). 
Parties are likely to focus their resources on strategies that will maximize their gains and 
generate the most benefit. According to Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), these include 
strategies that target individuals who are already familiar to parties, who have strong 
social networks, who are influential, and who have resources. In general, individuals that 
fit these characteristics are typically the wealthy and educated, who are much more likely 
to be responsive to campaign measures and turn out to vote. Indeed, an abundance of 
empirical research finds support for the proposition that individuals with higher 
socioeconomic status are more likely to participate (Leighley 1995; Smets and van Ham 
2013).  
Given the existing knowledge that individuals with higher SES are those most 
willing to turn out, parties likely shift their resources and outreach to groups that exhibit 
higher socioeconomic status. In turn, individuals of lower status will likely be excluded 
or receive less attention from partisan outreach efforts. Plutzer (2002) argues that 
individuals with little disposable income are not attractive to parties, who doubt their 
ability to actively engage with the political process. This problem may be even more 
exacerbated in more recent years, as developing technology allows for parties to gather 
detailed data on likely voters. As parties become more sophisticated at identifying 
potential voters, they are able to narrow their range of partisan outreach (Ballinger 2006). 
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This biased pattern of mobilization can cause meaningful problems for the representation 
and advocacy of marginalized individuals (Rogers 2006).  
Beyond what we can infer regarding which individual characteristics may 
motivate partisan outreach, we still lack detailed knowledge of how political institutions 
change partisan strategies of campaigning. Taylor-Robinson (2010) notes that elites’ 
choices are largely shaped by institutional context. In the United States, Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1992) note that parties are faced with legal and institutional constraints, and that 
this varies by state. For instance, the presence of primaries in a given state may alter how 
much or when parties choose to allocate their resources for partisan outreach. 
Unfortunately, few studies have considered the impact of institutional design on 
party outreach in a comparative perspective outside the United States. In a 
comprehensive study of 24 countries, Karp and Banducci (2007) find that rates of party 
outreach are significantly lower in new democracies than old democracies, partly due to 
lower rates of party institutionalization. Other research shows that rates of party contact 
are significantly higher in candidate-based electoral systems as opposed to proportional 
representation systems (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008). The authors argue that this is 
because under PR systems, candidates have less of an incentive to campaign on a 
personal level given the larger district magnitude. But, under single-member-districts, 
candidates have an incentive to cultivate a more personal relationship and, therefore, 
should be more likely to contact potential voters.   
Aside from a few studies, we still lack detailed knowledge of how institutional 
context shapes campaigning behavior. One institution in particular presents us with a 
puzzle when it comes to party outreach. If a crucial part of political party campaigns is to 
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mobilize voters to turn out at the polls, what happens when turnout is already high? 
Under compulsory voting, all eligible citizens are required by law to show up at the polls. 
Although turnout is not universal under these systems, a plethora of research has found 
that CV laws considerably boost turnout rates anywhere from 10 to 18 percentage points 
(Baek 2009; Jaitman 2013; Singh 2011). This could yield a substantial shift in partisan 
strategies when it comes to partisan outreach.  
 The overwhelming majority of studies of compulsory voting examine how 
mandating turnout affects voter turnout. More recently, scholars have begun to study the 
more substantive effects of CV for overall individual political behavior (e.g., Córdova 
and Rangel 2017; Hooghe and Stiers, forthcoming). Few studies, however, focus on CV’s 
impact on elite behavior. The focus of this existing research is primarily on how near-
universal voter turnout produced by CV laws may disproportionally benefit one party 
over the other in terms of electoral outcomes. Liberal parties, who are more likely to 
draw support from citizens of low income and education (Anderson and Beramendi 2012; 
Pontusson and Rueda 2010), are thought to benefit from mandatory voting laws, as 
marginalized voters are encouraged to turnout at higher rates (Lijphart 1997). Empirical 
studies, however, have found mixed support for the proposition that higher and more 
equal voter turnout would benefit left-leaning parties. 
 Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid (2016) show that support for leftist policies in a 
Swiss canton was greater during times where individuals were subject to compulsory 
voting laws. In the context of Australia, Fowler (2013) finds that the gradual adoption of 
compulsory voting in different states boosted the seat shares of the left-leaning Labor 
Party by 7-10 percent. Jensen and Spoon (2011), however, find that leftist parties are 
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benefitted only when CV is coupled with high turnout. By contrast, other studies fail to 
find any political gains from the left under compulsory voting. Jackman (1999) shows 
that if Australia were to abolish compulsory voting, the Liberal Party would still report 
small political gains. A subnational study of Austria shows that no substantial gains are 
made by the right in the absence of compulsory voting (Ferwerda 2014). Most recently, 
Miller and Dassonneville (2016) find that the vote share of left-leaning parties actually 
increased when CV was abolished in the Netherlands in 1970. The authors, then, suggest 
that “the logic underlying the conventional wisdom is in need of reevaluation” (p. 132). 
One of the problems might be that this research assumes a kind of mechanical 
relationship between increased voter turnout and more votes for left-leaning parties, with 
little attention to how political elites may strategically adjust to the legal requirement to 
vote. A shift in campaigning strategy could potentially influence electoral outcomes, 
which may be a reason for the lack of consistent evidence of which parties benefit from 
maximized turnout. In other words, scholars have not yet considered the in-depth 
dynamics on how a voting law affects the strategies employed by political parties. In the 
next section, I discuss how party elites are expected to shift their campaigning strategies 
under compulsory voting, and develop expectations for the patterns of party outreach 
observed under different voting systems. 
Compulsory Voting and Partisan Outreach: Theoretical Mechanisms 
 Many different elements of partisan outreach can be expected to change when 
countries require voter turnout by law. The existing comparative studies of political 
campaigning focus primarily on overall levels of party contact, and what explains those 
patterns (Karp and Banducci 2007; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008). In this research, I 
provide a much more detailed account of partisan outreach by focusing on three distinct 
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aspects: (1) how much outreach there is; (2) who is the target of outreach; and (3) who is 
leading the outreach. By investigating all three elements of party contact, I am able to 
provide a more nuanced picture of how compulsory voting affects campaign behavior.  
How much outreach is there? 
As previously discussed, political parties whose goal is to win elections have two 
specific tasks: to mobilize individuals and to persuade voters. In considering overall 
levels of partisan outreach, we first must understand how compulsory voting can alter a 
party’s incentive to devote money and resources to campaign efforts. One line of thought 
is intuitive: when voting is compulsory, the need for mobilization essentially disappears. 
Because turning out at the polls is mandatory by law, political elites no longer have to 
devote efforts to mobilization via GOTV campaigns (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008; 
Lever 2010a). Norris (2004) suggests that parties under CV should invest less on 
mobilizing efforts. Lijphart (1997) and Lever (2010) both suggest that because the need 
for mobilization is lacking, CV laws would significantly decrease levels of campaign 
spending. This logic suggests that those living under compulsory voting laws are 
significantly less likely to report having been contact by a party during electoral 
campaigns. 
This view focuses solely on mobilization as a goal of parties, assuming that the 
mere fact that voting is mandatory will discourage parties from contacting voters at all. 
Assuming that mobilization is the leading motivation for party outreach, we should 
expect that when a country makes mobilization a legal or constitutional requirement, 
parties no longer have an incentive to invest their resources on party outreach. This leads 
to my first hypothesis: 
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H1a: Overall levels of partisan outreach in countries with compulsory voting laws 
should be lower than in countries with voluntary voting. 
At the same time, it may not be the case that political parties simply forego 
spending their resources when the need for mobilization disappears. Mobilization is only 
one part of the campaign equation—parties may also engage in persuasion tactics. 
Therefore, political elites are likely to divert their resources into convincing potential 
voters to choose them at the polls. Lever (2010, 902) describes this process as a shift in 
parties’ goals, stating that “compulsion means that the battle is not, any more, to make 
sure that your supporters actually get to the polls, or to deter those of your opponents 
from doing so… but to ensure that of those who turn out, as many vote for you as 
possible.” Therefore, rather than decreasing overall levels of party outreach, compulsory 
voting can simply encourage parties to divert their resources from mobilization to 
persuasion, leaving average rates of party contact unchanged (Hooghe and Pelleriaux 
1998; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008). This logic leads to the following hypothesis:  
H1b: Overall levels of partisan outreach in countries with compulsory voting laws 
should be similar to levels in countries with voluntary voting. 
At the same time, we know that when voting is voluntary only a fraction of the 
electorate turns out to vote. In this case, parties only have to target a small set of the 
population that they know is likely to turn out. When voting is mandatory, however, the 
pool of potential voters increases significantly, increasing the need for partisan outreach 
as parties are tasked with winning over a much larger electorate. In arguing why rates of 
party attachment might be higher under compulsory voting, Singh and Thorton (2012, 
193) highlight that parties have much more to gain from reaching out in instances where 
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the probability that one will vote is high, thus encouraging parties to “step up their efforts 
to promote their brand.” Under voluntary voting rules, even amongst individuals with the 
characteristic of those who should be more likely to turn out (higher SES), there is still 
much uncertainty whether one will actually go to the polls, which makes the marginal 
benefit of partisan outreach more uncertain. Under CV, however, the probability that an 
individual will go to the polls is substantially higher, making outreach a “good 
investment” for parties. In the aggregate, the certainty associated with the pool of 
potential voters is much higher under CV, encouraging higher levels of partisan outreach.  
 In other words, under voluntary voting where turnout is not mandatory, parties 
target a smaller and more specific sector of the population. Therefore, even if parties 
under this system need to persuade voters to both turnout and vote for their platform, the 
lack of necessity to reach out to a broader sector of the population generates a modest 
need for partisan outreach. Under compulsory voting, the pool of potential voters 
increases significantly as all citizens are required to turn out by law, and the certainty 
attached to their probability of turning out makes partisan outreach a good investment for 
parties attempting to win over votes. An alternative expectation, then is the following: 
H1c: Overall levels of partisan outreach in countries with compulsory voting laws 
should be higher than in countries with voluntary voting. 
Who is the target of outreach? 
  Apart from changing the overall rate of party outreach, institutional design may 
also affect whom parties target. Compulsory voting has been proposed as a strategy to 
reduce patterns of unequal participation based on socioeconomic status (Lijphart 1997). 
This is because when all individuals are required by law to turn out, regardless of age, 
gender, income, or education level, turn out is expected to be less biased. Empirical 
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evidence shows that mandatory turnout decreases participation gaps in socioeconomic 
status (Fowler 2013; Gallego 2015), age (Singh 2011) and gender (Córdova and Rangel 
2017). Amongst these studies, a common theoretical expectation is that under 
compulsory voting, parties are encouraged to reach out to marginalized citizens, since 
there is a higher likelihood that they will turn out to vote. 
The logic is as follows. As the pool of potential voters increases under 
compulsory voting, individuals who are typically not likely to turnout under VV are now 
more likely to do so. Because all eligible citizens are required to turn out by law, parties 
do not have an incentive to only focus on one specific sector of the population (Ballinger 
2006; Hill 2014; Lijphart 1997). Rogers (2006, 24) summarizes that “where turnout can 
be taken more or less for granted, the political parties will have an incentive to attempt to 
win over undecided or less engaged groups.” Therefore, parties are required to reach out 
to all potential voters, regardless of socioeconomic status. This means that partisan 
outreach should be more consistent across all socioeconomic groups under compulsory 
voting. By contrast, when voting is voluntary, parties would divert their efforts to those 
more likely to turn out (i.e. higher socioeconomic status) (Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). 
When analyzing GOTV efforts in a number of experiments, Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek 
(2014) conclude that mobilization efforts in the United States tend to widen the 
disparities between low and high propensity voters.  
This is not to say, however, that partisan outreach should be completely equal 
under CV laws—indeed, some research does find that certain electoral inequalities still 
persist when voting is mandatory (Power 2009; Quintelier, Hoodhe, and Marien 2011). 
But, given the heightened probability that marginalized voters will turn out at the polls if 
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required to by law when compared to the counterparts when voting is voluntary, we 
should expect partisan outreach to be significantly less skewed under CV systems. This 
logic leads me to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Levels of partisan outreach in countries with compulsory voting laws should 
be significantly less skewed towards individuals with higher socioeconomic 
status than in countries with voluntary voting laws. 
Who is leading the outreach? 
 It is important to consider that although all parties may have incentives to adapt 
their campaigning strategies when subjected to compulsory voting laws, different types of 
parties may adapt differently. Given that certain ideologies appeal more to specific 
sectors of the population, it is important to consider how those distinctions may matter. 
As previously discussed, research shows that especially under voluntary voting, 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to turn out, and thus more 
likely to get targeted by parties. Individuals with higher socioeconomic status tend to be 
more conservative (Tucker, Vedlitz, and DenNardo 1986). Because higher SES 
individuals are already more likely to turn out under voluntary voting, right-leaning 
parties are less likely to need strong mobilization efforts.  
But, when voting is compulsory, the introduction of many more marginalized 
citizens may shift the balance in the electorate. Low propensity voters under voluntary 
voting are much more likely to turn out under compulsory voting given that they are now 
faced with penalties. These low-propensity voters, however, are likely to support more 
left-leaning parties, creating problems for conservative parties. This is essentially why 
some studies of electoral outcomes under CV posit that left-leaning parties should benefit 
from mandatory voting laws (Jackman 1999; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi 2017). But, 
  109 
this expectation does not consider that right-leaning parties could then adapt their 
strategies in order to account for the introduction of left-leaning voters into the electorate. 
Right-leaning parties should adapt in two ways. In terms of mobilization, right-
leaning parties have an incentive to amplify their partisan outreach in order to ensure that 
each and every one of their strong supporters will turn out to vote. In terms of persuasion, 
right-leaning parties under CV have a higher incentive to go after moderate or 
independent voters in order to win their vote. In other words, right-leaning parties will 
need to make sure they can count on a large percentage of their voters to turn out, while 
simultaneously trying to persuade undecided or moderate voters. We should expect that 
mobilization from the right to be higher when turnout is required by law in order to offset 
the gains made by the left when a larger and more equal electorate is expected under 
compulsory voting. My final hypotheses are as follows: 
 H3a: Overall levels of right-leaning partisan outreach in countries with 
compulsory voting laws should be higher than in countries with voluntary 
voting. 
H3b: Right-leaning parties in countries with compulsory voting should be more 
likely to reach out to moderate potential voters than right-leaning parties in 
countries with voluntary voting. 
Data & Methods 
To evaluate partisan outreach to potential voters, I use survey data from the most 
recent module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project. The fourth 
module of the post-election survey has thus far been conducted in 28 different countries 
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between 2011 and 2015.38 The decision to focus on the fourth wave is based primarily on 
the availability of a survey question that approximates party outreach. One way to 
measure party contact would be to survey political parties and gather their own data on 
campaign efforts. But, because detailed data in a comparative perspective on this matter 
are not available, the best way to capture party outreach is to record whether an 
individual reports being contacted by a political party during a campaign. Note that this 
does not involve an individual’s own willingness to initiate a contact with a political 
party member (a question that is often asked in political surveys), but whether a member 
of a political party contacted the individual in any form.  
 The dependent variable, party outreach, is based on the following question: 
“during the campaign, did a party or candidate contact you in person or by any other 
means?” The respondent had the option to select yes, no, or to abstain from answering 
(missing). This question is used to create my dependent variable, party outreach, which 
takes the value of 1 when the respondent indicated having been contacted by a party or 
candidate during the campaign, and 0 otherwise.  
I am also interested in which political party in particular contacted an individual 
in order to be able to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b. As a follow-up to the general question of 
whether an individual was contacted by a party, the next question asks individuals to 
identify which parties contacted them. Individuals can list up to 10 different parties that 
                                                 
38 While the survey has been conducted in 28 different locations, one of those in 
particular lacks a variety of data in other dimensions (Taiwan). Thus, empirical analyses 
for H1a-c and H2 in this chapter exclude Taiwan, bringing the total number of countries to 
27. Due to missing data in some countries, the empirical analyses for H3a-b include 24 
countries. 
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may have contacted them during the campaign.39 In order to identify whether a specific 
party was left-leaning or right-leaning, I followed the following steps: First, I used the 
Manifesto Project, which identifies the policy positions of political parties across the 
world. The project rates each political party on a left-right scale ranging from -100 (very 
liberal) to 100 (very conservative). But, it might not be accurate to simply choose a cutoff 
point (i.e. 0), to indicate that anything positive should be considered a right-leaning party, 
and anything negative a left-leaning party. For instance, in the context of the United 
States, both of the Democratic and Republican parties scored positive numbers in the left-
right scale (7 for the democrats and 24 for republicans). If that were the case, both parties 
would be considered “right-leaning.”  
Instead, I am more interested in understanding where the parties stand relative to 
one another in the context of their own country. Therefore, I created an average of the 
scores for each political party for each country within the MP dataset, and then identified 
whether each party was to the right of the average (right-leaning), or to the left of that 
average (left-leaning). I then merged these data to the specific parties that were 
mentioned by each individual in the CSES survey as having contacted them. Two 
dependent variables were created—right-leaning contact received a 1 if any party that 
had a more conservative policy agenda within that country had contacted that individual 
(and zero otherwise), and left-leaning contact received a 1 if any party that had a more 
liberal policy agenda within that country had contacted that individual (and zero 
otherwise). Individuals who did not report having been contacted by a right or left 
                                                 
39 Although individuals can name up to 10 different parties, I only considered whether the 
respondent identified having been contacted by one of the 5 major parties in their given 
country. The CSES classifies the 5 major parties based on their seat share in the current 
legislature. 
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leaning party, or contacted by a party at all, were coded as zeroes for each of these 
dependent variables.40 
The main independent variable indicates whether a country has a compulsory 
voting system. Compulsory Voting is a dichotomous measure coded 1 if voting is 
compulsory in a particular country and a 0 if voting is voluntary. These data were drawn 
from the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), which 
identifies which countries around the world practice compulsory voting. In my sample, 6 
out of the 27 countries have compulsory voting laws, and 7 post-election surveys have 
been carried out under compulsory voting laws.41 
Because I am interested in how the institution of compulsory voting conditions 
the relationship between partisan outreach and marginalized voters, I use a measure of 
socioeconomic status in order to test Hypothesis 2. Specifically, I use levels of education 
as a representation of socioeconomic status (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1995). Education 
ranges from 1 to 4 and records whether the individual reported having: (1) none or less 
than primary schooling; (2) completed primary or incomplete secondary schooling; (3) 
completed secondary and some tertiary schooling; (4) completed college or more. In 
order to account for the conditional effect of compulsory voting on SES and partisan 
outreach, I include an interaction term between the compulsory voting variable and the 
education variable in the model. 
                                                 
40 The follow-up question asking about which parties contacted the individual were not 
asked in Canada, and Ireland. The MPD data did not have information for Thailand. This 
brings the total number of countries in this analysis to 24. 
41 In the sample, the countries of Mexico, Greece, Australia, Brazil, Thailand, and Turkey 
all have compulsory voting laws. See Table C1 in Appendix C for a full description of 
the surveys and countries included in the data. 
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Control Variables 
 I control for several variables that might affect an individuals’ propensity to be 
contacted by a political party. At the individual level, age can be an important factor, as 
older individuals are found to turn out to vote at higher levels and thus be targeted by 
parties (Blais 2000). It has also been argued that gender may play a role in political 
activism, and that women are less likely to engage with politics (Verba, Burns, and 
Schlozman 1997). Therefore, I include a variable that identifies whether the respondent 
was female. Finally, in order to account for the fact that those being targeted by parties 
are merely the ones that have closer partisan ties, I control for whether a respondent 
identified being close to a political party (party attachment) (Singh and Thorton 2012). 
All individual-level variables were drawn from the same CSES post-election survey from 
which the dependent variable was drawn.42  
 At the country level, I control for several other factors that are thought to alter 
partisan strategies. I control for whether the election was a presidential, and whether the 
country employed a proportional representation system—which could encourage the 
targeting of marginalized citizens. I also control for the level of democracy and economic 
development for each country. Data on democracy come from the Freedom House’s civil 
liberties and political rights ratings (Freedom House 2016). This variable was 
transformed in order to report states with higher scores in the freedom house scale as 
more democratic, while lower scores reflect less democratic states. Economic 
development is measured as Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2016), with higher levels indicating more 
                                                 
42 See Table C2 in Appendix C for a full description of the control variables.  
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developed countries. Descriptive Statistics of all variables are available in Table C3 of 
Appendix C.   
Methodology 
One important feature of the data in this study is that observations are clustered at 
different levels of analysis. The data are clustered at two levels: individual respondents 
(level 1) within post-election surveys within countries (level 2). The main variable of 
interest, compulsory voting, is recorded at the country level. The outcome variables, 
however, are drawn from public opinion data and are thus recorded at the individual 
level. To account for the nested nature of the data, I estimate a hierarchical model across 
two levels of analysis: respondents 𝑖 nested within countries 𝑗 (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002). Because the analyses use a dependent variable that is dichotomous (whether one 
was contacted by a party or not), I employ a hierarchical logit model to test my 
expectations. Below, the first model specification (1) is used to test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 
and 3a, the second model specification (2) is used to test Hypothesis 2, and the third 
model specification is used to test Hypothesis 3b:43 
(1)  𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾01 + 𝛾01𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾20 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾40𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾02𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑗
+ 𝛾03𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑗 + 𝛾04𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠4𝑗
+ 𝛾05𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙5𝑗 + 𝛾06𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎6𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗 
 
                                                 
43 The second and third model specifications to test hypotheses 2 and 3b posit a cross-
level effect (between education and compulsory voting and between ideology and 
compulsory voting). I test its statistical significant without assuming a random slope for 
the education variable. As such, the models only assume random effects for the intercept. 
Snijders and Bosker (2012, 106) explain that cross-level interaction effects can be tested 
through an interaction regardless of whether the individual-level variable has a random 
slope or not. 
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(2)  𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾01 + 𝛾01𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗 
+ 𝛾11 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑖𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾20 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾40𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾02𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑗
+ 𝛾03𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑗 + 𝛾04𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠4𝑗
+ 𝛾05𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙5𝑗 + 𝛾06𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎6𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗 
 
(3)  𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾01 + 𝛾01𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗 + 𝛾10 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾11 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦1𝑖𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑗
+ 𝛾20 𝐴𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾30 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒3𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾40𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾50𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛5𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾02𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑗 + 𝛾03𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3𝑗
+ 𝛾04𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠4𝑗 + 𝛾05𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙5𝑗
+ 𝛾06𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎6𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗 
where 𝑈0𝑗 represents the random effects for the intercept across countries, and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 are 
errors at the individual level.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 A descriptive look at the data shows some of the expected patterns previously 
discussed. Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics of overall levels of party contact by 
compulsory and voluntary voting. Overall average levels of party contact are very similar 
for both systems, around 33 and 35 percent. This could be an initial indication that party 
outreach may not be significantly lower or higher in countries with compulsory voting. 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of Overall Levels of Party Contact by Voting Law 
Voting Law Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Voluntary 30,078 .331 .471 0 1 
Compulsory 14,094 .358 .479 0 1 
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Figure 4.1 graphs the average rate of party contact by level of education without 
taking into account different voting systems. For those who have none or less than 
primary education, the rate of partisan outreach is at around 17 percent. For those with 
primary education, approximately 25 percent report being contacted by a party. Once the 
respondent’s education level reaches a complete secondary degree, the rate increases to 
35.6 percent. Finally, the biggest jump is seen for those who have complete college, 
almost 11 points higher than the previous level of education (46.6 percent).  
Figure 4.1. Average Rates of Party Outreach by Levels of Education 
 
Notes: Figure 4.1 shows overall average levels of party outreach by education in the 
27 countries included in the sample. 
 
Table 4.2 breaks down the percentage of contacted individuals by education level 
in each voting system. For instance, out of all individuals that were contacted by a 
political party under voluntary voting, 10.59 percent had no education, 20.59 percent had 
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primary education, 35.6 percent had secondary education, and 42.25 percent had a 
college education. In the case of compulsory voting, there is a lot more parity at the 
middle levels of education, but still large gaps in terms of those with low and high levels 
of education (no education and college). These descriptive statistics show that while 
under voluntary voting, patterns of outreach follow a linear increase based on levels of 
education (similar to what we see in Figure 4.1), compulsory voting patterns are less 
linear and more varied.  
Table 4.2. Percentage of Contacted Individuals, by Education Level 
 
Education Levels 
No 
Education Primary Secondary College 
Voluntary 10.59% 20.59% 35.6% 42.25% 
Compulsory 3.9% 29.17% 22.45% 44.48% 
 
 
When taking into account outreach by the left and the right separately, we see that 
levels of outreach are slightly higher for both types of parties under compulsory voting 
than under voluntary voting (see Table 4.3). Also, there are no apparent differences when 
comparing left-leaning and right-leaning contact under both systems. This could suggest 
that different types of parties are not behaving significantly difference than one another 
under compulsory voting. While these data distributions hint at some possible 
relationships, these descriptive statistics do not account for any other factors known to 
influence partisan outreach, so it is more appropriate to examine these effects in a fully 
specified model. In the next section I discuss in detail the results from the hierarchical 
models. 
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Table 4.3. Percentage of Individuals Contacted by Left-Leaning or 
Right-Leaning Parties 
 Left-Leaning Contact 
Right-Leaning 
Contact 
Voluntary 17.68% 18.06% 
Compulsory 25.81% 26.88% 
 
Empirical Results 
 I first evaluate whether compulsory voting changes overall political party 
behavior, by empirically testing Hypotheses 1a-1c and Hypothesis 2. The results are 
presented in Table 4.4. The first element to be investigated is whether overall levels of 
party outreach are different under compulsory or voluntary voting. Turning to Model 1, 
we see that the coefficient for CV is negative, but not statistically significant. This 
indicates support for Hypothesis 1b—while compulsory voting laws lower the need for 
mobilization, it does not mean political parties will simply decrease their outreach efforts. 
Instead, it is likely they will divert their resources to persuasion, leaving overall levels of 
outreach unchanged. It is also possible that CV does not necessarily erase the need for 
mobilization. Given that CV does not generate universal turnout, there is still room for 
mobilization. Gerber and Green (2008) note that “even when turnout is high… the 
capacity to mobilize large numbers of voters can be decisive.” I provide an additional 
empirical investigation into whether we can establish the trade-off between mobilization 
and persuading taking place under compulsory voting in the next section.  
This finding may cast doubt on claims that compulsory voting has the potential to 
significantly decrease campaign costs (Keaney and Rodgers 2006; Lijphart 1997). In 
2015, former President Barack Obama was asked to comment on the idea of compulsory 
voting. His initial response was that “It would be transformative if everybody voted—that 
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would counteract money more than anything” (Somin 2015). These results suggest that 
although it is possible that compulsory voting decreases campaign spending in several 
other dimensions, it is unlikely that efforts and resources directed to party outreach would 
be substantially different given a mandatory voting law. 
Table 4.4. The Influence of Compulsory Voting on Party Outreach 
 
(1) 
Overall 
Party Outreach 
(2) 
Overall 
Party Outreach 
Compulsory Voting -0.452 -0.111 
 
(0.616) (0.628) 
Education 0.292*** 0.334*** 
 (0.017) (0.021) CV *Education  -0.106** 
  (0.033) 
Female 0.011 0.009 
 
(0.023) (0.023) 
Age 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) Party Attachment 0.558*** 0.557*** 
 
(0.025) (0.025) 
Presidential Election -1.194*** -1.202*** 
 
(0.135) (0.136) 
PR System -1.158** -1.148** 
 (0.376) (0.378) 
Effective # of Parties 0.176* 0.174* 
 
(0.074) (0.075) 
Democracy Level -0.659 -0.629 
 (0.443) (0.445) GDP per capita 0.801* 0.788* 
 (0.353) (0.355) Constant -5.952** -6.135** 
 (2.308) (2.318) 
Num. Individuals 42,308 42,308 
Num. Countries 27 27 
Note: Hierarchical logit models. Coefficients are statistically 
significant at *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.  Standard errors in 
parentheses.  
 
 The second element focuses on explaining who is the target of campaigns given 
the institutional context. The expectation (H2) is that rates of party outreach will be less 
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skewed towards those with higher SES under compulsory voting than under voluntary 
voting. In other words, we should expect that all individuals under compulsory voting 
rules—regardless of level of education—will be contacted at similar rates given that there 
is higher probability that they are potential voters. Model 2 in Table 4.4 takes into 
account an interactive effect between compulsory voting and education levels. Because 
the significance of interactions are difficult to interpret from the table, Figure 4.2 graphs 
the mean predicted probability of being contacted by a political party given your level of 
education and whether the system is compulsory or not. The confidence intervals 
surrounding the means indicate whether the differences between groups are statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level.44 
While it does appear that under both systems, there is an increasing trend in terms 
of the probability that an individual with higher levels of education will get contacted by 
a party, this rate is not statistically significant under compulsory voting when discerning 
between the first three levels of education. In other words, there is not apparent difference 
in the probability of being contacted by a party under CV if an individual has no 
education, primary education, or secondary education. College graduates do appear to 
have a slightly statistically significant higher chance to be contacted when compared to 
those with no education, but not in comparison to other levels.  
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Research indicates that graphing 84% confidence intervals allow one to determine 
whether the differences between groups are statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level. Thereby, a statistically significant difference can be inferred if the confidence 
intervals in the figure do not overlap (Julious 2004).  
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Figure 4.2. Predicted Probability of Party Outreach by Voting Law and 
Levels of Education 
 
Notes: Figure 4.2 shows the predicted probability of having been contacted by a party 
during the campaign, based on whether individual is subject to voluntary or compulsory 
voting and conditioned by the level of education. Confidence intervals indicate statistical 
significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on 
results presented in Model 2 in Table 4.4. 
 
When voting is voluntary, by contrast, there is a clear statistically significant 
increasing trend in the probability an individual will be contacted based on their 
education level. Individuals with a college degree are significantly more likely to be 
contacted than any other individual with a lower level of education. For someone with 
low levels of education (none or less than primary), the probability that they will get 
contacted is relatively small (approximately 18 percent). For someone with a college 
degree, that probability increases to around 49 percent. These patterns lend support for 
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Hypothesis 2—the bias in partisan contact by socioeconomic levels is clearly present 
under voluntary voting, but much less apparent under compulsory voting. 
The results presented so far do not take into account any characteristics of parties, 
instead treating them all as similar in their strategic behavior. But, it is important to 
consider that the introduction of a larger and more equal electorate under compulsory 
voting may be more troublesome for right-leaning parties—who theoretically should 
benefit from low and skewed turnout. Table 4.5 presents the results of hierarchical 
models predicting left-leaning outreach and right-leaning outreach separately.45  
Hypothesis 3a posits that right-leaning parties have a stronger interest to mobilize 
under compulsory voting in order to offset the inclusion of typically marginalized voters 
into the electorate. Models 3 and 4 in Table 4.5 present the results focusing on left-
leaning outreach and right-leaning outreach, respectively. As observed in Model 3, 
compulsory voting is not a statistically significant predictor of left-leaning outreach. The 
same is the case in Model 4 for right-leaning parties. Meaning, right-leaning parties are 
no more likely to significantly increase their party outreach efforts when voting is 
compulsory. This does not provide support for Hypothesis 3a. In other words, it is not the 
                                                 
45 The dependent variables here indicate whether an individual reported being contacted 
by a party on the left (Model 3) or the right (Model 4). In a small number of cases, 
individuals reported being contacted by both parties. These individuals receive the value 
of 1 on both dependent variables. Because there is a possibility that the errors in both 
equations are correlated, a statistical technique such as seemingly unrelated regression 
may be appropriate to account for the cross-equation error correlation. This is not 
possible, however, considering the multilevel structure of the data. In order to circumvent 
this issue, I run the same analyses excluding those individuals that reported being 
contacted by both parties and present the results in Table C4 in Appendix C. The results 
are similar to the ones presented in Table 4.5. 
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case that right-leaning parties (or left-leaning parties) behave significantly different under 
CV than VV. 46 
Table 4.5. The Influence of Compulsory Voting on Left-Leaning and 
Right-Leaning Party Outreach 
 
(3) 
Left-Leaning Outreach 
(4) 
Right-Leaning Outreach 
Compulsory Voting -0.186 0.400 
 
(0.740) (0.596) 
Education 0.246*** 0.263*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) Female -0.025 -0.029 
 
(0.030) (0.029) 
Age 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) Party Attachment 0.444*** 0.354*** 
 
(0.033) (0.032) 
Ideology -0.047*** 0.049*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Presidential Election -0.946*** -1.359*** 
 
(0.161) (0.141) 
PR System -1.613*** -1.163** 
 (0.485) (0.388) 
Effective # of Parties 0.131 0.117 
 
(0.090) (0.073) 
Democracy Level -0.408 -0.457 
 (0.572) (0.459) GDP per capita 0.375 0.913** 
 (0.426) (0.341) Constant -3.260 -9.131*** 
 (3.101) (2.533) 
Num. Individuals 31,753 31,753 
Num. Countries 24 24 
Note: Hierarchical logit models. Coefficients are statistically significant at 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
                                                 
46 These analyses consider whether parties on the right under CV behave different than 
parties on the right under CV (and vice-versa for left-leaning parties). This is because my 
theoretical expectations suggest that parties on the right will need to change their 
behavior under CV compared to what they were doing in the absence of CV. It does not 
consider whether right-leaning parties behave differently than left-leaning parties under 
each system. In a separate analysis presented in Table C5 in Appendix C, I consider this 
possibility by conducting a multinomial analysis using type of contact as the dependent 
variable. This analysis shows that it is also not the case that right-leaning parties behave 
significantly different than left-leaning parties under compulsory voting. 
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It could be the case that while overall levels of party outreach for each given type of 
party are similar under both systems, the strategy behind outreach changes when voting is 
mandatory. Hypothesis 3b posits that right-leaning parties should make stronger efforts to 
reach out to more moderate voters in order to persuade them to vote compared to their 
efforts under voluntary voting. Table C6 in Appendix C presents the results when taking 
into account the individuals’ reported party ideology and the likelihood they will be 
contacted by a party on either side of the political spectrum. In order to better represent 
the results, I graph the predicted probabilities on being contacted by a Left-leaning or 
Right-leaning party when considering the individual’s ideology and the voting system in 
Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3. Predicted Probability of Party Outreach by Voting Law and 
Individual Ideology 
 
Notes: Figure 4.3 shows the predicted probability of having been contacted by a left-
leaning or right-leaning party during the campaign, based on whether individual is 
subject to voluntary or compulsory voting and conditioned by the individual’s ideology. 
Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant differences at the 95% confidence 
level. Estimates were calculated based on results presented in Table C6 in Appendix C. 
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 Figure 4.3. shows no apparent differences between the targets of outreach for both 
parties under different systems. This does not provide support Hypothesis 3b. The results 
presented indicate that right-leaning parties do not appear to be behaving differently 
under CV when it comes to party outreach. One reason for this may be that while right-
leaning parties may not be updating their outreach strategies when it comes to 
compulsory voting, they could still be engaging in strategic behavior in other forms of 
campaigning. For instance, it is possible that instead of changing their mobilization or 
targeting strategy, right-leaning parties are changing their policy agenda and position in 
order to appeal to this new electorate under CV. While this type of investigation is 
beyond the scope of this paper, further investigation into other campaigning strategies 
based on ideological party differences may be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Mobilization Versus Persuasion 
 They hypotheses and empirical tests presented so far make it difficult to discern 
whether parties are engaging in more mobilization or persuasion. The null finding that 
party outreach does not seem to be lower or higher under CV suggests that parties under 
CV are simply shifting resources from mobilization to persuasion, because in theory, 
mobilization is no longer needed when voting is compulsory. In this section, I provide 
additional evidence supporting the notion that under CV, party outreach is mostly in the 
form of persuasion, and that campaigns might not necessarily be cheaper when voting is 
mandatory because parties continue to invest resources in contacting individuals—albeit 
having a different goal in mind. 
 First, in order to see whether mobilization via outreach is indeed a successful 
mobilizer of voters, I predict whether being contacted by a political party increases the 
chances that someone will turn out to vote. This should matter primarily when voting is 
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voluntary, and should have no significant effect on turnout choice under compulsory 
voting. Figure 4.4 shows that while having been contacted by a political party during the 
campaign is a strong and significant predictor of an individuals’ choice to turn out to vote 
when under voluntary voting, it has virtually no effect on an individuals’ choice to turn 
out under CV.47 While this is expected given that voting is mandatory under CV, it shows 
that mobilization is much less of a factor under CV, therefore discouraging parties to 
spend significant resources on mobilization. But, when voting is voluntary, it is clearly 
worthwhile to still invest in contacting voters with the goal to mobilize them to the polls.  
Figure 4.4. Predicted Probability of Voting by Voting Law and Party Contact 
 
Notes: Figure 4.4 shows the predicted probability of reporting having voted based on 
whether individual is subject to voluntary or compulsory voting and whether they were 
contacted by a party or not during the campaign. Confidence intervals indicate statistical 
significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on 
results presented in Table C7 in Appendix C. 
 
                                                 
47 Predicted probabilities were generated from results presented in Table C7 in Appendix 
C. 
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 Karp and Banducci (2007) note that one way to specifically distinguish whether 
parties are engaging in mobilization versus persuasion efforts is to see whether they are 
targeting individuals that are already partisan or not. If parties are targeting mostly 
individuals who have strong party attachments—and hence are less likely to be 
persuaded—then it is likely that parties are engaging in mobilization efforts, and simply 
ensuring that those individuals turn out to vote. But, if parties are reaching out to a 
broader electorate and not only targeting individuals with high party attachments, it could 
mean that they are reaching out to those who are more likely to persuaded. Using my 
sample, I test whether parties under compulsory and voluntary voting are more likely to 
target those with low or high party attachment.  
Figure 4.5 shows that there is a clear increasing trend in the probability that 
parties under voluntary voting will contact an individual based one their level of party 
attachment.48 Specifically, the probability of being contacted by a political party under 
VV when you report not being very close to a political party is about 35 percent. That 
probability increases to approximately 50 percent when an individual reports being very 
close to a party. These differences, however, are non-existent under compulsory voting—
individuals have similar probabilities of being contacted by a political party regardless of 
their party attachment, as average levels are comparable and confidence intervals overlap. 
Altogether, this evidence provides support for the theoretical expectation that even 
though parties under compulsory voting do not have an incentive to invest resources on 
mobilization, they still engage in party outreach with the goal to persuade voters and 
secure their votes. 
                                                 
48 Predicted probabilities were generated from results presented in Table C8 in Appendix 
C. 
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Figure 4.5. Predicted Probability of Party Contact by Voting Law 
and Party Attachment 
 
Notes: Figure 4.5 shows the predicted probability of reporting having been 
contacted by a party based on whether individual is subject to voluntary or 
compulsory voting and the individuals’ reported level of party attachment. 
Confidence intervals indicate statistical significant differences at the 95% 
confidence level. Estimates were calculated based on results presented in Table 
C8 of Appendix C. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 This study directly contributes to our lack of detailed understanding of how elite 
behavior can be conditioned by institutional design. By simply requiring citizens to turn 
out at the polls, compulsory voting laws can significantly alter many aspects of the 
political sphere. Unfortunately, most studies of compulsory voting focus solely on its 
effects on individuals who are subject to the laws and their behavior at the polls. The few 
studies investigating the impact of CV at the elite level focus on what kinds of electoral 
outcomes might arise from mandatory voting laws, largely overlooking the fact that elites 
will strategically update their strategies when presented with such institutional design. 
  129 
The results of this analyses show that political parties do adjust to their institutional 
environment. When voting is mandatory, parties continue to invest their resources in 
campaign outreach, and are also less likely to focus significantly more on those 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status. Yet, right-leaning parties do not appear to 
substantially change their strategy in order to offset potential gains by the left.  
 Of particular importance are the differences in party outreach based on education. 
College graduates will be the target of parties no matter what voting laws are present, 
highlighting that SES is still an important determinant of party mobilization. But, 
compulsory voting can be an effective tool to prevent parties from severely skewing their 
target population. These findings have important implications for countries that have 
considered either adopting or abandoning compulsory voting laws. In Chile, for example, 
compulsory voting was recently abolished, and one of the factors cited in support of the 
change is that under voluntary voting, parties would be encouraged to reach out to 
marginalized voters in other to get them to turn out (Barnes and Rangel 2014). But, as 
Hooghe and Perilaux (1998, 423) argue, “although some proponents of abolishing the 
compulsory vote state that after abolishment, political parties will try to convince voters 
to actually go to the polls, it is much more likely that they will try to win voters from 
other parties, rather than to try to motivate the disinterested.” The results presented in this 
paper corroborate this argument, suggesting that voluntary voting may only exacerbate 
political marginalization.  
 The analyses show that right-leaning parties do not substantially change their 
outreach strategy as theoretically expected. This could be because when voting is 
voluntary, right-leaning parties may update their campaign strategy in a different way. 
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Instead of changing their outreach efforts or who to target, they may simply shift policy 
positions to appeal to the new electorate. The data limitations in this study do not allow 
us to investigate how CV may shape campaign platforms and ideology. Some studies 
have begun to investigate whether this second component of political campaigning is 
conditioned by institutional context (Bugarin and Portugal 2015; Fowler 2013). Scholars 
could also reach out to political elites in CV countries and obtain feedback as to how their 
political strategies are shaped by this institutional design. Therefore, the further 
consideration of how other aspects of campaign behavior are shaped by mandatory voting 
laws appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
 This research provides evidence of an association between compulsory voting and 
party outreach strategies. At the same time, further research is necessary to investigate 
the causal relationship between these political features. A lack of elite or survey 
campaign data expanding a long period of time in a number of countries where 
compulsory voting was abolished or implemented makes it difficult to infer how strong 
the causal effect of CV is. Future experimental or qualitative work could be useful in 
addressing this shortcoming. Meanwhile, this research presents a comprehensive and 
novel attempt to establish how patterns of elite behavior can be shaped by institutional 
context. 
 Still, the findings of this research also speak to other potential implications that 
can come out of the patterns observed under the two different systems. When 
marginalized individuals are forgotten in the political process, they may feel abandoned 
by the system and powerless vis-à-vis the more educated, privileged class. Their interests 
might not get represented and public policy will skew away from those who might need it 
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the most. By contrast, when political parties are making an effort to reach out to those 
who are not part of the mainstream, individuals’ own sense of importance and efficacy 
might increase, encouraging them to engage with the polity in a deeper and more 
meaningful way. Further, as discussed by Lijphart (1997) and Lever (2010), mandatory 
turnout and the shift of parties’ focus away from encouraging or depressing mobilization 
towards winning over individuals’ votes can decrease the need for negative campaigning 
and attack ads, which are typically used in efforts to increase turnout. This would in turn 
promote a more honest and inclusive campaign, which could have positive impact for the 
country’s political system overall. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
One of the most commonly studied questions in political science is when and why 
people turn out to vote. This is because citizen participation remains a central component 
of the democratic process, determining who gets elected and influencing what policies 
are implemented by elected officials. Some countries deem voter turnout important 
enough to require it by law. This dissertation has focused on understanding how citizens 
and elites respond to the legal requirement to vote. From a citizens’ perspective, I 
investigated attitudinal consequences of compulsory voting laws, as well as political 
behavior beyond voting on election day. From an elite perspective, I propose and test 
expectations regarding campaign behavior when elites are faced with a mandatory 
requirement to vote. In doing so, I engage different sets of data and research designs.  
In chapter two, I developed a detailed theoretical framework that highlights 
whether compulsory voting increases citizens’ feelings of civic duty, or generates 
resentment amongst eligible voters. I also posited that compulsory voting could decrease 
the novelty attached to voting, increasing levels of indifference. I use a hierarchical 
modeling technique and survey data from the 2010 Latin American Public Opinion 
Project, which includes over 17,000 individuals in 18 different countries. Results show 
that voters living under CV are no more likely to report either increased feelings of civic 
duty or higher rates of resentment, compared to their counterparts under voluntary voting. 
Instead, individuals who are required to turn out by law are slightly more likely to feel 
indifferent towards electoral participation.  
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 Chapter three takes advantage of the recent abolition of compulsory voting in 
Chile in order to evaluate whether CV laws promote political engagement beyond 
election day. I construct a dataset using novel survey-data from Chile’s Centro de 
Estudios Publicos, by combining 11 waves of public opinion surveys conducted from 
2005 to 2016, totaling over 11,000 respondents over an 11 year period. I also investigate 
the impact of CV on six different elements of political engagement, related to information 
seeking, the discussion of politics, and political activism. This unique research design 
contributes directly to our understanding of how and when political engagement is 
affected by a legal requirement to vote. I show that under compulsory voting, individuals 
are significantly more likely to read and watch political news, and also to discuss politics 
with friends. This effect is stronger for those with lower levels of education.  
 Finally, in chapter four I investigate whether mandatory voting laws alter elite 
campaign behavior and encourage political parties to reach out to a wider set of the 
electorate. I conduct cross-national hierarchical analyses using data from the latest wave 
of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems—a comprehensive dataset of post-
election surveys of over 40,000 individuals in 27 different countries. I also combine party 
ideology data from the Manifesto Project to construct measures of party outreach for left 
and right-leaning political organizations. I find that levels of partisan outreach are similar 
under both systems, and that this is likely because parties under compulsory voting are 
more likely to change their outreach strategy form mobilization to persuasion. These data 
show that while compulsory voting, intuitively, should minimize mobilization efforts, 
levels of party outreach are actually similar to when voting is voluntary. Further evidence 
shows that this is likely because parties under CV are shifting their strategy from 
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mobilization to persuasion. At the same time that overall levels of party contact are 
similar, some interesting differences between compulsory and voluntary voting systems 
do emerge. When voting is voluntary, parties are significantly more likely to reach out to 
individuals with higher levels of education, while these differences are not apparent 
under compulsory voting. Outreach strategies do not seem to vary when taking into 
account party ideology, though this could be because party platforms may shift when 
voting is mandatory. 
 Taken together, these findings speak directly to the potential of compulsory 
voting to affect different aspects of the democratic process that extend beyond simply 
increasing voter turnout rates on election day. Compulsory voting does not necessarily 
alter citizens’ attitudes towards voting in a positive or negative way, but it does alter 
patterns of political behavior when it comes to engaging with politics. This indicates that 
increased political engagement under CV is not necessarily a product of psychological or 
attitudinal changes per se, but likely a more rational calculation of when to invest on 
obtaining additional political information given the institutional context. At the same 
time, we know that it’s not only citizens that respond to the institutional contexts—elites 
also take into account institutional design when making rational calculations on how to 
best achieve their goals. Given that campaign strategies can be different under 
compulsory voting, many more aspects of the political landscape (such as party 
ideological positions, and consequently, electoral gains) could be shaped by mandatory 
voting laws. The contributions this dissertation makes to our understanding of the 
impacts of compulsory voting laws also suggest several policy implications. 
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Policy Implications and Avenues for Future Research 
 The proposed theories and empirical evidence in this dissertation, first and 
foremost, offer interesting suggestions to practitioners in places where voting is 
voluntary. These implications speak to two different situations: occasions where adopting 
compulsory voting might be an appealing institutional innovation, and situations where a 
country might be considering abolishing compulsory voting. In the former case, a country 
with waning turnout rates should not necessarily be assumed to desire higher turnout. 
Voter ID laws and other efforts to suppress turnout in the United States are an example of 
a clear resistance against promoting electoral participation. Despite these concerns, 
research has shown that higher turnout in the United States may cause modest changes in 
electoral outcomes (Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; Highton and Wolfinger 2001), 
suggesting that higher turnout could increase legitimacy and bolster participation but not 
be as damaging to the Republican Party as it may seem. For countries that welcome a 
reform like this, however, higher turnout via CV laws may come with additional 
ramifications.  
These ramifications, in turn, could be viewed as either beneficial or detrimental. 
The fact that CV does not necessarily promote strong attitudinal effects amongst citizens 
could be a positive thing for those who fear the implementation of compulsory voting 
will lead to immediate attitudinal backlash. At the same time, it may be disappointing for 
some who believe instituting a legal requirement to vote will awaken feelings of civic 
duty amongst individuals. If anything, compulsory voting may slightly increase 
indifferent feelings towards voting, turning voting into a mundane task rather than 
extraordinary act.  
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 While we can observe patterns of average levels of specific attitudes in a given 
country with or without compulsory voting, it is less clear whether adopting compulsory 
voting at the present moment would lead to a stronger change in attitudes towards voting. 
This is because in the sample studied in Chapter 2, compulsory voting has been existent 
for a long period of time and, therefore, become an ingrained part of society. Most 
individuals taking the surveys, for example, lived under compulsory voting rules their 
whole lives. It would thus be interesting to investigate how voters might react if 
compulsory voting were implemented in countries with a long-standing culture of voting 
as a voluntary act. It could be that in today’s society, where democratic values of freedom 
and individual liberty are touted as essential, individuals would react more negatively to a 
legal requirement to vote. In the United States, for example, several Gallup surveys from 
1960 to 2004 have consistently shown that approximately 70 percent of Americans 
believe compulsory voting to be a “poor law” (Panagopoulos, 2004). If the Colombian 
government decides to adopt compulsory voting laws in the near future, as it has recently 
debated, a closer examination of citizen attitudes towards voting pre and post reform in a 
context of long-standing voluntary practice could be a prominent avenue for future 
research. In the meantime, experimental work that simulates a legal requirement to turn 
out via the imposition of penalties (i.e., Shineman, forthcoming) could also be helpful in 
predicting not only political behavior, but also attitudinal outcomes.  
It is perhaps harder to argue that having more individuals seeking out political 
information under compulsory voting could be a negative thing. If we believe that any 
information—however superficial it may be—can contribute to a more educated vote 
choice, then countries should welcome a more engaged citizenry. This finding provides 
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an answer to skeptical individuals who raise concerns about having a large pool of 
uninformed voters enter the electorate by implementing CV laws. I show that when 
voting is required, individuals (especially those with lower levels of education) tend to 
engage with political information at significantly higher rates. Given data limitations I am 
not able to show that this information will subsequently lead to higher rates of political 
knowledge or valid voting at the polls, but it does tells us that the likelihood individuals 
will blindly go to the polls when voting is mandatory is lower than what opponents of CV 
might argue. 
At the same time, this research shows that while CV does have an impact on 
engagement beyond the ballot box, the impact is not as widespread as some proponents 
of this institutional design might argue. Compulsory voting does not necessarily lead a 
more politically active society in terms of direct political action. As my results in Chapter 
3 demonstrate, compulsory voting does not promote discussion of politics among friends, 
or engaging in political activities such as working with parties or persuading others to 
think a certain way about politics. The effects of CV are primarily private and do not 
extend beyond the individual or the family. In this vein, the legal requirement to vote 
does not necessarily transform aggregate levels of political activity beyond turnout in a 
country, but can to a certain extent alter individual political engagement or even decisions 
at the ballot box.  
 Another important implication of this dissertation is that it also gives elites an 
idea of how they would be influenced if compulsory voting were to be implemented. 
Often, during debates on this institutional design, legislators will argue on many points 
regarding the influence it will have on voters, some of which were addressed in Chapters 
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2 and 3 (Senado 2012). But, it is also important for legislators to consider the effects CV 
may have on political campaigns and the political landscape. Evidence presented here 
suggests that, contrary to certain beliefs (Keaney and Rogers; Lijphart 1997), compulsory 
voting may not drive the costs of campaigns down. Former President Obama, for 
instance, was recently quoted saying “other countries have mandatory voting…it would 
be transformative if everybody voted—that would counteract money more than anything” 
(Somin 2015). If we focus solely on campaign spending on party outreach, that is likely 
not to be the case. Legislators will have to broaden their mobilization strategy to reach 
out to marginalized citizens, and will still invest in trying to persuade them for their 
votes. Given that party outreach is not the only aspect of campaign spending, however, 
future research should expand on our understanding of campaign investments once voting 
is compulsory.  
The data limitations in this study do not permit a further investigation into 
changing campaign platforms and ideology under compulsory voting. A productive way 
to move this literature forward would be to survey or interview political elites in CV 
countries and obtain feedback as to how their political strategies are shaped by this 
institutional design. A closer examination into subnational campaign spending patterns in 
Chile, for example, could also provide useful information into how the abolition of 
compulsory voting altered campaign behavior. Research could also investigate campaign 
speeches and platforms before and after reform to capture any particular changes in how 
politicians have chosen to appeal to voters when presented with different institutional 
contexts. 
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 While it is common to think about the evidence presented here and in related 
literature as a way to inform scholars and practioners on the benefits or consequences of 
adopting compulsory voting, it is also important to consider how this research can also 
inform those countries that have compulsory voting laws and may consider abandoning 
it. In fact, the abolition of compulsory voting has been more common than the adoption 
of it in the past 40-50 years. Chile, the most recent example of abandoning this 
institutional design, may have inspired other countries in the region to reconsider their 
election laws. Public opinion surveys conducted in Brazil, for example, have shown that 
compulsory voting is becoming increasingly unpopular amongst the population. 
Datafolha (2015), a public-opinion think thank in Brazil, shows that the percentage of 
people who are against the compulsory voting law has risen from 43 percent in 2008 to a 
high of 66 percent in 2015. Average rates of disapproval are highest amongst those with 
higher levels of education and income. This could be puzzling—perhaps indicating that 
even though those with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to suffer from the 
costs of turning out to vote under CV, they do not seem to resent the system as much. A 
deeper examination into the reasoning behind support or opposition to CV could also 
present an interest research agenda. 
 If a country like Brazil chooses to follow public opinion and abolish compulsory 
voting, however, they should be prepared to experience some of the patterns that are 
presented in this research. Overall rates of political engagement may decrease—
particularly among less educated individuals. Campaign strategies will shift, and likely be 
less inclusive, but won’t necessarily be less extensive, as we see that rates of outreach are 
similar under each system. A country like Brazil could also look to Chile’s experience in 
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considering election reform. Prior to abandoning CV in 2010, about 78 percent of Chile’s 
population opposed the legal requirement to vote while only 22 percent supported it, 
suggesting similar levels of disapproval of the current system in Brazil. But, levels of 
support for compulsory voting in Chile have recently risen up to almost 50 percent, 
suggesting Chilean citizens may be starting to regret the reform (CEP 2016). Carey and 
Horiuchi (2013) suggest that this buyer’s remorse may be even stronger for Progressive 
Chileans, as public opinion towards economic redistribution appears to have shifted after 
the large drop-offs in participation. Drawing from the findings in this research, it could 
also be due to lower levels of political engagement now that voting is voluntary, and a 
shift on partisan strategies that have minimized efforts to mobilize marginalized citizens. 
Because the reform in Chile is still recent, other trends may be observed in future years 
that could help inform countries considering abolition. The theories and evidence 
presented in this dissertation, however, provide broader empirical answers to some of the 
debates surrounding the maximization of voter turnout through a legal requirement to 
vote.   
Overall, this dissertations shows that the legal requirement to vote do not 
necessarily promote strong positive or negative feelings towards the democratic process, 
but does in fact increase levels of political engagement, and keeps political parties active 
and engaging with all types of voters. These findings help inform the debate on whether 
countries should adopt or abolish compulsory voting, by mitigating concerns on whether 
the adoption could have significant negative effects, and at the same time highlighting 
some of the beneficial aspects of CV that countries considering abolition may regret 
losing (e.g., lower rates of political engagement, more unequal party outreach).  
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Going forward, efforts to test some of the existing causal mechanisms that can’t 
be properly captured through observational research designs will aid in our understanding 
of how maximizing turnout via CV laws influences the political realm. Yet, this 
dissertation has directly contributed to our understanding of how political institutions can 
affect political behavior, and the importance of electoral participation for the democratic 
process—which Dahl (1989, 322) considers “the most reliable means for protecting and 
advancing the good and interests of all the persons subject to collective decisions.” 
Requiring that all citizens participate, then, may be a way to ensure that such interests get 
advanced.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Chapter 2 Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1. Spanish Translation of the Dependent Variable 
Language  Question Answer Options Source 
Spanish “¿Cuál de 
éstas frases 
esta más 
cerca de sus 
sentimientos 
cuando va a 
las urnas a 
votar? 
1=Tengo un sentimiento de 
satisfacción  
2=Lo hago sólo porque es mi 
deber  
3=Me siento molesto, es un 
desperdicio de tiempo  
4=No siento nada en particular  
5=No voto  
Latinobarometro 
2010 
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Table A2. Countries in the Sample by Voting System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Voting System Enforced? 
Colombia Voluntary - 
El Salvador Voluntary - 
Guatemala Voluntary - 
Nicaragua Voluntary - 
Venezuela Voluntary - 
Argentina Compulsory Enforced 
Bolivia Compulsory Unenforced 
Brazil Compulsory Enforced 
Chile Compulsory Enforced 
Costa Rica Compulsory Unenforced 
Dominican Republic Compulsory Unenforced 
Ecuador Compulsory Enforced 
Honduras Compulsory Unenforced 
Mexico Compulsory Unenforced 
Panama Compulsory Unenforced 
Paraguay Compulsory Unenforced 
Peru Compulsory Enforced 
Uruguay Compulsory Enforced 
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Table A3. Description of Control Variables 
 Variable 
Name 
Description & Coding Source 
Age “Age of the Respondent.” Latinobarometro 
2010 
Female “Sex of the Interviewee.”  
1=female; 0=male 
Latinobarometro 
2010 
Education “What level of education do you have? What was 
the last year you completed?” 
0 years= 1(none or illiterate); 1-11 years=2 (less 
than HS); 12 years=3 (completed HS); more than 
12  years=4 (some college or more) 
Latinobarometro 
2010 
Political 
Interest 
 
“How interested are you in politics?” 
4=very interested; 3=some interested; 2=few 
interested; 1=not at all interested 
Latinobarometro 
2010 
Satisfaction 
with 
Democracy 
“In general, would you say that you are very 
satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not 
at all satisfied with the working of the democracy 
in (country)?” 
1=not at all satisfied; 2=not very satisfied; 3=quite 
satisfied; 4=very satisfied 
Latinobarometro 
2010 
Voter “If elections were held this Sunday, which party 
would you vote for?” 
0= Wouldn’t Vote; 1=everything else 
Latinobarometro 
2010 
Income I use principle component factor analysis to 
generate quintiles of wealth based on household 
assets. See Cordova (2009) for detail. 
Latinobarometro 
2010 
Minority “Ethnic group (code by observation).” 
1=asian, black, indigenous, mestizo, mulato, or 
other race; 0=white 
Latinobarometro 
2010 
GDP per 
capita 
The Log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita for 2010 
World 
Development 
Indicators 2016 
Democracy 
Level 
Freedom House Civil Liberties and Political 
Rights Ratings (1-7). The variable was 
transformed in order to report states with higher 
scores in the FH Scale as more democratic, while 
lower scores reflect less democratic states 
Freedom House, 
2016 
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Table A4. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Min Max Mean S.D. N 
Age 16 96 40.1 16.49107 20,204 
Female 0 1 0.52 0.50 20,204 
Education 1 4 2.34 0.84 20,204 
Political Interest 1 4 1.93 0.94 19,946 
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 1 4 2.41 0.87 19,316 
Voter 0 1 0.78 0.41 19,420 
Income 1 5 2.96 1.39 20,204 
GDP per capita 7.31 9.5 8.64 0.67 20,204 
Democracy Level 3 7 5.33 1.12 20,204 
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Table A5. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards 
Voting (Abstention as the Baseline) 
 Civic Duty  Resentment  Indifference  Satisfaction 
Compulsory Voting  0.771  0.946  1.260*  0.680 
 (0.616)  (0.588)  (0.589)  (0.421) 
Age 0.037*  0.035*  0.025*  0.041* 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Female -0.004  0.041  -0.008  -0.011 
 (0.079)  (0.098)  (0.088)  (0.082) 
Education 0.254*  0.168*  0.149*  0.250* 
 (0.058)  (0.071)  (0.064)  (0.060) 
Political Interest 0.279*  0.227*  0.170*  0.691* 
 (0.051)  (0.062)  (0.056)  (0.052) 
Satisfaction with Democracy 0.121*  -0.195*  -0.024  0.317* 
 (0.047)  (0.060)  (0.053)  (0.049) 
Voter 1.684*  1.065*  1.297*  2.320* 
 (0.081)  (0.102)  (0.092)  (0.090) 
Income 0.062*  0.088*  0.073*  0.137* 
 (0.031)  (0.038)  (0.034)  (0.032) 
Minority 0.062  -0.147  0.122  0.087 
 (0.093)  (0.114)  (0.104)  (0.094) 
GDP per capita -0.096  -0.059  0.040  0.039 
 (0.365)  (0.349)  (0.349)  (0.249) 
Democracy Level -0.144  -0.025  -0.261  -0.213 
 (0.270)  (0.258)  (0.258)  (0.184) 
Constant -0.341  -1.978  -1.298  -3.911* 
 (2.789)  (2.668)  (2.668)  (1.904) 
Number of Observations 17,020       
Number of Countries 18       
Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of 
selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline response of Abstention. Coefficients 
are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A6. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards 
Voting (Resentment as the Baseline) 
 Civic Duty  Indifference  Satisfaction  Abstention 
Compulsory Voting  -0.175  0.314*  -0.266  -0.946 
 (0.114)  (0.127)  (0.202)  (0.588) 
Age 0.002  -0.010*  0.006*  -0.035* 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Female -0.045  -0.049  -0.052  -0.041 
 (0.068)  (0.079)  (0.072)  (0.098) 
Education 0.086  -0.019  0.082  -0.168* 
 (0.046)  (0.054)  (0.049)  (0.071) 
Political Interest 0.052  -0.056  0.465*  -0.227* 
 (0.040)  (0.047)  (0.041)  (0.062) 
Satisfaction with Democracy 0.316* 0.171*  0.512*  0.195* 
 (0.042)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.060) 
Voter 0.619* 0.232*  1.255*  -1.065* 
 (0.074)  (0.086)  (0.084)  (0.102) 
Income -0.026  -0.014  0.049  -0.088* 
 (0.026)  (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.038) 
Minority 0.209* 0.270*  0.234*  0.147 
 (0.079)  (0.092)  (0.083)  (0.114) 
GDP per capita -0.036  0.100  0.099  0.059 
 (0.071)  (0.078)  (0.121)  (0.349) 
Democracy Level -0.119* -0.236*  -0.188*  0.025 
 (0.051)  (0.056)  (0.089)  (0.258) 
Constant 1.637* 0.680  -1.933*  1.978 
 (0.564)  (0.622)  (0.942)  (2.668) 
Number of Observations 17,020       
Number of Countries 18       
Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of 
selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline response of Resentment. Coefficients 
are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A7. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards 
Voting (Satisfaction as the Baseline) 
 Civic Duty  Resentment  Indifference  Abstention 
Compulsory Voting  0.091  0.266  0.580*  -0.680 
 (0.211)  (0.202)  (0.193)  (0.421) 
Age -0.004*  -0.006*  -0.016*  -0.041* 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Female 0.008  0.052  0.004  0.011 
 (0.038)  (0.072)  (0.056)  (0.082) 
Education 0.004  -0.082  -0.101*  -0.250* 
 (0.025)  (0.049)  (0.038)  (0.060) 
Political Interest -0.413*  -0.465*  -0.521*  -0.691* 
 (0.020)  (0.041)  (0.032)  (0.052) 
Satisfaction with Democracy -0.196*  -0.512*  -0.341*  -0.317* 
 (0.022)  (0.044)  (0.034)  (0.049) 
Voter -0.635*  -1.255*  -1.023*  -2.320* 
 (0.056)  (0.084)  (0.071)  (0.090) 
Income -0.075*  -0.049^  -0.063*  -0.137* 
 (0.015)  (0.028)  (0.022)  (0.032) 
Minority -0.025  -0.234*  0.036  -0.087 
 (0.045)  (0.083)  (0.068)  (0.094) 
GDP per capita -0.135  -0.099  0.001  -0.039 
 (0.125)  (0.121)  (0.114)  (0.249) 
Democracy Level 0.069  0.188*  -0.048  0.213 
 (0.092)  (0.089)  (0.084)  (0.184) 
Constant 3.570*  1.933*  2.613*  3.911* 
 (0.965)  (0.942)  (0.890)  (1.904) 
Number of Observations 17,020       
Number of Countries 18       
Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of 
selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline response of Satisfaction. Coefficients are 
statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 Table A8. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards 
Voting (Dichotomous Outcomes) 
 Duty  Resentment  Indifference  Satisfaction Don’t Vote 
Compulsory Voting -0.037  0.178  0.560***  -0.137 -0.716 
 (0.193)  (0.178)  (0.162)  (0.232) (0.528) 
Age 0.003***  0.001  -0.011***  0.008*** -0.037*** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.003) 
Female 0.001  0.047  -0.003  -0.014 0.006 
 (0.031)  (0.067)  (0.050)  (0.036) (0.078) 
Education 0.036  -0.049  -0.078*  0.062* -0.299*** 
 (0.021)  (0.046)  (0.035)  (0.024) (0.059) 
Political Interest -0.205***  -0.151***  -0.220***  0.447*** -0.385*** 
 (0.017)  (0.039)  (0.029)  (0.019) (0.050) 
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 
-0.035  -0.327***  -0.165***  0.235*** -0.112* 
(0.019)  (0.041)  (0.030)  (0.022) (0.047) 
Voter 0.147***  -0.552***  -0.300***  0.888*** -1.724*** 
 (0.039)  (0.073)  (0.057)  (0.054) (0.080) 
Income -0.037**  0.009  -0.010  0.070*** -0.073* 
 (0.012)  (0.026)  (0.019)  (0.014) (0.030) 
Minority 0.038  -0.189*  0.055  0.011 -0.035 
 (0.040)  (0.081)  (0.064)  (0.046) (0.092) 
GDP per capita -0.117  -0.079  0.060  0.095 0.041 
 (0.115)  (0.112)  (0.098)  (0.137) (0.314) 
Democracy Level 0.055  0.159*  -0.110  -0.076 0.099 
 (0.085)  (0.081)  (0.072)  (0.101) (0.232) 
Constant 0.965  -1.531  -0.852  -4.153*** 0.685 
 (0.882)  (0.857)  (0.754)  (1.054) (2.405) 
# of Observations 17,020  17,020  17,020  17,020 17,020 
# of Countries 18  18  18  18 18 
Notes: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of selecting the 
dependent variable listed at the top. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Table A9. The Impact of Enforced Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes 
Towards Voting (Civic Duty as the Baseline) 
 Resentment  Indifference  Satisfaction  Abstain 
Unenforced CV 0.195  0.501***  -0.019  -0.613 
 (0.117)  (0.090)  (0.207)  (0.612) 
Enforced CV 0.131  0.463***  -0.274  -1.074 
 (0.127)  (0.098)  (0.240)  (0.719) 
Age -0.002  -0.012***  0.004***  -0.037*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Female 0.045  -0.004  -0.007  0.004 
 (0.068)  (0.052)  (0.038)  (0.079) 
Education -0.086  -0.105**  -0.003  -0.256*** 
 (0.046)  (0.035)  (0.025)  (0.058) 
Political Interest -0.052  -0.108***  0.412***  -0.280*** 
 (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.020)  (0.051) 
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 
-0.316***  -0.145***  0.196***  -0.122* 
(0.042)  (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.047) 
Voter -0.617***  -0.387***  0.638***  -1.687*** 
 (0.074)  (0.059)  (0.056)  (0.081) 
Income 0.025  0.011  0.075***  -0.061* 
 (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.031) 
Minority -0.214**  0.059  0.016  -0.055 
 (0.080)  (0.063)  (0.046)  (0.093) 
GDP per capita 0.053  0.145**  0.196  0.209 
 (0.075)  (0.054)  (0.127)  (0.376) 
Democracy Level 0.121*  -0.115**  -0.053  0.160 
 (0.051)  (0.038)  (0.088)  (0.262) 
Constant -1.782**  -1.042*  -4.140***  -0.675 
 (0.604)  (0.446)  (1.003)  (2.958) 
# of Observations 17,020       
# of Countries 18       
Notes: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the 
probability of selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline response of Civic 
Duty. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
  
Table A10. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards Voting, 
Conditional on Voting Behavior (Civic Duty as the Baseline) 
 Resentment  Indifference  Satisfaction  Abstain 
Compulsory Voting 0.091  0.133  0.007  -0.825* 
 (0.171)  (0.131)  (0.259)  (0.140) 
Voter -0.675*  -0.748*  0.725*  -1.795* 
 (0.170)  (0.126)  (0.117)  (0.139) 
Compulsory Voting*Voter 0.081  0.455*  -0.111  0.167 
 (0.188)  (0.142)  (0.133)  (0.168) 
Age -0.002  -0.012*  0.004*  -0.037* 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Female 0.046  -0.001  -0.011  0.020 
 (0.068)  (0.052)  (0.038)  (0.077) 
Education -0.088  -0.105*  0.031  -0.171* 
        
Political Interest -0.050  -0.107*  0.416*  -0.288* 
 (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.020)  (0.050) 
Satisfaction with Democracy -0.322*  -0.149*  0.184*  -0.137* 
 (0.042)  (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.046) 
Income 0.025  0.011  0.069*  -0.093* 
 (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.029) 
Minority -0.235*  0.042  -0.019  -0.350* 
 (0.078)  (0.061)  (0.047)  (0.085) 
GDP per capita 0.024  0.129*  0.116  0.032 
 (0.069)  (0.049)  (0.137)  (0.072) 
Democracy Level 0.127*  -0.110*  -0.074  0.201* 
 (0.049)  (0.036)  (0.101)  (0.052) 
Constant -1.489*  -0.637  -3.506*  0.968 
 (0.552)  (0.406)  (1.053)  (0.590) 
Number of Observations 17,020       
Number of Countries 18       
Notes: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of selecting the dependent 
variable over the baseline (Civic Duty). Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A11. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on Individual Attitudes Towards Voting, Conditional on Political 
Interest (Civic Duty as the Baseline) 
 Resentment  Indifference  Satisfaction  Abstain 
Compulsory Voting 0.142  0.254  -0.363  -0.821* 
 (0.208)  (0.155)  (0.247)  (0.205) 
Political Interest -0.051  -0.202*  0.321*  -0.328* 
 (0.091)  (0.069)  (0.039)  (0.090) 
Compulsory Voting*Political Interest 0.005  0.120  0.130*  0.054 
 (0.100)  (0.076)  (0.045)  (0.107) 
Age -0.002  -0.012*  0.004*  -0.037* 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Female 0.045  -0.004  -0.011  0.018 
 (0.068)  (0.052)  (0.038)  (0.077) 
Education -0.088  -0.105*  0.031  -0.172* 
 (0.047)  (0.035)  (0.025)  (0.053) 
Satisfaction with Democracy -0.322*  -0.149*  0.184*  -0.136* 
 (0.042)  (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.046) 
Voter -0.612*  -0.383*  0.643*  -1.676* 
 (0.074)  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.078) 
        
 (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.029) 
Minority -0.235*  0.041  -0.017  -0.350* 
 (0.078)  (0.061)  (0.047)  (0.085) 
GDP per capita 0.025  0.134*  0.122  0.037 
 (0.069)  (0.049)  (0.136)  (0.072) 
Democracy Level 0.126*  -0.114*  -0.077  0.198* 
 (0.049)  (0.036)  (0.100)  (0.052) 
Constant -1.537*  -0.761  -3.264*  0.945 
 (0.554)  (0.407)  (1.047)  (0.594) 
Number of Observations 17,020       
Number of Countries 18       
Notes: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on the probability of selecting one of the options listed 
above over the baseline (Civic Duty). Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A12. The Impact of Compulsory Voting on the Civic Duty to Vote 
      Civic Duty 
       to Vote 
 
Compulsory Voting  0.041  
 (0.191)  
Age 0.003**  
 (0.001)  
Female 0.103**  
 (0.036)  
Education 0.005  
 (0.025)  
Political Interest 0.054**  
 (0.020)  
Satisfaction with Democracy 0.098***  
 (0.022)  
Voter 0.341***  
 (0.043)  
Income 0.019  
 (0.014)  
Minority -0.001  
 (0.045)  
GDP per capita 0.155  
 (0.115)  
Democracy Level -0.158  
 (0.084)  
Constant -0.297  
 (0.878)  
Number of Observations 16,984  
Number of Countries 18  
Notes: Hierarchical Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant at 
*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001 *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure A1. Predicted Probability of Selecting “I Don’t Vote” by Voting System and 
Voting Behavior 
 
Notes: Figure A1 shows the predicted probability of selecting “I Don’t Vote,” 
conditioned by being a voter or not. Confidence intervals indicate statistical 
significant differences at the 95% confidence level. Estimates were calculated 
from results presented in Table A10 in Appendix A.
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Appendix B: Chapter 3 Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table B1. List of Surveys Available Pre and Post Election Reform 
Survey # Year Month # of Individuals 
Voting 
Compulsory? 
Survey 1 2005 June 1,501 Yes 
Survey 2 2007 November 1,492 Yes 
Survey 3 2008 November 1,492 Yes 
Survey 4 2009 October 1,495 Yes 
Survey 5 2010 June 1,488 Yes 
2011: Compulsory Voting Abolished 
Survey 6 2013 July 1,471 No 
Survey 7 2014 July 1,434 No 
Survey 8 2015 August 1,389 No 
Survey 9 2015 November 1,425 No 
Survey 10 2016 June 1,392 No 
Survey 11 2016 November 1,453 No 
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Table B2. Spanish Translations of Dependent Variables 
Language Primary Question Source 
Spanish 
“Para cada actividad que le nombraré 
indique si Ud. la realiza frecuentemente, a 
veces, o nunca.” 
CEP (Centro de 
Estudios Públicos) 
 
Variable Sub-Question Answer Options 
Watch 
Politics “Mira programas politicos en television” 
1=Nunca 
2=A Veces 
3=Frequentemente 
Read Politics “Lee noticias sobre politica” 
1=Nunca 
2=A Veces 
3=Frequentemente 
Talk Politics 
with Family “Conversa en familia sobre politica” 
1=Nunca 
2=A Veces 
3=Frequentemente 
Talk Politics 
with Friends “Conversa con Amigos sobre politica” 
1=Nunca 
2=A Veces 
3=Frequentemente 
Persuade “Trata de convencer a alguien de lo que Ud. 
Piensa politicamente” 
1=Nunca 
2=A Veces 
3=Frequentemente 
Work with 
Party 
“Trabaja o ha trabajado para un partido o 
candidato” 
1=Nunca 
2=A Veces 
3=Frequentemente 
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Table B3. Description of Control Variables 
Variable 
Name Description & Coding Source 
Female “Sex” 1=female; 0=male 
CEP (Centro de 
Estudios Publicos) 
Age “What is your age?” age of the respondent 
CEP (Centro de 
Estudios Publicos) 
Education 
“What is your educational level?” 
0=none; 1=primary incomplete; 2=primary 
complete; 3=middle incomplete; 4=middle 
complete; 5=high school incomplete; 6=high 
school complete; 7=university incomplete; 
8=university complete; 9=post-graduate 
CEP (Centro de 
Estudios Publicos) 
Income* 
 
“What is your monthly income” 
1=less than $35000; 2=35001-56000; 3=56001-
78000; 4=78001-101000; 5=101001-134000; 
6=134001-179000; 7=179001-224000; 8=224001-
291000; 9=29101-358000; 10=358001-448000; 
11=48001-1000000; 12=10000012000000; 
13=2000001-3000000;14=more than 3000000 
CEP (Centro de 
Estudios Publicos) 
Rural “Urban or Rural zone?” 1=rural; 0=urban 
CEP (Centro de 
Estudios Publicos) 
Presidential 
Election 
“Did a presidential election take place the year of 
the survey?” 
1=yes; 0=no 
Servicio Electoral de 
Chile (SERVEL) 
Municipal 
Election 
“Did a municipal election take place the year of 
the survey?” 
1=yes; 0=no 
Servicio Electoral de 
Chile (SERVEL) 
GDP 
growth 
GDO growth (annual %); lagged by one year 
 
World Development 
Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Note: *Income is measured in Chilean pesos. To compare, 1,000 Chilean Pesos equals 
approximately $1.51 US Dollars. A value of 1 in this measure would indicate a monthly 
income of approximately $52 dollars. 
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Table B4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable Min Max Mean S.D. N 
Female 0 1 0.59 0.49 16,176 
Age 18 98 47.50 18.00 16,168 
Education 0 9 3.70 2.22 15,929 
Income 1 14 6.49 3.23 11,211 
Rural 0 1 0.16 0.36 16,176 
Presidential Election 0 1 0.27 0.44 16,176 
Municipal Election 0 1 0.27 0.44 16,176 
GDP Growth -1.03 6.04 3.26 1.97 16,176 
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Table B5. The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Political Engagement, Conditional 
on Education 
 Read Politics Watch Politics 
Compulsory Voting 0.498*** 0.498*** 
 (0.092) (0.081) 
Education 0.346*** 0.246*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Compulsory Voting * Education -0.029 -0.025 
 (0.018) (0.017) 
Female -0.373*** -0.402*** 
 (0.041) (0.039) 
Age 0.005*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Income 0.056*** 0.034*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Rural -0.469*** -0.181*** 
 (0.059) (0.052) 
Presidential   Election 0.130 0.175* 
(0.084) (0.072) 
Municipal Election -0.038 -0.139* 
 (0.074) (0.063) 
GDP per capita 0.045** 0.037* 
 (0.017) (0.015) 
Constant 2.072*** 1.449*** 
 (0.120) (0.111) 
# of Observations 11,014 11,023 
# of Surveys 11 11 
Note: Hierarchical Ordered Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically 
significant at *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses
  
Table B6. The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Political Engagement, Controlling for Registration 
 Read 
Politics 
Watch 
Politics 
Talk Politics 
w/ Family 
Talk Politics 
w/ Friends 
Persuade 
Others 
Work w/ 
Party 
Compulsory Voting 0.469* 0.475* 0.224* 0.138* 0.045 0.142 
 (0.063) (0.054) (0.046) (0.067) (0.088) (0.128) 
Female -0.380* -0.408* 0.018 -0.512* -0.234* -0.168* 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.054) (0.074) 
Age 0.003* 0.008* -0.003* -0.006* -0.007* 0.010* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.329* 0.231* 0.269* 0.281* 0.110* 0.188* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) 
Income 0.053* 0.033* 0.042* 0.053* 0.014 0.027* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) 
Rural -0.480* -0.190* -0.195* -0.242* -0.275* -0.274* 
 (0.059) (0.052) (0.056) (0.060) (0.080) (0.117) 
Registered 0.364* 0.296* 0.367* 0.308* 0.067 0.405* 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.069) (0.071) (0.090) (0.141) 
Presidential   Election 0.129 0.173* 0.177* 0.262* 0.290* 0.083 
(0.085) (0.072) (0.059) (0.091) (0.119) (0.176) 
Municipal Election -0.033 -0.136* 0.080 0.173* 0.199 -0.057 
 (0.074) (0.063) (0.053) (0.079) (0.103) (0.153) 
GDP per capita 0.042* 0.035* 0.025* 0.029 0.012 0.035 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019) (0.025) (0.037) 
Constant 2.209* 1.563* 1.910* 1.786* 1.909* 4.262* 
 (0.120) (0.112) (0.112) (0.125) (0.159) (0.236) 
# of Observations 10,999 11,008 10,997 10,996 10,995 10,982 
# of Surveys 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Note: Hierarchical Ordered Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table B7. The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Political Engagement, Only Registered Voters 
 Read 
Politics 
Watch 
Politics 
Talk Politics 
w/ Family 
Talk Politics 
w/ Friends 
Persuade 
Others 
Work w/ 
Party 
Compulsory Voting 0.465* 0.474* 0.226* 0.155* 0.070 0.123 
 (0.066) (0.054) (0.045) (0.065) (0.088) (0.134) 
Female -0.386* -0.423* -0.004 -0.523* -0.242* -0.158* 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.045) (0.058) (0.077) 
Age 0.003* 0.009* -0.002 -0.006* -0.006* 0.010* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.339* 0.242* 0.284* 0.291* 0.118* 0.203* 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) 
Income 0.055* 0.035* 0.043* 0.057* 0.021* 0.023 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) 
Rural -0.438* -0.169* -0.151* -0.197* -0.198* -0.204 
 (0.062) (0.055) (0.059) (0.064) (0.084) (0.119) 
Presidential   Election 0.141 0.183* 0.186* 0.233* 0.260* 0.162 
(0.092) (0.076) (0.062) (0.091) (0.123) (0.187) 
Municipal Election -0.059 -0.155* 0.068 0.170* 0.171 -0.063 
 (0.079) (0.065) (0.053) (0.077) (0.104) (0.161) 
GDP per capita 0.040* 0.029 0.021 0.030 0.001 0.023 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.026) (0.040) 
Constant 1.932* 1.354* 1.622* 1.563* 1.954* 3.878* 
 (0.126) (0.115) (0.114) (0.126) (0.164) (0.233) 
# of Observations 9,673 9,681 9,675 9,673 9,671 9,659 
# of Surveys 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Note: Hierarchical Ordered Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table B8. The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Political Engagement, Age 40 or Above 
 Read 
Politics 
Watch 
Politics 
Talk Politics 
w/ Family 
Talk Politics 
w/ Friends 
Persuade 
Others 
Work w/ 
Party 
Compulsory Voting 0.460* 0.447* 0.188* 0.091 -0.027 -0.046 
 (0.067) (0.054) (0.054) (0.087) (0.106) (0.165) 
Female -0.391* -0.443* -0.014 -0.611* -0.325* -0.210* 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) (0.073) (0.093) 
Age 0.007* 0.010* -0.004 -0.006* 0.002 0.012* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Education 0.329* 0.237* 0.269* 0.278* 0.113* 0.203* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) 
Income 0.080* 0.047* 0.062* 0.073* 0.040** 0.039* 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) 
Rural -0.434* -0.175* -0.145* -0.178* -0.268* -0.170 
 (0.073) (0.063) (0.070) (0.076) (0.104) (0.138) 
Presidential   Election 0.206* 0.202* 0.174* 0.283* 0.368* 0.132 
(0.092) (0.073) (0.074) (0.123) (0.149) (0.228) 
Municipal Election -0.051 -0.149* 0.057 0.175 0.207 -0.132 
 (0.080) (0.064) (0.064) (0.104) (0.126) (0.196) 
GDP per capita 0.033 0.023 0.018 0.027 0.006 0.053 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.031) (0.049) 
Constant 2.323* 1.432* 1.605* 1.548* 2.509* 4.120* 
 (0.183) (0.167) (0.176) (0.199) (0.257) (0.343) 
# of Observations 6,972 6,978 6,978 6,973 6,972 6,965 
# of Surveys 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Note: Hierarchical Ordered Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix C: Chapter 4 Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table C1. List of Countries in the Sample 
Country Post-Election Survey Year 
Compulsory 
Voting 
Australia 2013 Yes 
Austria 2013 No 
Brazil 2014 Yes 
Bulgaria 2014 No 
Canada 2011 No 
Czech Republic 2013 No 
France 2012 No 
Germany 2013 No 
Greece 2012 Yes 
Iceland 2013 No 
Ireland 2011 No 
Israel 2013 No 
Japan 2013 No 
Mexico 2012 Yes 
Mexico 2015 Yes 
Montenegro 2012 No 
New Zealand 2011 No 
Norway 2013 No 
Poland 2011 No 
Portugal 2015 No 
Serbia 2012 No 
Slovenia 2011 No 
South Korea 2012 No 
Sweden 2014 No 
Switzerland 2011 No 
Taiwan* 2012 No 
Thailand 2011 Yes 
Turkey 2015 Yes 
United States 2012 No 
*Because important aggregate level data is missing 
for Taiwan, it is not included in the main empirical 
analyses 
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Table C2. Description of Control Variables 
 
Variable 
Name 
Description & Coding Source 
Education 
“Highest level of education of the 
respondent” 
1=none or less than primary; 2= primary or 
incomplete secondary; 3=secondary 
complete and some tertiary; 4=college or 
more 
CSES 
Female “Gender of the respondent” 1=female; 0=male CSES 
Age “Age of respondent in year” CSES 
Party 
Attachment 
“are you close to any political party?” 
1=yes; 0=no CSES 
Presidential 
Election 
“type of election prior to survey” 
1= presidential; 0=parliamentary CSES 
PR System 
“Does the country have a proportional 
representation system?” 
1=yes; 0=no 
Database of 
Political 
Institutions 
(DPI) 
Effective # 
of Parties 
Effective number of electoral parties 
(ENEP) 
 
CSES 
Democracy 
Level 
Freedom House Scores 
1=full autocracy; 7=full democracy Freedom House 
GDP per 
capita Log of GDP per capita during election year 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(World Bank) 
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Table C3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Min Max Mean S.D. N 
Education 1 4 2.92 0.80 49259 
Female 0 1 0.52 0.50 49670 
Age 16 103 49.00 17.48 49296 
Party Attachment 0 1 0.45 0.50 46126 
Presidential Election 0 1 0.22 0.42 49837 
PR System 0 1 0.54 0.50 49837 
Effective # of Parties 2.19 14.1 5.24 2.68 49837 
Democracy Level 4 7 6.53 0.81 49837 
Log of GDP per capita 8.54 11.53 10.26 0.833 49837 
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Table C4. The Influence of Compulsory Voting on Left-Leaning and Right-Leaning 
Party Outreach (excluding those contacted by both parties) 
 
(3) 
Left-Leaning Outreach 
(4) 
Right-Leaning Outreach 
Compulsory Voting -0.918 0.428 
 
(0.827) (0.577) 
Education 0.234*** 0.260*** 
 (0.033) (0.031) Female 0.015 -0.001 
 
(0.045) (0.042) 
Age 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) Party Attachment 0.618*** 0.407*** 
 
(0.049) (0.046) 
Ideology -0.080*** 0.113*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Presidential Election -0.379* -1.191*** 
 
(0.186) (0.173) 
PR System -1.419** -0.429 
 (0.543) (0.378) 
Effective # of Parties 0.130 0.093 
 
(0.100) (0.071) 
Democracy Level -0.876 -0.650 
 (0.637) (0.445) GDP per capita 0.341 1.091*** 
 (0.474) (0.331) Constant -0.714 -11.234*** 
 (3.453) (2.505) 
Num. Individuals 27,351 27,351 
Num. Countries 24 24 
Note: Hierarchical logit models. Coefficients are statistically significant at 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
  167 
Table C5. Compulsory Voting and Type of Party Outreach (Multinomial Models, 
Left Outreach as the Baseline) 
 
(3) 
No Outreach 
(4) 
Right-Leaning Outreach 
Compulsory Voting -6.916 -6.511 
 
(11.305) (10.590) 
Education -0.291*** 0.024 
 (0.030) (0.039) Female 0.005 -0.030 
 
(0.042) (0.053) 
Age -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) Party Attachment -0.711*** -0.159** 
 
(0.045) (0.058) 
Presidential Election -1.297 -2.911 
 
(2.052) (1.926) 
PR System -6.361 -6.537 
 (7.421) (6.972) 
Effective # of Parties -1.624 -1.381 
 
(1.330) (1.251) 
Democracy Level -12.957 -12.987 
 (8.782) (8.306) GDP per capita 5.179 5.732 
 (6.454) (6.057) Constant 57.810 47.376 
 (48.514) (45.604) 
Num. Individuals 37,420 37,420 
Num. Countries 24 24 
Notes: Estimated coefficients indicate the impact of each independent variable on 
the probability of selecting one of the options listed above over the baseline (Left-
Leaning Contacted). Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<.05; **p<.01; 
***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table C6. The Influence of Compulsory Voting on Left-Leaning and Right-Leaning 
Party Outreach, by Individual Ideology 
 
(3) 
Left-Leaning Outreach 
(4) 
Right-Leaning Outreach 
Compulsory Voting -1.055 0.651 
 
(0.836) (0.585) 
Ideology (Middle) -0.590*** 0.415*** 
 (0.070) (0.079) 
Ideology (Right) -0.657*** 0.853*** 
 (0.076) (0.080) 
CV*Ideology(Middle) 0.195 -0.200 
 (0.122) (0.126) 
CV*Ideology(Right) 0.209 -0.340** 
 (0.126) (0.129) 
Female 0.012 0.004 
 (0.045) (0.042) Age 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Party Attachment 0.569*** 0.410*** 
 (0.050) (0.047) Education 0.230*** 0.254*** 
 
(0.033) (0.031) 
Presidential Election -0.397* -1.160*** 
 
(0.187) (0.173) 
PR System -1.436** -0.430 
 (0.547) (0.378) 
Effective # of Parties 0.129 0.093 
 
(0.101) (0.071) 
Democracy Level -0.863 -0.660 
 (0.641) (0.445) GDP per capita 0.350 1.081** 
 (0.477) (0.331) Constant -0.780 -10.936*** 
 (3.476) (2.505) 
Num. Individuals 27,351 27,351 
Num. Countries 24 24 
Note: Hierarchical logit models. Coefficients are statistically significant at 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table C.7. The Influence of Party Contact on Voting, by Voting Law 
 (1) 
Voted 
Compulsory Voting 0.591 
 (0.516) 
Party Contact 0.561*** 
 (0.044) 
Compulsory Voting*Party Contact -0.051 
 (0.094) 
Education 0.457*** 
 (0.022) 
Female -0.038 
 (0.030) 
Age 0.019*** 
 (0.001) 
Party Attachment 1.117*** 
(0.036) 
Presidential Election 0.402** 
 (0.132) 
PR System 0.238 
 (0.315) 
Effective # Parties -0.027 
 (0.062) 
Democracy Level -0.687 
 (0.370) 
GDP per capita 0.660* 
 (0.294) 
Constant -3.257 
 (1.931) 
# of Observations 41,781 
# of Countries 27 
Note: Hierarchical Logit Models. Coefficients are 
statistically significant at *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001 *p<.05. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table C8. The Influence of Party Attachment on Party Contact, by Voting Law 
 (1) 
Party Contact 
Compulsory Voting -0.434 
 (0.600) 
Party Attachment (Somewhat Close) 0.193*** 
 (0.049) 
Party Attachment (Very Close) 0.580*** 
 (0.059) 
Compulsory Voting*Party Attachment 
(Somewhat Close) 
0.131 
(0.083) 
Compulsory Voting*Party Attachment 
                               (Very Close) 
-0.193* 
(0.096) 
Education 0.296*** 
 (0.021) 
Female -0.003 
 (0.030) 
Age 0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
Presidential Election -1.493*** 
 (0.147) 
PR System -1.347*** 
 (0.366) 
Effective # Parties 0.199** 
 (0.072) 
Democracy Level -0.651 
 (0.431) 
GDP per capita 0.621 
 (0.343) 
Constant -3.814 
 (2.243) 
# of Observations 24,103 
# of Countries 27 
Note: Hierarchical Logit Models. Coefficients are statistically significant 
at *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001 *p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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